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As you requested, I am writing to confirm that 
in August or September of this year I made an inquiry of 
inside counsel at First Colony Life Insurance Company 
(a wholly owned subsidiary of Ethyl Corporation)---~ 
determine if it had any interest in the case of ~tropolitan 
Life Insurance Company, et als. v. ward, involving an 
Alabama tax on out of state insurance-business. 
I was assured that because of its unique insurance 
products and its unusual way of doing business through 
general agents, First Colony had no interest whatsoever in 
the case and would not be affected by its outcome in any 
significant way. 
Please let me know if you think I should seek to 
obtain any additional information about First Colony's 
position. 
16/274 
Best regards to you and Jo, as always. 
SC\:e~ 
~:c. Cart:- Jr. 
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As you requested, I am writing to confirm that 
in August or September of this year I made an inquiry of 
inside counsel at First Colony Life Insurance Company 
(a wholly owned subsidiary of Ethyl Corporation) to 
determine if it had any interest in the case of Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company, et als. v. Ward, involving an 
Alabama tax on out of state 1nsurance business. 
I was assured that because of its unique insurance 
products and its unusual way of doing business through 
general agents, First Colony had no interest whatsoever in 
the case and would not be affected by its outcome in any 
significant way. 
Please let me know if you think I should seek to 
obtain any additional information about First Colony's 
position. 
16/274 
Best regards to you and Jo, as always. 
S~e~ 
~:c. Cart:- Jr. 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
~nvrtmt Qtltud ttf tltt 'Jtttittb ~fattg 
'llaslrittghtn. ~. Qt. 2llgtJ!.;l ~I 
December 6, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1274-Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward 
Dear Lewis: 





cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF' 
..JUSTICE BYRON R . WHITE 
.i'nprtmt <q,utri o-f tlrt ~tb ,jta:tt$ 
Jfa;gJrbtghtn. ~. <!J. 2ll~~~ 
December 6, 1984 
83-1274 -
Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward 
Dear Lewis, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely yours, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
lgs December 7, 1984 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: The Conclusion to Our Opinion in Metropolitan Life 
The conclusion to our opinion now reads as follows: 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute violate the E Protection Clause as ap lied 
to appellants. T e judgment of t e Alabama Supreme 
ourt 1s reversed, and the case is remanded for fur 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. 
We might add some limiting language such as the following to the 
first sentence: fo'v ~~~At .... , 
5 
t,~ 
~e conclude~hat the Alabama domestic prefere~c~:~c';sus~a~x~;~;~ .... ~~~r­
~atute, as m asured by the two purposes found by the 
<!;ircuit ~urt to be legitimate, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause as applied to appellants.~------------
da t::.- ~1-L. ,.IIJI~,:;ai!!!lijj-.jtil' rc:c:"Tf ~ ~ 
f/k;,./ ~ 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
.h}trttttt Qfltltrl ltf tqt J{ttittb ~htttg 
._Mltittgbm. ~. Qf. 211~~~ 
December 11, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1274, Metropolitan Life Ins. Life Co. v . Ward 
Dear Lewis: 
I have one problem with the opinion now circulating. 
You hold that the two purposes asserted here do not le-
gitimate the Alabama tax. ~ agre~ But, for me, it does not 
follow, as is asserted on page t2 of the second draft, that as 
applied to appellants the tax therefore violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. One or more of the other 15 asserted pur-
poses may save it. Do you not agree? 
Of course, the briefs here addressed the 17 asserted 
purposes and there is enough in the record for this Court to 
rule on them, even though the courts below adjudicated only 
two. In light of their rulings, with which we disagree, this 
for them was all that was necessary . I am willing to leave it 
to you whether to remand or to pass upon the other reasons. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
cc : The Conference 
December 11, 1984 
83-1274 Metropolit~n Life v. ward 
Dear Harry: 
Thank you for your letter. of December 11. I think you 
have a good point, and t will be glad to make the remand in 
this case more specific. 
What would you t~ink of changing the last paragraPh to 
read as follows: 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic 
preference tax statute, as measured by the 
two purposes found to be legitimate by th~ 
Circuit Court for Montgomery ~ounty, see 
supra, at 3, violates the Equal Protection 
Clause as applied to appellants. The judg-
ment of the 'labama Supreme Court accordingly 
is reversed, and the case is remanded for 
further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
I then would add a footnote similar to n. 5 that '"'as in my 
first circulated draft to state that some fifteen additional 
purposes w~re advanced by the state. As none of these was 
addressed by the courts belm-1 we express no opinion with 
respect to any of them. 
Justice Blackmun 






-.J USTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
.hvr.tntt <qourt ~ tit~~~ .jtattg 
'Jrulfington. ~. QI. 2ll.;i'l~ 
December 12, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1274, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward 
Dear Lewis: 
Your suggested change in the last paragraph, plus the 
addition of a footnote similar to the old n. 5, alleviates my 
concern, and I join your opinion. 
I might be a little happier if the last paragraph would 
read as follows: ~~~sue 
"We conclude that neither of the two purposes ~ 
fur the red by the preference tax statute .(addressed by 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra1at t-· 
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause. 
The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly 
.-· is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." 






~mtt <4.ourt of tlrt ~tb' ~­
•a•ftinghnt. J. <; 2.0bi~~ 
D£C.l 2 1984 
Dear Justice Powell: 
Re: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. W. G. Ward 
No. 83-1274 
Attached is a draft syllabus for your opinion in the 
above case which I shall appreciate your returning to me 
together with any suggestions that you care to make. If 
the lineup of the Court is not included in the draft 
syllabus but is now available, please send it to me. 
This draft syllabus is based on the opinion whose 
draft number appears in the upper right-hand corner. 
Please send me two copies of any subsequent draft of your 
opinion necessitating changes in the syllabus so that 
appropriate revisions can be made and resubmitted to you 
before the syl~abus and opinion are issued. 
When I receive the syllabus back from you, I shall 
have the Publications Unit prepare a printed version, and 
I shall then send you a proof copy. 
Attachment 




Henry C. Lind 
Reporter of Decisions 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO. et al. v. WARD et al. 
appeal from the supreme court of alabama 
No. 83-1274. Argued October 31, 1984--Decided 
DRAfT ~YllAbUS 
(Baud on uraft 
No. .. « \he 
~} 
An Alabama statute imposes a substantially lower gross premiums 
tax rate on domestic insurance companies than on out-of-state 
(foreign) insurance companies. The statute permits foreign 
companies to reduce but not to eliminate the differential by 
investing in Alabama assets and securities. Appellant foreign 
insurance companies filed claims for refunds of taxes paid, 
contending that the statute, as applied to them, violated the 
Equal Protection Clause. The State Commissioner of Insurance 
denied the claims. On consolidated appeals to a county Ciicuit 
Court, in which several domestic companies intervened, the 
statute was upheld in a summary judgment. The court ruled that 
the statute did not violate the Equal Protection Clause 
because, in addition to raising revenue, it served the 
legitimate state purposes of encouraging the formation of new 
insurance companies in Alabama and capital investment by 
foreign insurance companies in Alabama assets and securities, 
and that the distinction between foreign and domestic companies 
was rationally related to those purposes. The Alabama Court of 
Civil Appeals affirmed the finding as to legitimate state 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the issue 
of rational relationship. On certiorari to the Alabama Supreme 
j 
2 SYLLABUS 
Court, appellants waived their rights to such an evidentiary 
hearing, and the court entered judgment for the State and the 
intervenors on appellants' equal protection challenge to the 
statute. 
Held: The Alabama domestic preference tax statute violates the 
Equal Protection Clause as applied to appellants. Pp. 4-12. 
(a) Under the circumstances of this case, promotion of 
domestic business by discriminating against nonresidents is not 
a legitimate state purpose. Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization of California, 451 U.S. 648, 
distinguished. Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost to 
foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose constitutes the very sort of parochial 
discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to 
prevent. A State may not constitutionally favor its own 
residents by taxing foreign corporations at a highter rate 
sol~ because of their residence. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce 
Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit the 
applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. Equal protection 
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the 
discrimination is similar to the type of burden with which the 
Commerce Clause also would be concerned. Pp. 6-12. 
. . 
SYLLABUS 3 
{b) Nor is the encourgement of the investment in Alabama 
assets and securites a legitimate state purpose. Domestic 
insurers remain entitled to the more favorable tax rate 
regardless of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, 
since the investment incentive provision does not enable 
foreign insurers to eliminate the statute's discriminatory 
effect, it does not cure but reaffirms the impermissable 
classification based solely on residence. Pp. 12. 
So. 2d __ , reversed and remanded. 
CHAMBERS OF 
.JUSTICE HARRY A . BLACKMUN 
;hpr~utt ~ourl ~ tfr~ ~ .jfahg 
-aslfington. ~. ~· 2ll.;i'l~ 
December 12, 1984 
Re: No. 83-1274, Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward 
Dear Lewis: 
Your suggested change in the last paragraph, plus the 
addition of a footnote similar to the old n. 5, alleviates my 
concern, and I join your opinion. 
I might be a little happier if the last paragraph would 
read as follows: 
"We conclude that neither of the two purposes 
furthered by the preference tax statute addressed by 
the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra at 
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause. 
The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly 
is reversed, and the case is remanded for further 
proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion." 




cc: The Conference 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
~u.pumt ~ourl of t4t~h ~bdts 
~as4ittghtn. ~. <!f. 2llpJt.~ 
PERSONAL 
Re: No. 83-1274 - Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. 
W. G. Ward, Jr. 
Dear Lewis, 
I have been "struggling" with this and I may wind 
up joining the judgment. I'll wait on the dissent, but 
I doubt it will persuade me to affirm. 
Justice Powell 
Regards, 
s~ L ~ -CL ~ 
~ 
December 29, 1984 
PERSON AI, 
83-1274 Metropolitan Life v. Warrl 
Dear Chief: 
Your personal note of December 2A indicating that 
you are "struggling" with this case concerns me. 
Following the November arguments, one of the caqeq 
vou assigned me was 83-240 LawrPnce Countv v. Lead-Deadwood 
School District. Because Byron han writt~n a dissent from 
denial of cert, you reassigned Lawrence Countv to nyron and 
said you would give me another case to write. 
This turned out to be A3-1271 l\lfetropolitan r~ifP. v. 
Ward. But at that time there were only three votes to re-
verse, i.nclufling my own. At Conference vou ha<'l voted tenta-
tively to affirm, and Ryron had "passed". T talked to Byron 
and he conclud~rl - after further consideration - that he 
wouln ioin me in a reversal. 
I then talked to you, a~ T waP still o~~ votP 
short. In response, vou wrote on November 14 (1Ptter en-
closed), statinq that you ha~ chanqPd vnur vote to "reverqe 
on equal protect ion qrounns." Indeed, vour vote ~,.;ras neces-
sary to enable vou to make the assiqnment. 
I have wrttt0n the cas~ orecisPly as it was arqued 
on behalf of ~1etropo1.itan r.ife, and consistent Ni.th our 
equal protection cases in this area. ThP McCarr~n Act ap-
plies only to Comm~rce Claus~ casf'o;. A.1so, mv opinion r~­
mands the case for cnnsi~eration on qrounds Al1eqed by thP 
state but not ~ecined. Ree Part IV, n. 12, and n. 10. 
In short, I need your vote for a Court. 
I therefore hooe, aftet further consideration, vou 
will stay with me and not merely join the judgment. After 
all, as the saying goes: "You qot me into this case". 
Sincerely, 





~ :) ~ E-//J A-"..J.·~~~ 
~&:z.t. ~~ ~  ....._~ 
1
. . 1\ , 1(1- . Pre 1m1nary Memo 
~ / a~ ctr ~_j _;} 
April ).--3 ,.-----1984 Conference ~. ~- ---~ 
List/ 3, Sheet 1 /1.-&.,..C_:P,......,._. ~ 
No. 83-1274 j-u...,n • .H..t. ......... ~,...-~.~~ 
METROPOLITAN LIFE ~~ Appeal ~S~.~C?t·. ~~~~~~~~ 
INSURANCE CO., eta~ Ala (0 ae 
LV r-~ ~1;....,-
v. ! k ,) -~ 
WARD, et al. ~ ~Civia:'~ 1 ~imely 
C3:)£:-~~ 
1 ~ k w~.<-io~ IA.4.~~~ ..... -.tc. 
1. suMMARYa ,Zher Ala, _;vio !ate~ th~ ~qual Protection 
1-ttA - ~ ~...,. « -'..4A r4..t - II .... 
Clause by faxi~g Ala. insurance companies at a lower rate t1rari'~
out-of-stat~ insurance companies. ~~ ~ ~~ 
2. FACTS AND DECISION BELOW: ~.~ 
~reign life insurance companies pay a gross premium  ' 
percent. Foreign companies selling other forms of insurance, 
f) r~.r'~f Q property and casualty insurance, pay 4 percent. _ n_o_m_es_t_i_c_ 
-2-
insurance companies pay a rate of only 1 percent on all forms of --insurance premiums. The statute provides that foreign companies 
may reduce the amount of their taxes by investing pre.scr ibed 
) 
percentages of their total worldwide assets in specified 
investments in the state of Ala. However, foreign life insurance --companies can never gay a gross premium tax rate of less than 2 -
percent, and other foreign insurance companies can never pay a 
tax rate of less than 3 percent. 
Following this Court's decision in~tern & Southern Life 
Insurance Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 u.s. 648 
(1981) , in which the Court held that domestic preference taxes on 
foreign insurance companies can be challenged on equai protection 
I 
grounds,~pellants sought refunds of more than $32 million in 
taxes paid to Ala. for tax years 1977 through 1980. The 
Commissioner of Insurance denied all these claims. 
Appellants then filed the present suit in Ala. state court, 
seeking a judgment declaring the domestic preference tax statute 
unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make 
appropriate refunds. The TC granted summary judgment in favor of 
the st~te, ruling that the statute was constitutional. On 
• 
appeal, the ~urt of Civil Appeals affirmed. 
The court observed that in Western & Southern, the Supreme 
Court held that taxes that discriminate against foreign insurance 
companies are invalid only if they fail to satisfy the rational 
basis test of the Equal Protection Clause. The court noted that 
the TC had found that the Ala. tax had at least two legitimate 
purposes in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging th e 
------------------
-3-
formation of new insurance companies in Ala., and (2) encouraging ? 
capital investment by foreign insurance companies in Ala. assets 
and governmental securities. The court ruled that both of these 
\ 
were legitimate state interests, but held that the TC erred in 
denying the foreign insurers the opportunity to fully present 
their evidence as to the rational relationship between the 
foreign/domestic classification and these legitimate state 
purposes. It therefore remanded the case for an evidentiary 
hearing on that issue. 
--seeklng review by the Ala. s. Ct., appellants waived any 
right to an evidentiary hearing or trial with respect to the 
issue whether the legislature could have reasonably believed that 
the classification would promote any legitimate state interest. 
The Ala. S. Ct., noting this stipulation, granted review and in 
an order entered final judgment in favor of the state, stating 
"that the foreign insurers' equal protection challenge to the 
Ala. premium tax statutes should be denied." 
3. CONTENTIONS: Appts contend that prior to this Court's 
decision in Western & Southern, it had long been held that a 
state tpx imposed on foreign corporations for the privilege of 
doing business in the state was not subject to review under the 
Equal Protection Clause because such a tax was merely a condition 
on the foreign corporation's right to enter the state. Lincoln 
Nat'l Life Insurance Co. v. Reed, 325 u.s. 673 (1945). However, 
those states which attempted to impose a greater tax on foreign 
corporations without calling it a privilege tax had their taxes 
struck down on equal protection grounds. Hanover Fire Insurance 
-4-
Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s. 494 (1926); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 u.s. 562 (1949); Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. 
Bowers, 380 u.s. 258 (1965); WHYY v. Borough of Glassborough, 393 
I 
u.s. 117 (1968). When the Supreme Court overruled Lincoln Nat'l 
in Western & Southern, the rules articulated in Hanover and the 
other cases became the governing law. The statute at issue in 
this case does not meet the standard outlined in those cases. 
~ ~ First, the state's interest in persuading insurance 
\ ~mpanies to incorporate or locate in Ala. is not sufficient to 
uphold the tax because this obvious purpose could have been 
ascribed to each of the domestic preference tax laws this Court 
invalidated in the prior cases. If such a purpose were 
legitimate, these cases would all necessarily have been decided 
the other way. Indeed, in Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. Bowers, 
380 u.s. 258 (1965), this Court reversed an Ohio court decision 
upholding a personal property tax on foreign but not domestic ' 
insurance companies even though the state in its brief asserted 
that the legislature might have enacted the discriminatory tax in 
order to encourage insurance companies to locate in Ohio. 
pecond, Ala.'s interest in encouraging capital investment 
by foreign companies in Ala. assets cannot be used to justify the 
discriminatory tax because the so-called "investment incentive" 
provision never permits a foreign company to eliminate the 
discriminatory differential entirely. Even if a foreign company 
invests all of its assets in Ala., it still pays a substantially 
higher gross premium tax than a domestic competitor doing the 
same type and volume of business. Appts contend that the Court 
' ·~ ' 
.. . 
-5-
should review this issue because over 20 states have similar 
discriminatory tax preferences and a number of state courts have 
held state domestic preference tax laws unconstitutional on equal 
\ 
protection grounds. 
Appees, American Educators Life, et. al, a group of domestic 
/ 
insurance companies who intervened in the proceeding below, 
contend that there is no reason for this Court to review the 
present case since the lower courts merely applied the standards 
articulated in Western & Southern to the facts of this case. 
Moreover, the result reached by the lower courts is clearly 
correct. Encouraging insurance companies to incorporate and 
carry on their business in Ala. is clearly a legitimate state 
purpose. In Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 u.s. 558 
(1959), this Court held that Ohio could grant a tax preference to 
foreign corporations in order to encourage them to locate in the 
state. In the Commerce Clause context, the Court has 
consistently held that encouraging the formation of domestic 
industries is a legitimate state interest. Parker v. Brown, 317 
u.s. 341 (1943); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 u.s. 137 (1970). 
Similar1ly, Ala.'s interest in encouraging capital investment in 
• 
Ala. investments is also a legitimate state interest. In Western 
& Southern, this Court recognized "the legitimacy of state 
efforts to maintain the profit level of a domestic industry." 
451 u.s., at 671. 
It was clearly reasonable for the Ala. legislature to 
conclude that a tax scheme that required domestic insurers to pay 
lower premium taxes would encourage the formation of new 
-6-
insurance companies in Ala. Likewise, it was reasonable for the 
legislature to conclude that a statute which reduced a taxpayer's 
taxes if he invests in Ala. investments would encoura.ge capital 
' 
investment in Ala. assets. The domestic insurers also submit a 
list of 12 other possible legitimate state interests that could 
support the tax. 
Appee the Commissioner of Insurance echoes most of the 
arguments advanced by the domestic insurers. He also contends 
that since appts waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on 
the reasonableness issue, the only issue before the Court is 
whether either of the two purposes identified by the lower courts 
is a legitimate state purpose. Both clearly are. Appts' 
reliance on Reserve Life Insurance is misplaced since that case 
was a summary decision with little or no precedential value. In 
any event, the controlling law is now Western & Southern, the law 
applied by the lower courts. 
In addition, the Commissioner asserts, without citing any 
authority to support the proposition, that appts' waiver of their 
right to an evidentiary hearing deprives this Court of 





In Western & Southern, the Court reviewed 
its prior decisions in this area and held that tax statutes 
discriminating against foreign insurance companies are valid if --
the discrimination is rationally related to a legitimate state 
interes~ (such statutes are not subject to Commerce Clause 




Southern, the Court upheld a Calif. tax that provided for hi~her 
tax rates on foreign insurance companies whose state of 





Calif. had a legitimate interest in promoting the 
-----------~-----~----~~------~----~------'----------------~~~_,-industry by deterring barriers to interstate business" 
I 
451 u.s. , 671, and that Calif. could reasonably conclude that its 
tax would advance that goal because other states would respond by 
J keeping their taxes lower. Ala.'s desire to encourage insurance 
companies to locate in the state seems to be as legitimate an 
interest as that asserted in Western & Southern, and providing a 
tax advantage to companies that locate ih the state is certainly 
a rational way of accomplishing that goal. In their reply brief, 
appts attempt to distinguish this case from Western & Southern by 
asserting that while a state can encourage the growth of the · 
domestic industry by promoting the elimination of barriers to 
interstate businesses, it cannot do so by erecting barriers to 
such businesses. That is really a Commerce Clause argument which 
has no place in this case because of the McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
Appts correctly note that almost any discriminatory tax 
against foreign insurance companies can be sustained on that 
I . . 
bas1s and that two post-Western & Southern state cases have 
struck down discriminatory taxes on equal protection grounds. 
Missouri Pacific Railroad v. Kirkpatrick, 652 S.W.2d 128 ('Mo. 
1983) ~ Gilbert Associates v. Commonwealth, 447 A.2d 944 (Penn. 
1982). However, the courts in those cases did not address the 
arguments accepted by the courts in this case. Appts are also 
correct that the Court struck down a domestic preference statute 
7 
-o-
in Reserve Life even though the state in its brief stated that 
the legislature might have enacted the tax in order to encourage 
foreign insurance companies to locate in the state. However, 
~ 
there was no opinion in that case so it is hard to tell on what 
basis the statute was struck down. Thus, while the Court may 
want to note the case in order to offer the lower courts some · 
guidance on what can be a permissible state interest (the 
Commissioner's jurisdictional argument is meritless), the Ala. 
courts' application of the rational basis test seems entirely 
proper to me. 
I recommend DFWSFQ. 
There are two responses and a reply. 
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. ~ .................. . 
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~Whether Alabama's domestic preference ta1 statute ,"" 
which taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates equal protection. 




, . .. 
I. Background 
A. Statutory Background 
Alabama, along with many other~es, - grants a 
preference to domestic insurance companies by imposing a sub-...__ 
stantially lower gross premiums tax rate on Alabama insurance 
companies than on out-of-state (foreign) companies. Under 
the present Alabama scheme, foreign life insurance companies 
'3 Pf,tO 
pay a gross premiums tax of three percent. Foreign companies 
4- "7 ,10 
selling other forms of insurance pay four percent. Ala. Code 
§27-4-4 (a) (1975). Domestic companies, by contrast, pay a 
IIJ,..o 
rate of only one percent on all forms of insurance premiums. 
Id. §27-4-5 (a) • As a result, a foreign company doing the · 
same type and volume of business in Alabama as a domestic 
company will generally pay three to four times as much in 
gross premiums taxes as its domestic competitor. 
~ The Alabama tax scheme does allow foreign companies 
'}1AP1 ' to reduce the discriminatory differential by investing pre-
companies can never pay a gross premiums tax rate of less 
than two percent and other foreign -
-._; 
insurance companies can 
never pay a tax rate of less than three percent. By con-
trast, domestic companies are automatically entitled to a tax 
rate of one percent, even if they have virtually no invest-
'--
ments in the state. In other words, the investment provision 
permits foreign companies to reduce--but never eliminate--the 
discrimination inherent in the domestic preference scheme. 
B. Factual Background 
In early 1981, appellants, a group of foreign insur-
ance companies, filed claims with the Alabama Dept. of Insur-
ance contending that the preference tax was unconstitutional 
as applied to them. They sought refunds of domestic prefer-
ence taxes paid to Alabama for tax years 1977 through 1980. 
On July 8, 1981, the Commissioner of Insurance denied all 
their claims. 
In August 1981, appellants appealed to the state Tc. · 
After intervention by numerous domestic insurance companies, 
the TC consolidated the appeals and selected two claims as 
lead cases to be treated as binding on all claimants. On 
rc.. 
summary judgment, it held the tax scheme constitutional. Ap-
plying the equal protection standard articulated by this~ 
Court inVWestern & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State Board ~fr~ 
of Equalization, 451 u.s. 648, 668 (1981), the TC found that ~ 
/J 
the domestic preference tax statute had legitimate state pur-
\\ 
poses and that distinguishing between foreign and domestic 
'--- ----~·· ~ v\ 
companies was 1! ationall related to those purposes. The TC 
identified the asserted legitimate state purposes as being,~ 
"in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the forma-
tion of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encourag-
:! 
ing capital investment by foreign insurance companies in the 
Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth in the 
statute." J.S. App. 20a-2la. It also held that "the Alabama 
legislature could have reasonably believed that the statute's 
classification would promote the foregoing purposes." J. s. 
App. 2la. 
The foreign companies appealed. On April 27, 1983, 
/ 
the state appellate court affirmed on the legitimate state 
purpose issue, but remanded the case for an evidentiary hear-
ing on the rational relationship issue because it believed 
-.:- \ 
summary judgment was inappropriate. Appellants then peti-
tioned the Ala. s.ct. for cert on the legitimate state pur-
pose ~ue and appellees petitioned for review of the remand 
order. In their pleadings, appellants waived their right to 
~ -----------------------an evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue. -- ~On Sept. 23, 1983, the Ala. s.ct. denied all the cert petns, 
thus leaving it unclear on the record whether its order was 
intended to be a final judgment or to leave the lower court's 
remand order standing. Subsequently, to avoid an unnecessary 
evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue, ap-
pellants again waived their right to a hearing and sought 
rehearing in the Ala. s.ct. in order to obtain a final judg-
ment they could immediately appeal. The Ala. S.Ct. granted 
the motion for rehearing and entered final judgment against 
them. This Court then noted probable jurisdiction. 
II. Discussion 
In Western & Southern Life Insurance Co. v. State 
Board of Equalization, 451 u.s. 648 (1981), this Court aban-
doned its long-held "privilege tax" doctrine which had immu-
nized some state taxes on foreign companies against equal 
protection objections. The Court stated 
"whatever the extent of a State's authority to ex-
clude foreign corporations from doing business 
within its boundaries, tqat authority does not j us-
tify imposition of more onerous t axes or other bur- ~ 
den'S on ~Tgn corporations t:l'la'rlthose imposed on 11 ~ 
domest~ corporations, ~s the discrimination .~~ 1~ ,, 
bet and domest1c corpo-ra. tions p ears_ a ~
rational relation to a legitimate state purpose."  ~ 
Id -: , a f" GoB. --- - - ~~
Since appellants waived their right to an evidentiary hearing 
on the rational relationship issue, the 2 n1y ques_!J on pre- · 
sented to this Court is whether a 1i egi timate stat~ purp'6'se ~· 
justifies Ala.'s domestic tax preference. 9 
1 
_ The only recent s.ct. case discussing this 
' l~ /•~ \/western & Southern itself. It concerned whether the 
i s 4...-r;:;r;; 
~~ 
of ~ 
~ '"' California could impose a "retaliatory" tax on 
~ insurers. Under its tax scheme, Cal. taxed 
at a higher rate if the insurer's state of incorporation im-
posed higher taxes on Cal. insurers doing business in that 
State than Cal. would otherwise impose on that State's insur-
ers doing business in Cal. The pur_pose of such laws, the {J~ 
' 
Court held, "is to promote the interstate business of domes- J/V"' 
from enacting dis-tJ? 
"(I] t is clear," the ~~ 
tic insurers by deterring other States 
criminatory or excessive taxes." Ibid. 
. ' ··· rt·~:~."' 1., . ' 
r 
~·- · 
Court found, "that the purpose~: to gener~e::: at 
the expense of out-of-state insurers, but to apply pressure 
on other States to maintain low taxes on C ifornia 
insurers." Id., at 669-670. And there was no question as to 
th~gi~cy of that purpose: 
------
"There can be no doubt that g romotion of do-
mestic industr by de"'Eei r ' b rr · r Interstate 
bus1 ness---rs a egitimate state purpose. This Court 
has recognize e egi Imacy of state efforts to 
maintain the profit level of a domestic industry, 
Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341, 363-367 (1943), and 
of efforts to 'protect and enhance the reputation' 
of a domestic industry so that it might g0mpete 
more effectively in the interstate market, ~ike v. 
Bruce Church, Inc., 397 u.s. 137, 143 (1970). Cal-
ifornia's effort on behalf of its domestic insur-
ance industry is no less legitimate." Id., at 671. 
The only question for the present case is what the legitimate ,__ -=-. 
state purpose in Western & Southern was. If it was mere 
"promotion of domestic industry," the state purposes support-
ing the Ala. tax preference are legitimate. A~ s unabashed ~  '$' 
ai~is ~romote the domestic insurance industry and ~n-J ~ 
courage capital investment within the State. If, on the oth-
er hand, the legitimate state purpose was "promotion • • . Qy_ 
I . 
deterring barr1ers to interstate business," the Ala. purposes 
/ 
may well be illegitimate. 
Basing the Western & Southern holding on either of 
these purposes creates problems. On the one hand, the cita-
tions to Parker v. Brown and Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. sug-
gest that simply promoting business is a legitimate state 
purpose. In these two cases, the Court found that the 
state's interest in promotion was legitimate and strong 
enough to justify the burdens placed on interstate commerce. 
And, in general, though domestic promotion may be a parochial 
interest, can it fairly be called an illegitimate one? 
On the other hand, allowing mere promotion to justi-
lfy ~is~rimin~~gn businesses means that such discrimination will nearly always be justified. To justify 
any domestic preference, a State would have only to say that 
it wanted to benefit its own businesses--even if it planned 
to benefit them only by harming outsiders. Recognizing mere 
promotion as a legitimate purpose, then, would turn equal 
protection analysis into a semantic game. A discriminatory 
scheme would stand or fall according to how one styled its 
purpose: to benefit one group or to harm the others. This is -a distinction without a difference, which this Court has re-
- --'---
jected in analogous Commerce Clause analysis. Bacchus Im- · - · ~- ·---- ---------........._,___~ 
ports, Ltd. v. Dias, 104 S.Ct. 3049, 3057 (1984). Further-
more, if one truly believes that "a classification, though 
discriminatory, is not arbitrary or violative of the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any state of 
facts reasonably can be conceived that would sustain it," 
Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 u.s. 522, 528 (1959) 
(emphasis added) (citations omitted), the game is rigged from 
the beginning. Since a court can always conceive of promo-
tion as a purpose for discriminating against outsiders, the 
State wins whether it actually raises promotion as a defense 
or not. Does the Court really intend such cynical standards? 
None of this Court's other cases help much in decid-..,____ __ _ 
ing whether promotion of a State's businesses or encourage-
l .. '· ·. 1.,_ ,· 
.. . • 
""-
ment of investment within the State is legitimate for equal 
-"'" ....,__ 
pr~ _ _:urposes. Appe~veral old tax cases 
in which this Court ~n10k Elewn;t various state preference 
statutes on equal protection grounds. ~' Wheeling Steel 
Corp. v. Glander, 337 u.s. 562 (1949); Concordia Fire Insur-
ance Co. v. Illinois, 292 u.s. 535 (1934); Hanover Fire In-
surance Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s. 494 (1926); Southern Railway 
v. Greene, 216 u.s. 400 (1910). Each, however, is consistent 
with either possible interpretation of Western & Southern. 
~
The fact that the Court st.Eu-e k= sown the taxes at all, of 
A 
course, suggests that a purpose merely to benefit a State's 
own businesses is not legitimate. Otherwise, since this pur-
pose is always obviously present, the tax schemes should have 
withstood scrutiny. On the other hand, in each of these 
cases, the State does not appear to have explicitly brought 
forward promotion as a defense for its domestic preference. 
Thus, these cases could be read as saying only that if the 
State wants to invoke the obvious it has to say so. 
The a~~veral cases in which they claim 
this Court has held that promotion of domestic industries and 
similar aims are legitimate state purposes. ~' Bacchus 
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra; Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 
u.s. 137 (1970); Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 u.s. 
522 (1959); Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943); Carmichael 
v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 u.s. 495 (1937); Board of 
Education v. Illinois, 203 u.s. 553 (1906). The difficulty 
with some of these cases is that they analyze the legitimacy 
, .. 
• 
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III. Summary 
The only question presented by this case is whether 
promotion of a State's own businesses and encouragement of 
investment within the State are legitimate purposes for a 
~~~ '--
State ~ di'scriminat~gainst foreign corporations. The 
...-1 
ca~e~aw does not give a clear answer. Upholding these pur-
poses, however, would make this kind of equal protection 
analysis a game. A state could always invoke promotion as a 
reason i~ support of discrimination against the businesses of 
others. 
directly 
I would hold that any purpose to benefit only by J 
discriminating against others is not legitimate • 
........ __________ ------------..-----------
The other stated purpose simply does not justify the dis-
crimination here even if the purpose itself can be legitimate 
under some circumstances. 
Recommendation 
I would reverse the judgment below and remand for 
consideration of the legitimacy of the other purposes that 
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November 13, 1984 
83-1274 -
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Ward 
Dear Chief, 
I first voted tentatively to affirm in 
the above case, but after the discuss ion, I 
passed. I now think it would be more 
consistent with prior cases to reverse. That 
is my vote. 
Sincerely yours, 
The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
CHAMI!IERS Of< 
THE CHIEF .JUSTICE 
ilu.prtmt <lfonri of tJrt~~ .itatts-
Jfas-ftinghtn. ~. <If. 21l~J!.~ 
November 14, 1984 v 
Re: 83-1274 - Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
At Conference this case was "up in the air." All agreed 
it was a close case, and I voted to affirm but said I could 
"join 4 or 5" to reverse to get the issue settled. Byron passed 
but later voted to reverse. Harry changed f~ affirm to 
reverse. Lewis voted to reverse, tentatively; but since has 
become firm. 
After further contemplation and study, my vote is to reverse 
and, hence, I assigned the case to Lewis who was "reverse" on 
equal protection grounds. 
Regards, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE SANDRA DAY O'CONNOR 
Jnvrttttt <qonrt .ttf tqt 'Jifuittb Jtalt.&' 
'Jlht~ft'ittgt.tttt, ~. <q. 2llbf~~ 
November 30, 1984 
No. 83-1274 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Ward 
Dear Lewis, 
I shall be circulating a dissent in this 
case as soon as I can get around to it. 
Sincerely, 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
;inpum~ <!fltttrl o-f tlr~ 'Jlinittb' ;imt~g 
.. ag4Utgto-u. ~. <If. 2llgt'!~ 
November 30, 1984 
Re: 83-1274 - Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Company v. ward 
Dear Lewis: 












From: Justice O'Connor 
Recirculated:--------
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1274 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
ET AL., APPELLANTS v. W. G. WARD, JR., 
ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
[February -, 1985] 
JUSTICE O'CONNOR, dissenting. 
This case presents a simple question: Is it legitimate for a 
state to use its taxing power to promote a domestic insurance 
industry and to encourage capital investment within its bor-
ders? In a holding that can only be characterized as aston-
ishing, the Court determines that these purposes are illegiti-
mate. This holding is unsupported by precedent and subtly 
distorts the constitutional balance, threatening the freedom 
of both State and Federal legislative bodies to fashion appro-
priate classifications in ecQ.DQIDi~. Because I dis-
agree with both the Co~-of analysis and its conclu-
sion, I respectfully dissent. 
Alabama's legislature has chosen to impose a higher tax on 
out-of-state insurance companies and insurance companies in-
corporated in Alabama that do not maintain their principal ] 
place of business or invest assets within the State. Ala. \ 
Code §§ 27-4-4 et seq. This tax seeks to promote both a 
domestic insurance industry and capital investment in Ala-
bama. App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. Metropolitan 
Life Insurance Company, joined by many other out-of-state 
insurers, alleges that this discrimination violates its rights 
under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, which provides that a State shall not "deny to any per-
son within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
83-1274-DISSENT 
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Appellants rely on the Equal Protection Clause because, as 
corporations, they are not "citizens" protected by the privi-
leges and immunities clauses of the Constitution. Hemphill 
v. Orloff, 277 U. S. 537, 548-550 (1928). Similarly, they can-
not claim Commerce Clause protection because Congress in 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 59 Stat. 33, 15 U. S. C. § 1011 
et seq., explicitly suspended Commerce Clause restraints on 
state taxation of insurance and placed insurance regulation 
finnly within the purview of the several States. Western & 
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 
u. s. 648, 655 (1981). 
Our precedents impose a heavy burden on those who chal-
i- • .. .. lenge local economic ~tion solely on Equal Protection 
~l ...-...~ Clause ground:: 5 In tlttSTontext, our long-established juris-
,,~~* prudence requires us to defer to a legislature's judgment if . n ~ 
1 
the classification is rationally related to a legitimate state ~ J
~ • _.- • " purpose. Yet the Court evades this careful framework for A.. ,.,a A~ V<> 
._,..,., analysis, melding the proper two-step inquiry regarding the \ "f---V o.i~,_ · 
n.zt 1 • ~ 1 State's purpose and the classification's relationship to that ~-~ 
purpose into a single unarticulated judgment. This tactic ~ ' 
enables the Court to characterize obviously legitimate State . 
goals as improper solely because it disagrees with the c~nced- ~ 5 -#..R Fs.f.;¢"' 
edly rational means of differential taxation selected by the 
legislature. This unorthodox approach leads to further 
error. The Court gives only the most cursory attention to 
the factual and legal bases supporting the State's purposes 
and ignores both precedent and significant evidence in the 
record establishing their legitimacy. Most troubling, the 
~ · Court discovers in the Equal Protection Clause an implied 
' ~ CJCI.,._ prohibition against classifications whose purpose is to give 
d& k the "home team" an advantage over interstate competitors. 
C.I~I'Cttt'-'4\.• Ante, at 8. 
44 A- •...... f- The Court overlooks the unequivocal language of our prior · · ..,~w decisions. "Unless a classification trammels fundamental 
•• ...., personal rights or is drawn upon inherently suspect distinc-
tions such as race, religion, or alienage, our decisions pre-
";'r -vfa· ~ ~-~., ;1::.. .odc.c.. 
.w,-. ~ ...a.R::tc:. tiLl-~ ... "k. J-J...Lf 
'1-c.l..--. o( ~ 
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sume the constitutionality of the statutory discriminations 
and require only that the classification challenged be ration-
ally related to a legitimate state interest." New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303 (1976). See, e. g. Lehnhausen v. 
Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U. S. 356 (1973). Judicial 
deference is strongest where a tax classification is alleged to 
infringe the right to equal protection. "[l]n taxation, even 
more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest 
freedom of classification." Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U. S. 
83, 88 (1940). "Where the public interest is served one busi-
ness may be left untaxed and another taxed, in order to pro-
mote the one or to restrict or suppress the other." Carmi-
chael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 512 (1937) 
(citations omitted). As the Court emphatically noted in 
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers: 
"[l]t has repeatedly been held and appears to be en-
. ~ ~ ~ tirely settled that a statute which encourages the loca-
~ ,~ ,..cJ4~ ~ ~ tion within the State of needed and useful industries by 
~ (>·~.,...(...!>If~ v.---~ e3empting them, though not also others, from its taxes 
~ -\-c ~ ·...., oJ.o - is not arbitrary and does not violate the Equal Protec-
~. ~ ~~ tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Similarly, 
b~ ~ f("c it has long been settled that a classification, though dis-
(..4'f"f<1"o:l'~  · criminatory, is not arbitrary or violative of the Equal 
~~ Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if any 
state of facts reasonably can be conceived that would 
sustain it." 358 U. S. 522, 528 (1959) (citations 
omitted). 
. ( 
See also Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 451 U. S., at 674; Minnesota v. Clover Leaf 
Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981). 
Appellants waived their right to an evidentiary hearing 
and conceded that Alabama's classification was rationally re-
lated to its purposes of encouraging the formation of domestic 
insurance companies and bringing needed services and capi-
tal to the State. Thus the only issue in dispute is the legiti-
83-1274--DISSENT 
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macy of these purposes. Yet it is obviously legitimate for a 
State to seek to promote local business and attract' capital 
investment, and surely those purposes animate a wide range 
of legislation in all 50 States. 
The ~ority evades the obvious by refusing to acknowl-
edge the factual background bearing on the legitimacy of the 
State's purpose or to address the many collateral public bene-
fits advanced by Alabama. Instead, the Court dismisses the 
State's arguments stating merely that they were not "ad-
dressed by the courts below." Ante, at 12, n. 10. In point 
of fact, the full range of purposes documented before this 
Court was also argued and documented before the Alabama 
Supreme Court. See Record, Vols. VI, VII, VIII. That 
court found "at least two purposes, in addition to raising rev-
enue: (1) encouraging the formation of new insurance compa-
nies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging capital investment by 
foreign insurance companies in the Alabama assets and gov-
ernmental securities set forth in the statute." App. to Juris. 
Statement 20a-21a (emphasis added). Moreover, it is set-
tled law that the appellee may assert any argument in sup-
port of the judgment in his favor, regardless of whether it 
was relied upon by the court below. Dandridge v. Wil-
liams, 397 U. S. 471, 475, n. 6 (1970). The Court's failure 
actually to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect 
its tax, see ante, at 12, n. 10, is all the more baffling, since 
appellants took the exceptional step of conceding the factual 
issues to assure a speedy resolution of numerous pending 
lawsuits disruptive of industry stability. See Brief of Amici 
Curiae Alaska, et al. 1-2. Our precedents do not condone 
such a miserly approach to review of statutes adjusting eco-
nomic burdens. See, e. g. Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, 358 U.S., at 528-529; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 
U. S. 420, 425 (1961); United States v. Carolene Products, 
304 U. S. 144, 152-153 (1938); Borden's Co. v. Baldwin, 293 
U. S. 194, 209 (1934). The Court has consistently reviewed 
83-1274-DISSENT 
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the validity of such statutes based on whatever "may reason-
ably have been the purpose and policy of the State Legisla-
ture, in adopting the proviso." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, supra, at 528-529. It is to that inquiry that I now 
turn. 
Alabama claims that its insurance tax, in addition to rais-
ing revenue and promoting investment, promotes the forma-
tion of new domestic insurance companies and enables them 
to compete with the many large multistate insurers that cur-
rently occupy some 75% to 85% of the Alabama insurance 
market. App. 80. Economic studies submitted by the 
State document differences between the two classes of insur-
ers that are directly relevant to the well-being of Alabama's 
citizens. See id. 46-130. Foreign insurers typically concen-
trate on affluent, high volume, urban markets and offer stan-
dardized national policies. In contrast, domestic insurers 
such as intervenors American Educators Life Insurance 
Company and Booker T. Washington Life Insurance Com-
pany are more likely to serve Alabama's rural areas, and to 
write low-cost industrial and burial policies not offered by the 
larger national companies. 1 Additionally, Alabama argues 
persuasively that it can more readily regulate domestic insur-
ers and more effectively safeguard their solvency than that of 
insurers domiciled and having their principal places of busi-
ness in other states. 
Ignoring these policy considerations, the Court insists that 
Alabama seeks only to benefit local business, a purpose the 
Court labels invidious. Yet if the classification chosen by 
the State can be shown actually to promote the public wei-
1 "Industrial insurance" is the trade tenn for a low face-value policy typi-
cally sold door-to-door and maintained through home collection of monthly 
or weekly premiums. Alabama currently has more industrial insurance in 
force than any other State. Burial insurance is another fonn of insurance 
popular in rural Alabama that is offered exclusively by local insurers. By 
contrast, Metropolitan Life, like many multistate insurers, has discontin-
ued writing even whole-life policies with face values below $15,000. App. 
173-176. 
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fare, this is strong evidence of a legitimate State purpose. 
See Note, Taxing Out-of-State Corporations After Western & 
Southern: An Equal Protection Analysis, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 
877, 896 (1982). In this regard, Justice Frankfurter wisely 
observed that: 
"[T]he great divide in the [equal protection] decisions lies 
in the difference between emphasizing the actualities or 
the abstractions of legislation. . . . To recognize marked 
differences that exist in fact is living law; to disregard 
practical differences and concentrate on some abstract 
identities is lifeless logic." Morey v. Doud, 354 U. S. 
457, 472 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). 
A thoughtful look at the "actualities of [this] legislation" com-
pels the conclusion that the State's goals are legitimate by 
any test. 
II 
Insurance is a uniquely local concern. We have often pru-
dently conceded that "Justices of this Court lack both the 
expertise and the familiarity with local problems . . . neces-
sary to the making of wise decisions with respect to the rais-
ing . . . of public revenues" and the formulation of tax policy 
in areas traditionally relegated to state or local control. San 
Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U. S. 1, 41 (1973). 
The policy of favoring local concerns in State regulation and 
taxation of insurance, which the majority condemns as illegit-
imate, is not merely a recent invention of the States. The 
States initiated regulation of the business of insurance as 
early as 1851. See Issues and Needed Improvements in 
State Regulation of Taxation, GAO Report B-192813, p.5 
(Oct. 9, 1979) ("GAO Report"). In 1944, however, this 
Court overruled a long line of cases holding that the business 
of insurance was an intrastate activity beyond the scope of 
the Commerce Clause. United States v. South-Eastern Un-
derwriters Association, 322 U. S. 533 (1944). "The deci-
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sion provoked widespread concern that the States would no 
longer be able to engage in taxation and effective regulation 
of the insurance industry. Congress moved quickly, enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act within a year of the decision 
in South-Eastern Underwriters." St. Paul Fire & Marine 
Insurance Co. v. Barry, 438 U. S. 531, 539 (1978). See 
H. R. Rep. No. 143, 79th Cong., 1st Sess., 2 (1945); 91 Cong. 
Rec. 8479-8480 (Jan. 25, 1945) (remarks of Sen. Ferguson); 
id., at 8487 (remarks of Sen. Ellender). The drafters of the 
Act were sensitive to the same concerns Alabama now vainly 
seeks to bring to this Court's attention: the greater respon-
siveness of local insurance companies to local conditions, the 
different insurance needs of rural and industrial states, the 
special advantages and constraints of state-by-state regula-
tion, and the importance of insurance license fees and taxes 
as a major source of State revenues. See, e. g., Hearings on 
S132 Before Senate Subcomm. on the Judiciary, 78th Cong., 
1st Sess., 3, 10, 16-17 (letter of Gov. Sharpe of S. Dakota 
stressing role of domestic insurers that provide "poor man" 
and rural policies adapted to farming concerns); 90 Cong. 
Rec. H6564 (June 22, 1944) (remarks of Rep. Vorys). "As 
this Court observed shortly afterward, '[o]bviously Congress' 
purpose was broadly to give support to the existing and 
future state systems for regulating and taxing the business of 
insurance.' Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin, 328 
U. S. 408, 429 (1946)." St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance 
Co. v. Barry, supra, at 539. 
The majority opinion correctly notes that Congress did not 
intend the McCarran-Ferguson Act to give the States any 
power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than 
they already possessed. But the legislative history cited by 
the majority, ante, at 10, n. 7, relates not to differential tax-
ation but to decisions of this Court that had invalidated State 
taxes on contracts of insurance entered into outside the 
State's jurisdiction. See H. R. Rep. No. 143, 9th Cong., 1st 
Sess., 3 (1945). The Court fails to mention that at time the 
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Act was under consideration the taxing schemes of Alabama, 
Arizona, Arkansas, Illinois, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Mich-
igan, Mississippi, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, South Dakota, 
Tennessee, Texas, Washington, and Wisconsin all incorpo-
rated tax differentials favoring domestic insurers. See App. 
377-379. 
Any doubt that Congress' intent encompassed taxes that 
discriminate in favor of local insurers was dispelled in 
Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benjamin. Cf. Note, Congres-
sional Consent to Discriminatory State Legislation, 45 
Colum. L. Rev. 927 (1945) (discussing the issues of constitu-
tional power posed by the Act). There a foreign insurer 
challenged a tax on annual gross premiums imposed on for-
eign but not domestic insurers as a condition for renewal of 
its license to do business. Congress, the foreign insurer 
argued, was powerless to sanction the tax at issue because 
''the commerce clause 'by its own force' forbids discrimina-
tory state taxation." Prudential Insurance Co. v. Benja-
min, 328 U. S., at 426. A unanimous Court rejected the ar-
gument that exacting a 3% gross premium tax from foreign 
insurers was invalid as "somehow technically of an inherently 
discriminatory character." Id., at 432. The Court con-
cluded that the McCarran-Ferguson Act's effect was "clearly 
to sustain the exaction and that this can be done without 
violating any constitutional provision." Id., at 427 (empha-
sis added). Benjamin expressly noted that nothing in the 
Equal Protection Clause forbade the State to enact a law 
such as the tax at issue. I d., at 508, 511. In this regard the 
Court relied in part on Hanover Fire Insurance Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S. 494 (1926), a decision that explicitly recog-
nized that differential taxation of revenues of foreign cor-
porations may not be arbitrary or without reasonable basis. 
See Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of 
Equalization, 451 U. S., at 664, n. 17. The Commerce 
Clause, Benjamin emphasized, is not a "one way street" but 
encompasses congressional power ''to discriminate against 
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interstate commerce and in favor oflocal trade," ... "subject 
only to the restrictions placed on its authority by other con-
stitutional provisions." 328 U. S., at 434. Where the States 
and Congress have acted in concert to effect a policy favoring 
local concerns, their action must be upheld unless it unequiv-
ocally exceeds "some explicit and compelling limitation 
imposed by a constitutional provision or provisions designed 
and intended to outlaw the action taken entirely from our 
constitutional framework." I d., at 435-436. 
Our more recent decision in Western & Southern in no way 
undermines the force of the analysis in Benjamin. Western 
& Southern confirms that differential premium taxes are not 
immune from review as ''privilege" taxes, but it also teaches 
that the Constitution requires only that discrimination be-
tween domestic and foreign corporations bear a rational rela-
tionship to a legitimate state purpose. Benjamin clearly 
recognized that differentially taxing foreign insurers to pro-
mote a local insurance industry was a legitimate State pur-
pose completely consonant with Congress' purpose in the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act. 
The contemporary realities of insurance regulation and 
taxation continue to justify a uniquely local perspective. In-
surance regulation and taxation must serve local social poli-
cies including assuring the solvency and reliability of com-
panies doing business in the State and providing special pro-
tection for those who might be denied insurance in a free 
market, such as the urban poor, small businesses and family 
farms. GAO Report 10-13; State Insurance Regulation, 
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Antitrust, Monopoly and 
Business Rights of the Sen. Judiciary Comm., 96th Cong., 
1st Sess., 19-21 (1979) (hereinafter Insurance Regulation). 
Currently at least 28 of the 50 states employ a combination of 
investment incentives and differential premium taxes favor-
ing domestic insurers to encourage local investment of policy-
holders' premiums and to partially shelter smaller domestic 
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insurers from competition with the large multistate compa-
nies. App. 66. 
State insurance commissions vary widely in manpower and 
~ expertise." GAO Report 14. In practice, the State of incorpo-
ration exercises primary oversight of the solvency of its 
insurers. GAO Report 36-38. See generally Dunne, Risk, 
Reality, and Reason in Financial Services Deregulation: A 
State Legislative Perspective, 2 J . Ins. Reg. 342 (1984) (pre-
pared by the Conference of Insurance Legislators). See, 
e. g., Ala. Code §27-2-21; Ill. Rev. Stat,ch. 73 §§745; (power Q C. 
to examine books of domestic insurers); Ala. Code § 27-32-1 
et seq.; Ill. Rev. Stat. §§ 799, 800 (commissioner's authority to 
assume control to prevent insolvency); see generally Wise. 
Stat. Anno. Ch. 620, Prefatory Committee Comment-1971, 
536, 546 (noting lesser control over nondomestic's financial 
operations). Even the State-of-incorporation's efforts to 
regulate a multistate insurer may be seriously hampered by 
the difficulty of gaining access to records and assets in forty-
nine other States. Dunne, supra, at 356. ]bus the security ~ 
of Alabama's citizens who purchase insurance from out-of-
state companies may depend in part on the diligence of 
another State's insurance commissioner, over whom Alabama 
has no authority and limited influence. In the event of finan-
cial failure of a foreign insurer the State may have difficulty 
levying on out-of-state assets. See, e. g., Phoenix Insur-
ance Co. v. McMaster, 237 U. S. 63, 73 (1915). Since each 
State maintains its own insurance guarantee fund, the 
domestic insurers of the States where a multistate insurer is 
admitted to do business may ultimately be forced to absorb 
local policyholders' losses. I d., at 372-372. 
Many have sharply criticized this piecemeal system, see, 
e. g., GAO Report i-iii; Schmalz, The Insurance Exemption: 
Can it be Modified Successfully, 48 ABA Antitrust L. J. 579 
(1979), but Congress has resisted suggestions that it modify 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act to permit greater federal inter-
vention. See GAO Report 1; Insurance Regulation, supra. 
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This Court cannot ignore the exigencies of contemporary 
insurance regulation outlined above simply because it might 
prefer uniform federal regulation. Given the distinctions in 
ease of regulation and services rendered by foreign and 
domestic insurers, we cannot dismiss as illegitimate the 
State's goal of promoting a healthy local insurance industry 
sensitive to regional differences and composed of companies 
that agree to subordinate themselves to the Alabama Com-
missioner's control and to maintain a principal place of busi-
ness within Alabama's borders. Though economists might 
dispute the efficacy of Alabama's tax, "[p]arties challenging 
legislation under the Equal Protection Clause cannot prevail 
so long as 'it is evident from all the considerations presented 
to [the legislature], and those of which we may take judicial 
notice, that the question is at least debatable.'" Western & 
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 
U. S., at 64, quoting United States v. Carolene Products 
Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938). Moreover, appellants waived 
their right to challenge the tax measure's effectiveness. 
III 
Despite abundant evidence of a legitimate state purpose, 
the majority condemns Alabama's tax as ''purely and com-
pletely discriminatory'' and "the very sort of parochial dis-
crimination that the Equal Protection Clause was intended to 
prevent." Ante, at 7. Apparently, the majority views any 
favoritism of domestic commercial entities as inherently sus-
pect. The majority ignores a long line of our decisions. In 
the past this Court has not hesitated to apply the rational 
basis test to regulatory classifications that distinguish 
between domestic and out-of-state corporations or burden 
foreign interests to protect local concerns. The Court has 
always recognized that there are certain legitimate restric-
tions or policies in which, "[b]y definition, discrimination 
against nonresidents would inhere." Arlington County 
Board v. Richards, 434 U.S. 5, 7 (per curiam) (1977). For 
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example, where state of incorporation or principal place of 
business affect the State's ability to regulate or exercise its 
jurisdiction, a State may validly discriminate between for-
eign and domestic entities. See G .D. Searle v. Cohn, 455 
U. S. 404 (1982) (difficulty of obtaining jurisdiction over non-
resident corporation provides a rational basis for excepting 
such corporations from statute of limitations); Metropolitan 
Casualty Insurance Co. v. Brownell, 294 U. S. 580 (1935) 
(domicile of insurer relevant to statute of limitations as for-
eign insurers offices and funds generally located outside 
state); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 553, 562 
(1906) (State's greater control over domestic than foreign 
nonprofit corporations justifies discriminatory tax). 
There is no doubt that a State may provide subsidies or re-
bates to domestic but not to foreign enterprises if it rationally 
believes that the former contribute to the State's welfare in 
ways that the latter do not. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap 
Corp., 426 U. S. 794, 810-814 (1976). A State may use its 
taxing power to entice useful foreign industry, see Allied 
Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S., at 528, or to make 
residence within its boundaries more attractive, see Zobel v. 
Williams, 457 U. S. 55, 67-68 (1982) (BRENNAN, J., concur-
ring). Though such measures might run afoul of the Com-
merce Clause, "[n]o one disputes that a State may enact laws 
pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and effect 
of encouraging domestic industry." Bacchus Imports Ltd. 
v. Dias, - U. S. - (1984); Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, at.668. Cf. 
Edgar v. MITE Corp., 45 U. S. 624, 646 (1982) (POWELL, J. 
concurring) (noting State's interest in protecting regionally 
based corporations from acquisition by foreign corporations). 
Equal protection does not bar Congress from enacting or 
authorizing States to enact legislation to protect industry in 
one State ''from disadvantageous competition" with less 
stringently regulated businesses in other States. Hodel v. 
Indiana, 452 U. S. 314, 329 (1981). In short, the Equal Pro-
........... -- ..... .,. ·-
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tection Clause does not presume such classifications or pur-
poses invidious, but requires only that they be rationally 
related. 
The majority's attempts to distinguish these precedents 
are unconvincing. First the majority suggests that a State 
purpose might be legitimate for purposes of the Commerce 
Clause but somehow illegitimate for purposes of the Equal 
Protection Clause. No basis is advanced for this theory 
because no basis exists. The test of a legitmate State pur-
pose must be whether it addresses valid State concerns. To 
suggest that the purpose's legitimacy, chameleon-like, 
changes according to the constitutional clause cited in the 
complaint is merely another pretext to escape the clear mes-
sage of this Court's precedents. 
Next the majority asserts that "a State may not constitu-
tionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corpora-
tions at a higher rate solely because of their residence," citing 
cases that rejected discriminatory ad valorem property 
taxes, defended as taxes on the "privilege" of doing business. 
~ Ante,AB. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949); Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 
(1926); Southern R . Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910). 
These decisions were addressed in Western & Southern, and 
the classifications were characterized as impermissibly dis-
criminatory because they did not "'rest on differences perti-
nent to the subject in respect of which the classification is 
made."' 451 U. S., at 668, quoting Power Manufacturing 
Co. v. Saunders, 274 U. S. 490, 494 (1927). As the majority 
concedes, none of these decisions intimates that the tax stat-
utes at issue in the decisions rested on relevant differences 
between domestic and foreign corporations or had purposes 
other than the raising of revenue at the out-of-state corpora-
tions' expense. In fact, the Court noted in several of these 
opinions that foreign corporations may validly be taxed at a 
higher rate if the classification is based on some relevant dis-
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tinction. No such distinction, however, had been demon-
strated or even alleged. See WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 
supra, at 120 ("This is not a case in which the exemption was 
withheld by reason of the foreign corporation's failure or 
inability to benefit the State in the same measure as do do-
mestic nonprofit corporations"); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 572 (''the inequality is not because of 
the slightest difference in Ohio's relation to the decisive 
transaction"); Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S., at 
416-17 (parties conceded that the business of the foreign and 
domestic corporations was precisely the same). 2 Lacking the 
threshhold requirement of an articulated distinction relevant 
to an asserted purpose, the classifications at issue in these 
decisions could never have survived rational basis scrutiny 
and no such analysis was even attempted. These precedents 
do not answer the question posed by this case: whether a leg-
islature may adopt differential tax treatment of domestic and 
foreign insurers not simply to raise additional revenue but 
with the purpose of affecting the market as an "instrument of 
economic and social engineering"? P. Hartman, Federal 
Limitations on State and Local Taxation, § 3:2 (1981). The 
majority's suggestion that these cases necessarily decided 
the issue before us, as promotion of domestic business is "log-
1 The only cited authority that arguably addressed the issue raised in the 
instant case is a per curiam reversal and remand without opinion of a deci-
sion upholding a discriminatory ad valorem tax on a foreign insurer's fix-
tures and other tangible property. See Reserve Life Insurance Co. v. 
Bowers, 380 U.S. 285 (1965). A reversal and remand is more enigmatic 
even than a summary affirmance, which has precedential value only as 
to "the precise issues necessarily presented and decided." Mandel v. 
Bradley, 432 U. S. 173, 176 (1977). Decisions without opinion may not be 
equated with "an opinion by this Court treating the question on the mer-
its." See Edelman v. JcmJ.an, 415 U. S. 651, 670-671 (1975). "Indeed, 
upon fuller consideration of an issue under plenary review, the Court has 
not hesitated to discard a rule which a line of summary affirrnances may 
appear to have established." Fusari v. Steinberg, 419 U.S. 379, 392 
(BURGER, C. J., concurring) (1975). 
.. ~ 
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ically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes 
such as those at issue [in the cited cases]," is mere specula-
tion. See ante, at 8, n. 6. 
In treating these cases as apposite authority, the majority 
again closes its eyes to the facts. Alabama does not tax at a 
higher rate solely on the basis of residence; it taxes insurers, 
domestic as well as foreign, who do not maintain a principal 
place of business or substantial assets in Alabama, based on 
conceded distinctions in the contributions of these insurers as 
a class to the State's insurance objectives. The majority 
obscures the issue by observing that a given "foreign insur-
ance company doing the same type and volume of business in 
Alabama as a domestic company'' will pay a higher tax. 
~ Ante, at -"-. Under our precedents, tax classifications 
need merely ''rest[] upon some reasonable consideration of 
difference or policy." Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 
supra, at 527. Rational basis scrutiny does not require that 
the classification be mathematically precise or that every for-
eign insurer or every domestic company fit to perfection the 
general profile on which the classification is based. "[T]he 
Equal Protection Clause does not demand a surveyor's preci-
sion" in fashioning classifications. Hughes v. Alexandria 
Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 814 (1976). 
IV 
Because Alabama's classification bears a rational relation-
ship to a legitimate purpose, our precedents demand that it 
be sustained. The Court avoids this clear directive by a 
remarkable evasive tactic. It simply declares that the ends 
of promoting a domestic insurance industry and attracting 
investments to the State when accomplished through the 
means of discriminatory taxation are not legitimate state 
purposes. This bold assertion marks a drastic and unfortu-
nate departure from established equal protection theory. 
By collapsing the two prongs of the rational basis test into 
one, the Court arrives at the ultimate issue-whether the 
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means are constitutional-without ever engaging in the def-
erential inquiry we have adopted as a brake on judicial 
impeachment of legislative policy choices. In addition to 
unleashing an undisciplined fonn of Equal Protection Clause 
scrutiny, the Court's approach today has serious implications 
for the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause. 
Groping for some basis for this radical departure from equal 
protection analysis, the Court perceives an implied constitu-
tional prohibition against economic parochialism emanating 
from the the Equal Protection Clause itself. This theory 
forces the Equal Protection Clause into an unaccustomed role 
that it cannot sustain without grave damage to the constitu-
tional balance. Nor can this analysis be reconciled with the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act and our decisions in Western & 
Southern and Benjamin. 
Western & Southern established that a state may validly 
tax out-of-state corporations at a higher rate if its goal is to 
promote the ability of its domestic businesses to compete in 
interstate markets. Nevertheless, the Court today con-
cludes that the converse policy is forbidden, striking down 
legisl2.tion whose purpose is to encourage the intrastate 
activities of local business concerns by permitting them to 
compete effectively on their home turf. In essence, the 
Court declares ''We will excuse an unequal burden on foreign 
insurers if the State's purpose is to foster its domestic insur-
ers activities in other States, but the same unequal burden 
will be unconstitutional when employed to further a policy 
that places a higher social value on the domestic insurer's 
home-state than interstate activities." This conclusion is not 
drawn from the Commerce Clause, the textual source of con-
stitutional restrictions on State interference with interstate 
competition. Reliance on the Commerce Clause would, of 
course, be unavailing here in view of the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act. Instead the Court engrafts its own economic values on 
the Equal Protection Clause. Beyond guarding against arbi-
trary or irrational discrimination, as interpreted by the Court 
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today this Clause now prohibits the effectuation of economic 
policies that elevate local concerns over interstate compe-
tition. Ante, at 7. "But a constitution is not intended to 
embody a particular economic theory . . . . It is made for 
people of fundamentally differing views." Lochner v. N w 
York, 198 U. S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
In the heyday of economic due process, Justice Holmes 
warned: 
"Courts should be careful not to extend [the express] 
prohibitions [of the Constitution] beyond their obvious 
meaning by reading into them conceptions of public pol-
icy that the particular Court may happen to entertain." 
Tyson & Brother v. Banton, 273 U. S. 418, 445-446 
(1927) (Holmes, J., dissenting, joined by Brandeis, J.) 
(emphasis added). 
Ignoring the wisdom of this observation, the Court fashions 
its own brand of economic equal protection. In so doing, it 
supplants a legislative policy endorsed by both Congress and 
the individual States that explicitly sanctioned the very paro-
chialism in regulation and taxation of insurance that the 
Court'3 decision holds illegitimate. This newly unveiled 
power of the Equal Protection Clause would come as a sur-
prise to the Congress that passed the McCarran-Ferguson 
Act and the Court that sustained the Act against constitu-
tional attack. In the McCarran-Ferguson Act, Congress ex-
pressly sanctioned such economic parochialism in the context 
of state regulation and taxation of insurance. 
=MoNO'Iet, !_he doctrine adopted by the majority threatens 
the freedom not only of the States but also of the Federal 
government to formulate economic policy. The dangers in 
importing Commerce Clause values to the Equal Protection 
Clause should be self-evident: the Commerce Clause is a flex-
ible tool that Congress may invoke or leave dormant as it 
sees fit; the Equal Protection Clause is not so malleable. 
Doctrines of equal protection constrain the acts of federal and 
state legislatures alike. See, e. g., Califano v. Webster, 430 
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U. S. 313 (1977); Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate 
Unconstitutional State Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old 
Enigma, 35 Stan. L. Rev. 400-413 (1983). Contrary to the 
reasoning in Benjamin, the Court today indicates the Equal 
Protection Clause stands as an independent barrier if courts 
should determine that either Congress or a State has ven-
tured the ''wrong" direction down what has become, by judi-
cial fiat, the one-way street of the Commerce Clause. N oth-
ing in the Constitution or our past decisions supports forcing 
such an economic straight-jacket on the federal system. 
IV 
Today's opinion charts an ominous course. I can only hope 
this unfortunate adventure away from the safety of our prec-
edents will be an isolated episode. I had thought the Court 
had finally accepted that 
''the judiciary may not sit as a superlegislature to judge 
the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy deter-
minations made in areas that neither affect fundamental 
rights nor proceed along suspect lines; in the local eco-
nomic sphere, it is only the invidious discrimination, the 
wholly arbitrary act, which cannot stand consistently 
with the Fourteenth Amendment. New Orleans v. 
Dukes, 427 U. S. 297, 303-304 (1976) (citations omitted). 
Because I believe that the Alabama law at issue here serves 
legitimate State purposes through concededly rational 
means, and thus is neither invidious nor arbitrary, I would 
affirm the court below. I respectfully dissent. 
lgs February 18, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda ~u.41.J,...~., 
Re: No. 83-1274 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward 
We have received Justice O'Connor's dissent in this 
case. I have read it over and believe that we need do relatively 
little to respond to it. The entire dissent is premised on the 
assumption that all of the purposes advanced by the State for its 
domestic preference tax statute are before the Court. Thus, on 
p. 4, Justice O'Connor takes us to task for dismissing the 
arguments as not addressed by the courts below. She also 
contends that our failure to resolve whether Alabama may continue 
to collect its tax is "baffling, since appellants took the 
exceptional step of conceding the factual issues to assure a 
speedy resolution [of the case] . II !d. Thus, she 
characterizes as "obviously legitimate" the State's goals, among 
others, of benefitting Alabama citizens by promoting domestic 
insurers (i) who will write policies not offered by larger 
multistate companies; (ii) who are more readily regulated than 
foreign companies; and (iii) whose solvency can be more 
effectively safeguarded. Id., p. 5. 
In fact, of course, we did not address any of the 
State's other 15 purposes because the lower courts did not rule 
on their legitimacy. Even though these other purposes had been ., 
presented to the courts below, the circuit court specifically 
ruled only that the two of 
~
domestic insurance companies an promoting capital investment in 
Alabama were App. to Juris. St., at 20a-2la • ., 
Likewise, on appeal, the Court of Civil Appeals noted the two 
purposes that had been found to be legitimate, id., at 8a, and 
referred to them also by saying that the foreign insurers 
contended that "neither of the purposes found by the court are 
constitutionally legitimate." Neither the circuit court nor the 
appellate court purported to rule on any of the other purposes on 
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which Justice O'Connor relies. Indeed, the appellate court did 
not invoke any of the reasons asserted by Justice O'Connor for 
why favoring domestic industry is legitimate: it ruled simply 
that "[t]he Supreme Court has said that the location or promotion 
of a needed or useful industry within the state is a legitimate 
state purpose, as well as efforts to maintain the profit level of 
a domestic industry. See Parker v. Brown, .•• ; Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc ••.• " (citations omitted). It seems plain to me 
that the appellate court was ruling, as was the circuit court, on 
the legitimacy of promoting domestic industry for its own sake. 
Moreover, the dissent's statement that appellants 
conceded the factual issues is inaccurate. The appellate court's 
per curiam opinion on rehearing quotes the parties• stipulation, 
which says that appellants waived "any right to an evidentiary 
hearing or trial on the second, factual issue, to-wit: Whether 
the Legislature could have reasonably believed that the premium 
.. 
tax statute's use of the classification of insurance companies as 
foreign and domestic would promote any of the purposes which the 
lower courts have determined to be legitimate." App. to Juris. 
St., at 2a (emphasis added). Thus, I read the waiver as 
effective only as to the two purposes ruled to be legitimate by 
the circuit court and the Court of Civil Appeals. 
It is also noteworthy that the case arose on ~~ry 
judgment motio~ . The Court of Civil Appeals reversed the circuit 
court's judgment on the rational relationship issue and remanded 
for trial because it found there was a genuine issue as to the 
facts involved. For this Court to rule on any of the other 
purposes advanced by the State, it would not only have to make a 
legitimacy determination not ruled on by the courts below, but it 
would have to conduct its own inquiry as to rational relationship 
for these other State purposes, on a record that the appellate 
court has intimated is inadequate. 
As you will see from my marks on the dissent draft, I 
have other minor disagreements with the dissent's 
characterization of our opinion in some places. I do not believe 
that any of th however. I would 
recommend that we simply add a footnote clarifying the procedural 
posture of the case and pointing out why the purposes on which 
the dissent relies are not properly before us. Perhaps if we 
take this opportunity to emphasize just ~o 
-~--- .... --~-that it deals only with the promotion of domestic industry 
for its own sake and not for all the other reasons advanced by 
the State and the dissent--the Chief will be more comfortable 
; . 
about joining. Also, Dan suggested, and I agree, that we might 
at some point add a line in the text to the effect that if this 
discrimination is permitted to stand for the reason approved by 
the lower court, virtually any discrimination that promotes 




JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQUIST 
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.u!ring~ ~. <If. 20p~~ 
February 19, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1274 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Ward 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me. 
Sincerely~ 
Justice O'Connor 
cc: The Conference 
lgs March 7, 1985 
From: Lynda 
Re: Status Report on No. 83-1274 -- Metropolitan Life v. Ward 
Our draft responding to Justice O'Connor's dissent has 
been out for nearly two weeks now, and everyone has voted except 
Justice Brennan and the Chief. Dan tells me that he understands 
from Justice Brennan's clerk that Justice Brennan plans to vote 
with the dissent. We have heard nothing from the Chief, however. 
By my count, we still need his vote for a majority. The Chief 
has been casting his vote in quite a few other cases lately. Is 
it time to inquire as to his decision on ours, or is it better to 
leave well enough alone? There have been no responses to the 
changes we made in our opinion, and it's hard to understand what 
the Chief is waiting for at this point. 
Let me know if there is something I should be doing to 
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lgs March 20, 1985 
MEMORANDUM TO JUSTICE POWELL 
From: Lynda 
Re: No. 83-1274 -- Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v.Ward 
we have just received the second draft of Justice 
O'Connor's dissent in this case. I have to say that I am 
somewhat mystified as to the import of most of the changes she 
has made. However, they seem p~de~ign~g ~ say that the 
.1). 
local favoritism that was the goal of the Alabama legislature ~ --- " 
--- ~ 
been affirmatively Her point, I think, 
cJ:> is that such local favoritism would be permissible under the 
~ Commerce Clause, and therefore, it is improper for the Court to 
~ :):;-: invalidate it under the Equal Protection Clause. The ~nt 
~~never quite identifies, however, what it sees as Congress's 
~ ~authorization here. Perhaps it is the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
~h that is certainly 
~ ~ ~ The case to which the opinion now repeatedly cites is 
QV~ v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460 
u.s. 204 (1983). That case involved an executive order ssued by 
the Mayor of Boston requiring that all construction 
funded by city money, or by funds that the city had t 
to administer (certain types of federal funds), 
performed by a work force at least half of whom wereresidents ~f 
Boston. The Court upheld the order under the Commerce Clause, 
________.:; 
ruling that the city was a market participant, not a market 
regulator, and there was no indication that the Commerce Clause 
was supposed to limit the power of States to operate freely in 
the market. As to the fact that federal funds were involved in 
some projects, the Court noted that Congress, in regulations 
relating to use of federal money in city construction projects, 
had authorized the city's action, and thus was not subject to the 
Commerce Clause. 
All of this is well and good, but completely irrelevant, 
in my view, to our case. As I noted, I fail to see where 
dissent ever identifies explicitly the congressional 
authorization for Alabama's actions here. Moreover, as we hav.e 
already pointed out in our opinion, cases under the Equal 
Protection Clause need not necessarily be governed by Commerce 
Cla~~ce. Indeed, some of the Commerce Clause cases, 
such as Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, actually support our view 
that a State's ability to promote domestic industry for its own 
sake is not unlimited. See p.7, n.6 of our opinion. 
I would therefore recommend that we make no in 
response to the new draft, unless of course someone in our camp 
expresses a wish that we do so. If you are of a different view, 
however, I would be happy to draft whatever you like. Dan has 
read Justice O'Connor's new draft, and agrees with my assessment. 
" . 
.i'n:pt"tUU Qfltlttt of tirt ~b .i'bdts 
'8aslfingbm. ~.Of. 2llc5ll-~ 
CHAMISI!:RS OF 
.JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL 
February 28, 1985 
Re: No. 83-1274-Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. 
w. G. Ward, Jr. 
Dear Sandra: 





cc: The Conference 
.ittpt"ttttt Qf~url .n tirt ~h .ihdt.s' 
Jlufringhtn. ). <!J. 2ll~ll~ 
CHAMI!IERS OF" 
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March 20, 1985 
No. 83-1274 
Metropolitan Life Insuranqe Co. 
v. Ward 
Dear Sandra, 
Please join me in your second draft 
of the above. 
Sincerely, 
" . I I • 
)~\ 
Ju~tice ·O'Connor 
Copies to the Conference 
l 
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!-1arch 21, 1985 
RE: No. 83-1274 - !1-ietropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. v. W.G. Ward, Jr. 
:!)ear Lewis: 
This "not easy" case has had a somewhat tortured 
course since November but I am now satisfied with your 
Draft V and I join. 
Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
lgs March 22, 1985 
No. 83-1274 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward 
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T~ z see~presents the question;fwhether an Alabama 
domestic preference tax statute,~imposing higher gross premiums 
. ~~-~d . taxes on out-of-state 1nsurance compan1es) t~1 o6 domest1c 
~·~ A 
insurers, / violates the Equal Protection Clause. For the reasons 
stated in an opinion filed with the Clerk today,j we hold that it 
does. The decision of the Alabama Supreme Court ~ therefore ~ - -
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings. 
~cavv 
Justice O'Connor~ filed a dissenting opinion, in which 
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Rehnquist joined . 
. ' 
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From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: __________ _ 
Recirculated: _________ _ 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1274 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, ET 
AL., APPELLANTS v. W. G. WARD, JR., 
ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
[December --, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
which taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, ''the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic in-
surer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its princi-
pal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified investments in Alabama. I d., 
§ 27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total as-
sets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life in-
surer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. I d. Regardless 
of how much of its total assets a foreign company invests in 
Alabama investments, however, it can never reduce its gross 
premiums tax,rate to the same level paid by comparable do-
mestic companies, which are entitled to the one percent tax 
rate even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, 
the investment provision permits foreign insurance compa-
nies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination in-
herent in the domestic preference tax statute. 
' There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. They are that for annuities, the tax 
rate is one percent for both foreign and domestic insurers , Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-4(a), and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is 
three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance com-
panies, id. , § 27- 4-6(a). 
'• 
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute.." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally related 
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature could rea-
sonably have believed that the classification would have pro-
moted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
' Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
,., 
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment 
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived 
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether 
the statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the 
two purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and 
they requested a final determination of the legal issues with 
respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. 
The supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appel-
lants again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on 
the rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with 
the other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. U. S. -- (1984). 
We now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
'• 
83-1274-0PINION 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 5 
posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp . v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retal-
iatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explic-
itly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. We held that 
"( w ]e consider it now established that, whatever the extent 
of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from do-
ing business Within its boundaries, that authority does not 
justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on 
foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corpora-
tions, unless the discrimination between foreign 'and domestic 
corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state 
purpose." Id., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue of whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only 
question before us is whether those purposes found by the 
83-1274-0PINION 
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trial court 5 are legitimate. 
A 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between for-
eign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the for-
mation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State contends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
& Southern, that have upheld discriminatory taxes. See 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, -- U. S. -- (1984); Pike 
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, 
Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 
341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 
U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 
553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold that promotion of domestic industry is 
always a legitimate state purpose under equal protection 
analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's purpose in en-
5 Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17 
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate 
under equal protection analysis. See App. 27-33. We decline to review 
any of those except the two found by the circuit court to be legitimate, as 
they are not before us, but remand to that court for a determination of 
whether any of them is legitimate and rationally related to the classifica-
tion set forth in the statute. 
6 We find the other cases relied on by the State also to be inapposite to 
this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether pro-
motion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
•. 
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acting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate business 
of domestic insurers by deterring other States from enacting 
discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate one. 
451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve 
its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic insurers 
in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also want to 
do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as 
California did, to influence the policies of other States in 
order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to operate 
interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign compa-
nies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve 
its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at --. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,--
U. S. --, --U984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulate evenhand-
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at --. 
83-1274-0PINION 
8 METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his coneurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents soley by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsid-
ers, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417~ See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 
7 Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the states in support of their taxes in these cases , such promo-
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Our reliance on them and our rejection of Lincoln in Western 
& Southern demonstrates the continuing viability of the 
Equal Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute 
that seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only 
by burdening foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores of Ohio v. Bowers, 
supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. In 
that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign cor-
porations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that . the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
tic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that pro-
motion of domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose. 
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domes-
tic industry, it involves a statute that encourages nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build ware-
houses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory 
taxing scheme .. involved did not favor residents by burdening 
outsiders; rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an 
exemption that residents did not share. Since the foreign 
and domestic companies involved were not competing to pro-
vide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption 
did not directly affect adversely the domestic companies sub-
ject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not incon-
sistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic in-
dustry within a State, by discriminating against foreign 
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legiti-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
·. 
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mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
B 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
proviSions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's intere&_t, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
Bin fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response 
only to the South-Eastern Underwriters case, and that Congress did not 
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or regulate the insur-
ance industry other than what they had previously possessed. Thus Con-
gress expressly left undisturbed this Court's decisions holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause places limits on a State's ability to tax out-of-state 
corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 n. 6. 
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burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a test that is not difficult to pass. See Western & 
Southern, 451 U. S., at 674 (equal protection challenge may 
not prevail so long as the question of rational relationship is 
"'at least debatable'" (quoting United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. The effect of the statute at issue here is to place a 
discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to 
do business within the State, thereby also incidentally plac-
ing a burden on interstate commerce. Simply because the 
effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of 
burden with which the Commerce Clause also would be con-
cerned does not mean that the statute is not subject to equal 
protection restraints. We reaffirmed the importance of the 
Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in Western 
& Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic busihess over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-
mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose. 
This is a distinction without a difference, and one that were-
jected last term in an analogous context arising under the 
Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, --
9 It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E . g., Western & Southern, 451 
U. S., at 660 n. 12. 
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U. S., at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the cir-
cumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by 
discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state 
purpose. 
IV 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Al-
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose. The investment incentive provision of the Alabama 
statute does not enable foreign insurance companies to elimi-
nate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how 
much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insur-
ance companies are still required to pay a higher gross premi-
ums tax than domestic companies. 10 Moreover, domestic in-
surers remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax 
regardless of whether they invest in Alabama assets. The 
State's investment incentive provision therefore does not 
cure, but reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification 
based solely on residence. We hold that encouraging invest-
ment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discrimi-
natory manner serves no legitimate state purpose. 11 
v 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to ap-
10 Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten 
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4-5. 
11 We note that Hanover Fire Ins . Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494, 
508-509 (1926), in holding that foreign companies are entitled to equal tax 
treatment even if they have very little permanent investment in the State, 
also casts some doubt on the legitimacy of Alabama's investment incentive 
provision. 
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pellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
~~~ 
-3oll~ 
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I\. ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
[December --, 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
~ taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, ''the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic in-
surer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its princi-
pal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
characterized as a foreign insurer. I d., § 27-4-1(2). 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
. worldwide assets in specified ffi¥sstments i~ Alabam:J.: I d., 
§ 27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its total as-
sets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life in-
surer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. ~ Regardless 
of how much of its total assets a foreign companY. mv8Sts in /-:\ o-Alabama investme~ RQW~it can never redu~e its gross 
\_;,/ premiums tax,_rate o tiD:! s me level aid b comparable do-
mestic companies are entitled to the one percen ax 
ra e even 1 ey have no investments in the State. Thus, 
the investment provision permits foreign insurance compa-
nies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination in-
herent in the domestic preference tax statute. 
3 There are two exceptions to thes~ general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. ~ey aPe u~~ J:or annuities, the tax 
rate is one percent for both foreign and domestic- insurers , Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-4(a), and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is 
three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance com-
panies, id., § 27-4-6(a). 
J .:r/ ll .C. . 
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorpor~ted 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins . Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue:()') encouraging the for- ~ 
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and ¢ en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statuta" App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally re~ 
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature ~a- v 
sonably)lave believed that the classification would have pro-
moted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
• Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
.. 
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment 
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants th~~ed _ /' 
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issu
the statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the 
two purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and 
they requested a final determination of the legal issues with 
respect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. 
The supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appel-
lants again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on 
the rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with 
the other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the in~rvenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. U. S. -- (1984). 
We now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a[ California statute imposing a retal-
iatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explic-
itly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. l We held that 
"[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever the extent 
of a State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from do-
ing business Within its boundaries, that authority does not 
justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other burdens on 
foreign corporations than those imposed on domestic corpora-
tions, unless the discrimination between foreign and domestic 
corporations bears a rational relation to a legitimate state 
purpose." Id., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue 9f whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only 
question before us is whether those purposes found by the 
g ') a.:t 6b 1. 
83-1274-0PINION 
6 METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 
~ court 5 are legitimate. 
A 
The first of the purposes fo~md by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between for-
eign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the for-
mation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State contends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
& Southern, that[!1ave upheld discriminatory taxes. See 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, -- U. S. -- (1984); Pike 
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, 
Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 U. S. 
341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 
U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U. S. 
553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hol<~that promotion of domestic industry is 
alwayt' a legitimate state purpose under equal protection 
analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's purpose in en-
• Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17 
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate "1i/. 
under equal protection analysis. See~App. 27-33. We decline to review V!/ 
any of those except the two found b;the circuit court to be legitimate, ~0w£~~·~;h---;:------"jfCJ;:::; 
~ are ¥'before u~ ~ remand)~ that court ~ determin~· ~~· fu ~ p~0~(Ci> CH-/.t 
whether any o~ is legitimate and rationally related to the classifica- 9-/ M~ /: e 
tion set forth in the ~tatute. 
6 We find the other cases ~ on t the StateLalso to be inapposite to J/ wki~ / reM.t-4--
this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether pro-
motion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
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acting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate business 
of domestic insurers by deterring other States from enacting 
discriminatory · or excessive taxes-was a legitimate one. 
451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve 
its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic insurers 
in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also want to 
do business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as 
California did, to influence the policies of other States in 
order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to operate 
interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign compa-
nies who wish to do interstate business in order to improve 
its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at --J::2':' 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984) , we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty , --
U. S. --, --'(1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regula~levenhand­
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at ~ 
I0-11-= 
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purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solw by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, ~ only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsid-
ers, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417~ See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 
'0 ' ·l. . 
7 Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a purpose ad-




::.--~:,~~~rm:~Ht-M'H~"'ftf~~~~eettm--M Lincoln in Western 
Southern the continuing viability of the 
Equal Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute 
that seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only 
by burdening foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Storesl of Ohio v. Bowers, 
supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. In 
that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal pro-
tection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign cor-
porations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
tic industry is a legitima~e state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that pro-
motion of domestic iHElJtsb=;'j is a legitimate state purpose. 
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domes-
tic iflg1~trf , it involves a statute that encourages nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build ware-
houses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory 
taxbtg 11 e.b&zltl involved did not favor residents by burdening 
outsiders; rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an 
exemption that residents did not share. Since the foreign 
and domestic companies involved were not competing to pro-
vide warehousing services, granting the former an exemption 
did notldirectly affect adversely the domestic companies sub-
ject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not incon-
sistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic ~ 
~within a State, by discriminating against foreign 
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legiti-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
'' Tt\c. . 
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mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxeJ- that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
proviSIOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's intere!it, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
8 In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's response 
only to ~ South-Eastern Underwriters;-+ a nd that Congress dfd not 
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or regulate the insur-
ance industry other than what they had previously possessed. Thus Con-
gress expressly left undisturbed this Court's decisions holding that the 
Equal Protection Clause places limits on a State's ability to tax out-of-state 
corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 n. 6. 
~ 
U11ifd States vj t StAt~)' 
,3.;2.~ -ti.S. 533, 
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burden it imposes is found to be rationally ed to that pur-
~ pose, a ~that is not difficult to . See Western & 
Southern,~! U. 8.a at 674 ~qual protection challenge may 
not prevail so long as the question of rational relationship is 
"'at least debatable'" (quoting United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U. S. 144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the Be~~~m Mo\or!. Co . v . 
States.k The effect of the statute at issue here is to place a See. t ~'-u.s.L!~I,~d-~ - <.ll-'1611;~. 
discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who desire to 1-lx~ , -
do business within the State, thereby also incidentall lac- -: "'l ~ ti ~s{ tO..iiA~' 
ing a burden on interstate commerce. Si-mP, the [~-v~~· pvo·C~ 0~ ~ 
effect of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type of ()._r£ C\.pflA U'-
burden with which the Commerce Clause also would be con- ~l.t '1 h 
Q cerne~dees Jl.Gt meaR_Jkst tke statt~te is Rot subjeet to eqn* ' "t c ...rto 
proti cbollo restraillot~ We reaffirmed the importance of the / 
Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in Western 
& Southern and see no reason now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose · under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic busilless over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do- ------
mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall _ _ as ben~f.'tti ~ oV~e ~fDvJ 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose or t;~~ h::tv.-ni"'j A.~-tolt.af" . 
This is a distinction without a difference, and one that were-
jected last term in an analogous context arising under the 
Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias{ --
9 It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, /~ 
~ at 660 n. 12. A.. 
~,/r 
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U. S., at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the cir-
cumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business by 
discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state 
purpose. 
~ 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Al-
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. ore~e do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose. \The fnvestment incentive provision of the Alabama 
statute does not enable foreign insurance companies to elimi-
nate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how 
much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insur-
ance companies are still required to pay a higher oss premi-
ums tax than domestic companies. 10 MeFeev8~ £!-omestic in-
surers remain entitled to the more favorable r ate of tax 
re ardless of in Alabama assets. The 
State's investment incen.tive provision therefore does not 
cure, but reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification 
based solely on residence. We hold that encouraging invest-
ment in Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discrimi-
natory manner serves no legitimate state purpose. ,p. 
t 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to ap-
10 Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten 
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 




METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 13 
pellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
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This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
1 The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
' For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic in-
surer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its princi-
pal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
Id., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its to-
tal assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regard-
less of how much of its total assets a foreign company places 
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premi-
ums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic 
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate 
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the in-
vestment provision permits foreign insurance companies to 
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in 
the domestic preference tax statute. 
3 There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates of 
taxation of insurance companies. For annuities , the tax rate is one per-
cent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and for /) 
wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of one L---""!· ,(_ooSA 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, i d. , .e:- \. ~ / 
§ 27-4-6(a). c.::::-
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally related 
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reason-
ably could have believed that the classification would have 
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
• Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life clailJlants. See App. 314-315. 
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment 
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived 
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the 
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they 
requested a final determination of the legal issues with re-
spect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The 
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants 
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the ra-
tional relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the 
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. --AU. S. -- (1984). 
We now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins . Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before' it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R . Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retal-
iatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explic-
itly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. I d., at 667. We 
held that "[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on do-
mestic corporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only 
question before us is whether those purposes found by the 
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circuit court 5 are legitimate. 
A 
(1) 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between for-
eign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the for-
mation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State contends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory 
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, -- U. S. --
(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Al-
lied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of do-
mestic industry i~ legitimate state purpose under equal pro-
tection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's purpose 
5 Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17 
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate 
under equal protection analysis. See App. 27-33. We decline to review 
any of those except the two found by the circuit court to be legitimate, 
which are the only purposes before us. On remand, that court may deter-
mine whether any of the other purposes is legitimate and rationally related 
to the classification set forth in the statute. 
•we find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate 
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from 
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate 
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to ap-
prove its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic 
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also 
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no at-
tempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other 
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign 
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to im-
prove its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, --
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at 9. 
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fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsid-
ers, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers , 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
" ' 
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sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In 
rel 'ng on these cases, and rejecting Lincoln in Western & 
Southern, we affirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by 
burdening foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow-
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
~---lliic~:fW~"'~~' is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that pro-
motion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose. 
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domes-
tic business, it involves a statute that encourages nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build ware-
houses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory tax 
involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; 
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption 
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 
companies involved were not competing to provide 
ware ousing services, granting the former an exemption did 
not even directly affect adversely the domestic companies 
subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not 
7 Although the promotion of domestic · was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
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inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic 
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign 
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legiti-
mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
provisiOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
8Jn fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history of 
the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Con ess's res onse 
only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriter , supra, 322 U. S. 
533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give t e States any power 
to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they had previ-
ously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this Court's 
decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on a 
State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 n. 6. 
Ass fl. -
83-1274-0PINION 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 11 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, 
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co. , 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who de-
sire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally 
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection 
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the dis-
crimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with 
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We 
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no rea-
son now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-
9 lt is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E . g., Western & Southern, supra, at 
660 n. 12. 
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mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose 
This is a distinction without a difference, and one that we re-
jected last term in an analogous context arising under the 
Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra, 
-- U. S., at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under 
the circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic busi-
ness by discriminating against nonresidents is not a legiti-
mate state purpose. 
B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Al-
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favor-
able rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama 
----a-ss_e_t_s_ . .., the investment incentive provision of the Alabama 
statute oes not enable foreign insu_rance companies to elimi-
nate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how 
much of their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insur-
ance companies are still required to pay a higher gross premi-
ums tax than domestic companies. 10 The State's investment 
incentive provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms, 
the statute's impermissible classification based solely on resi-
dence. We hold that encouraging investment in Alabama as-
sets and securities in this plainly discriminatory manner 
serves no legitimate state purpose. 
10 Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten 
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4-5. 
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IV 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to ap-
pellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
11/29 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
1 The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. , 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestk preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic in-
surer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its princi-
pal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
characterized as a foreign insurer. !d., § 27-4-1(2). 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
!d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its to-
tal assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regard-
less of how much of its total assets a foreign company places 
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premi-
ums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic 
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate 
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the in-
vestment provision permits foreign insurance companies to 
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in 
the domestic preference tax statute. 
3 There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and 
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of 
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., 
§ 27-4-6(a). 
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally related 
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reason-
ably could have believed that the classification would have 
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
' Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment 
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived 
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the 
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they 
requested a final determination of the legal issues with re-
spect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The 
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants 
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the 
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the 
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse: 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, . we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retal-
iatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explic-
itly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. Id., at 667. We 
held that "( w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on do-
mestic corporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only 
question before us is whether those purposes found by the 
•. 
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circuit court G.re legitimate. 
A 
(1) 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between 
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State contends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory 
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, --U.S.--
(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Al-
lied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of do-
mestic industry· is a legitimate state purpose under equal pro-
tection analysis. '- Rather, we held that California's purpose 
5 Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17 
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate 
under equal protection analysis. See App. 27-33. We decline to review 
any of those except the two found by the circuit court to be legitimate, 
which are the only purposes before us. On remand, that court may deter-
mine whether any of the other purposes is legitimate and rationally related 
to the classi a i n set forth in the statute. 
J..We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate 
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from 
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes....:...,_was a legitimate 
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to ap-
prove its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic 
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also 
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no at-
tempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other 
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign 
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to im-
prove its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
·may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,--
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at 9. 
... 
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fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JusTICE BREN-
NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsid-
ers, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
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sumably to promote domestic industry within the State.~ In y 
relying on these casesr and rejecting Lincoln in Western & 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by 
burdening foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow-
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
tic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that pro-
motion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose. 
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domes-
tic business, it involves a statute that encourages non-
residents-who are not competitors of residents-to build 
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory 
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; 
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption 
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 
companies involved were not competing to provide ware-
housing services, granting the former an exemption did not 
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies sub-
ject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not in-
AAlthough the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
.,. 
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consistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic 
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign 
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legiti-
mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance context . .#.. 7 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
provisiOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
Ain fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 7 
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, 
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States 
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they 
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this 
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on 
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the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, 
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects personsk from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who de-
sire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally 
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection 
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the dis-
crimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with 
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We 
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no rea-
son now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-
~ It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at 
660 n. 12 . 
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mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as 
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a dis-
tinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S., 
at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circum-
stances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-
criminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state 
purpose. 
B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Al-
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favor-
able rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama 
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the 
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies 
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No 
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, for-
eign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher 
gross premiums tax than domestic companies.~ The State's 
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but 
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based 
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in 
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory 
manner serves no legitimate state purpose. 
t section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten 
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4-5. 
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IV 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to 
appellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
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This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn. , 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic in-
surer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its princi-
pal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
characterized as a foreign insurer. Id., §27-4-1(2). 
.. ' 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. · 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
!d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its to-
tal assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regard-
less of how much of its total assets a foreign company places 
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premi-
ums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic 
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate 
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the in-
vestment provision permits foreign insurance companies to 
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in 
the domestic preference tax statute. 
' There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a), and 
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of 
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., 
§ 27-4- 6(a). 
83-1274-0PINION 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 3 
II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama,· and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally related 
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reason-
ably could have believed that the classification would have 
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
' Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment 
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived 
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the 
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they 
requested a final determination of the legal issues with re-
spect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The 
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants 
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the 
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the 
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc . of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a retal-
iatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
. mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explic-
itly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. Id., at 667. We 
held that "[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on do-
mestic corporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." I d., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only 
question before us is whether those purposes found by the 
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circuit court 5 are legitimate. 
A 
(1) 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between 
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State contends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory 
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, -- U. S. --
(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Al-
lied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of do-
mestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal pro-
tection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's purpose 
6 Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled a list of 17 
state purposes they contend are served by the statute and are legitimate 
under equal protection analysis. See App. 27-33. We decline to review 
any of those except the two found by the circuit court to be legitimate, 
which are the only purposes before us. On remand, that court may deter-
mine whether any of the other purposes is legitimate and rationally related 
to the classification set forth in the statute. 
6 We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate 
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from 
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate 
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to ap-
prove its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic 
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also 
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no at-
tempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other 
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign 
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to im-
prove its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc . v. Hardesty, --
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at 9. 
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fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on outsid-
ers, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
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sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In 
relying on these cases1 and rejecting Lincoln in Western & 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by 
burdening foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow-
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations ·from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
tic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that pro-
motion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose. 
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domes-
tic business, it involves a statute that encourages non-
residents-who are not competitors of residents-to build 
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory 
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; 
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption 
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 
companies involved were not competing to provide ware-
housing services, granting the former an exemption did not 
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies sub-
ject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not in-
7 Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
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consistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic 
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign 
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legiti-
mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
prov1s10ns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
8 In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, 
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States 
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they 
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this 
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on 
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 
n. 6. 
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the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, 
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who de-
sire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally 
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection 
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the dis-
crimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with 
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We 
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no rea-
son now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State. could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-
9 1t is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at 
660 n. 12. 
, r• 
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mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as 
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a dis-
tinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S., 
at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circum-
stances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-
criminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state 
purpose. 
B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Al-
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favor-
able rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama 
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the 
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies 
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No 
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, for-
eign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher 
gross premiums tax than domestic ,companies. 10 The State's 
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but 
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based 
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in 
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory 
manner serves no legitimate state purpose. 
10 Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten 
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4-5. 
• ... 
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IV 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to 
appellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion . 
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JusTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
1 The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 u:s. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
'For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic 
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its prin-
cipal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
characterized as a foreign insurer. I d., § 27-4-1(2). 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received froni business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
I d., § 27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its to-
tal assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regard-
less of how much of its total assets a foreign company places 
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premi-
ums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic 
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate 
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the in-
vestment provision permits foreign insurance companies to 
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in 
the domestic preference tax statute. 
3 There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and 
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of 
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 27-
4-6(a). 
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the· 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally related 
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reason-
ably could have believed that the classification would have 
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
• Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment 
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived 
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the 
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they 
requested a final determination of the legal issues with re-
spect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The 
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants 
,again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the 
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the 
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. --U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a re-
taliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[ticr' rule of Lincoln and ex-
plicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. Id., at 667. We 
held that "[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on do-
mestic corporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only 
question before us is whether those purposes found by the 
circuit court are legitimate. 
6 
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A 
(1) 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between 
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State contends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
~o contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
'& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory 
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, -- U. S. --
(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Al-
lied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of do-
mestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal pro-
tection analysis. 5 Rather, we held that California's purpose 
6 We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
>, 
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate 
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from 
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate 
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to ap-
prove its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic 
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also 
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no at-
tempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other 
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign 
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to im-
prove its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc . v. Hardesty, --
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at 9. 
·' 
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NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on out-
siders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitutiol).-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 6 In 
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & ~ 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
6 Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
'· 
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seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by 
burdening foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow-
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
tic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that pro-
motion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose. 
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domes-
tic business, it involves a statute that encourages non-
residents-who are not competitors of residents-to build 
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory 
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; 
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption 
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 
companies involved were not competing to provide ware-
housing services, granting the former an exemption did not 
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies sub-
ject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not in-
consistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic 
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign 
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legiti-
mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
83-1274-0PINION 
10 METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in We§tern & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 7 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
provisiOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, 
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
7 In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, 
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States 
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they 
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this 
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on 
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 8 from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who de-
sire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally 
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection 
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the dis-
crimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with 
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We 
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no rea-
son now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-
mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as 
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a dis-
tinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S., 
at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circum-
stances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-
8 It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E . g., Western & Southern, supra, at 
660, n. 12. 
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criminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state 
purpose. 
B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Al-
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favor-
able rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama 
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the 
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies 
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No 
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, for-
eign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher 
gross premiums tax than domestic companies. 9 The State's 
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but 
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based 
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in 
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory 
manner serves no legitimate state purpose. 
IV 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to 
appellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
9 Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten 
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id. , § 27-4-5. 
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This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
1 The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
· Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic 
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its prin-
cipal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
!d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its to-
tal assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gr~ss premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regard-
less of how much of its total assets a foreign company places 
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premi-
ums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic 
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate 
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the in-
vestment provision permits foreign insurance companies to 
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in 
the domestic preference tax statute. 
3 There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and 
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of 
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 27-
4-6(a). 
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, .451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally related 
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reason-
ably could have believed that the classification would have 
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
Mter their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
• Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of legitimate state 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment 
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived 
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the 
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they 
requested a final determination of the legal issues with re-
spect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The 
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants 
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the 
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the 
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins . Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
'. 
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a re-
taliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding. but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and ex-
plicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. Id., at 667. We 
held that "[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on do-
mestic c'orporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only 
question before us is whether those purposes found by the_f 
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A 
(1) 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between -
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State contends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
.so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory 
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, -- U. S. --
(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Al-
lied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
U:pon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of do-
mestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal pro-
tection analysis. 5 Rather, we held that California's purpose 
5 We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate 
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from 
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate 
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to ap-
prove its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic 
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also 
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no at-
tempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other 
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign 
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to im-
prove its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JusTICE BREN-
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,--
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi- · 
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See irifra, at 9. 
83-1274-0PINION 
8 METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 
NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on out-
siders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 6 In 
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & \ 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
6 Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
83-1274-0PINION 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 9 
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by 
burdening foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow-
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
tic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that pro-
motion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose. 
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domes-
tic business, it involves a statute that encourages non-
residents-who are not competitors of residents-to build 
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory 
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; 
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption 
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 
companies involved were not competing to provide ware-
housing services, granting the former an exemption did not 
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies sub-
ject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not in-
consistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic 
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign 
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legiti-
mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
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lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 7 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
provisions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, 
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
7 In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, 
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States 
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they 
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this 
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on 
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 
n. 6. 
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 8 from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who de-
sire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally 
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection 
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the dis-
crimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with 
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We 
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no rea-
son now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-
mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as 
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a dis-
tinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S., 
at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circum-
stances· of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-
8 lt is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g. , Western & Southern, supra, at 
660, n. 12. 
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criminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state 
purpose. 
B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Al-
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favor-
able rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama 
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the 
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies 
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No 
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, for-
eign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher 
gross premiums tax than domestic companies. 9 The State's 
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but 
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based 
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in 
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory 
manner serves no legitimate state purpose. 
-
___ IV_ neilkr- 6] ~ ;v d. h<4 
We conclude that1 the Alabama domestic p~rence tax pur-po~s fu~ erl. (} 
s~atute:?iates the Equal Protection Claus~~Rf)f)Het'l~~~ 
~~U~ The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Cou~s 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
;r f- _0 ~ o r-der.ed · 
9 Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten 
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id. , § 27-4-5. 
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~ f\j_ 1_21_13 ______ _ 
No. 83-1274 








From: Justice Powell 
Circulated: _ ________ _ 
Recirculated: ________ _ _ 
riTED STATES 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
ET AL., APPELLANTS v. W. G. WARD, JR., 
ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
[December --, 1984] 
JUSTICE PowELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
. This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
1 The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic 
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its prin-
cipal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
characterized as a foreign insurer. !d., § 27-4-1(2). 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
I d., § 27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its to-
tal assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regard-
less of how much of its total assets a foreign company places 
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premi-
ums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic 
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate 
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the in-
vestment provision permits foreign insurance companies to 
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in 
the domestic preference tax statute. 
3 There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and 
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of 
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 27-
4-6(a). 
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic. companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally related 
)----,....._,....---, 
to t ose urposes and that the Alabama legislature reason-
ably could have believed that the classification would have 
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
Mter their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
'Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
83-1274-0PINION 
4 METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 
cuit court's =s as to the existence ofllegitimate state "{±be. fwt> 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary"-bearing on the r;:-.o<VO ~ a _ . J.:... .. 
issue of rational relationship·, ~ that summary judgment L:' · ~-:) 
was inappropriate on that questiOn because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants theri waived 
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the 
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and they 
requested a final determination of the legal issues with re-
spect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The 
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants 
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the 
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the 
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co .' v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized· that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a re-
taliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and ex-
plicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. !d., at 667. We 
held that "[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on do-
mestic corporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." !d., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes e on y 
question before us is whether those purposes Fel:iiH~ b' th9-
-eil'ea:it eea:w are legitimate. ~ 
No. 83-1274 Metropol: 
new footnote 5 
fThe State and t!he ntervenors ~ advance? ::.vm'- ..._ 
purposes in sup~o of the Alabama statute. A, N. either the Circu~~ 
Court nor the Go rt of Ciyil Appeals ruled on the legitimacy of 
those purposes, hewev.e..J;: ' t af\d 1..V will ·nob do st» ha.F-.e. On remand, 
the State will e free to advance those arguments ~ again. 
~ the dissent finds our failure to resolve whether 
Alabama may continue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4, 
we · reemphasize the procedural posture of the case: it 
arose on a motion for summary judgment. The Court of Civil 
Appeals, ~~ i.ot upheld the Circuit Court's ruling that the 
two purposes identif1ed by it were legitimate,A remanded on the ~ 
issue of rational relationship as to those putposes because it 
found the evidence in conflict. In order to~ an expedited . , 
ruling, appellants waived their righ.t to an e:vf dentiary 1:=J i~
only as to the purposes "which the lower courtf have determined 
to be legitimate." App. to .Juris. St., at 2a. Thus, for this 
Court to resolve £~ga~y whether Alabama may continue to collect 
the tax ·, · it would have ~~y to decide de novo whether any of 
the other purposes was legitimate,~ also whether the statute's 
classification bore a rational relat~onship to any of these 
purposes--all this, on a record t~E the Court of Civil Appeals 
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A 
(1) 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between 
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formatio of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State ontends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of omestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
.,so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
'& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory 
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, --U.S.--
(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Al-
lied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of do-
mestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal pro-
tection analysis{ Rather, we held that California's purpose 
~ ~We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate 
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from 
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate 
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to ap-
prove its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic 
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also 
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no at-
tempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other 
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign 
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to im-
prove its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc . v. Hardesty, --
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at 9. 
'· ,I 
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NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S. , at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on out-
siders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp . v. 
Glander; 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre- _ 7 
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State.J: In \Y 
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
\!,/----:1 Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
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seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by 
\--1ii:H\llefr.'ffii: foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow-
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding wi"' ~e.. 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build ~t ~ ~\\\ed. swres 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The l1_\ ~ ""\5jli 0: ~it~ 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes- l q__ ·~ 1 Vl V\euJ t~c busines~ is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec ~i~~;1j~i41 mt+.e. J 
tion analysis. ~ . ' 'wtlole. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allie a.wl 0~•C-V\ tU\~l • 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does no~old that pro-
on o omes 1c usmess is ~ legitimateoslia\ie ~l:if'~98'b ho~) 
~~tefl.\ instead ef beiag eeaeerned vlith J'I omotion of dome~~ 
-Me easiRe~~. it invel; ee a statute that encourages non-
residents-who are not competitors of residents-to build 
warehouses within the State. );hnev-,~e discriminatory 
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; 
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption 
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 
companies involved were not competing to provide ware-
housing services, granting the former an exemption did not 
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies sub-
ject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not in-
consistent with our holding here that promotion ot domestic 
business Wit m a Stat by discriminating againS\ foreign 
corporations that wish to ~ business there, is not a legiti-
mate state purpose. Se 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues no etheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory t x such as the one at issue here as vio-
'. 
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lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis- " (l _ 
criminatory taxes in the insurance context.~ vr 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
provisions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, 
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
-----Ain fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 
· of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, 
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States 
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they 
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this 
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on 
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 
n. 6. 
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons~ from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who de-
sire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally 
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection 
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the dis-
crimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with 
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We 
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no rea-
son now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-
mestic businessl A discriminatory tax would stand or fall 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose--as 
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a dis-
tinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S., 
at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circum-
stances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-
0 ~It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing' of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at 
660, n. 12. 
~ (tCttAched) 
·. 
new footnote 10: 
1trndeed, under the S~ate's analysis, ~discrimination could be 
justified simply on the gound that it favored ~.otl t 
~xpensa oc another. not here pu~po~t to prove or 
~r ~ rticular bra of lo~l ecGnomi regul~io ; 
rathe e hold only that such regulation may n t be accomplished 
by imposing discriminatorily higher taxes on no resident 
corporations solely because they are nonreside ts. 
~ t\~~~ ~.\b~ ~ 
QJ> ~~·a~ ~ 
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criminating against nonresident• is not a legitimate state 
purpose. 
B 
The second purpose found ~y the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the Al-
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
po ~ Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favor-
able""ate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama 
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the 
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies 
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No 
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, for-
eign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher ~ 
gross premiums tax than domestic companies.~ The State's 
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but 
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based 
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in 
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory 
manner serves no legitimate state purpose. 
IV 
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by 
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed 
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see su~r..:a:.z..•...:a;;.:.t~---::?-tb ~~-h· h.. -1-h~ 
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause The ' ~(J d ,J> 
~
si-tio~"' o -m-c... 
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is re- . . , 'r1-i ~ 
utM.t. . _u 
,11~ ----1Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten at ; ~~ ~ 
V percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 
invest in the s ecified Alabama investments. See id. § 27-4-5. 
10 Some 15 additional purposes have been advanced by the State an 
the intervenors in support of the statute. As none of these was addressed 
by the courts below, we express no view as to their legitimacy. 
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versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. J 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
1 The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic 
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its prin-
cipal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
characterized as a foreign insurer. !d., §27-4-1(2). 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three ·percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign I 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
Id., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its to-
tal assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regard-
less of how much of its total assets a foreign company places 
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premi-
ums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic 
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate 
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the in- \ 
vestment provision permits foreign insurance companies to 
reduce, but. never to eliminate, t~ disc;imin: tion inher~n~ in 
the domestic preference tax statute:= ._.. 
3 There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and 
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of 
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 27-
4-6(a). 
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for ~Il]Jlaryjud,gn;en1, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that tlie"'"'"statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally related 
to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature reason-
ably could have believed that the classification would have 
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
Mter their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
'Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
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cuit court's findings as to the existence of kgitimate s~e 
m!r~ses, but remanded fo:r: an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of rational relationship, ruling that summary judgment 
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants~_wai;red 
their right to an evidentiary hearing oii'ttie is8uew.b_etlier the 
statute"Sclassification bore a rational relationshi to the two 
purposes oun y the c1rcm cou o e legitimate, and they 
requested a final determination of the legal issues with re-
spect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The 
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants 
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the 
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the 
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. --U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a re-
taliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the. days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and ex- ~ 
plicitly held that the E · ual Protection Clause im oses limits 
UQOn a ~ e ~o,;er o con 1 1on e ng t of a ore1gn cor-
porat'Fonio""'trousm~s within its borders. I d., at 667. We 
held that "( w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on do-
mestic corporations, unless the discrimination b~tw~e!} for-
eign and domes icc ~i n be s rifi()riatrel'iit1'0J""fo a 
le~ ~a;t,sta~p~r>ose." d., at 66- . 
~  
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes sought to be accomplished, the only 
question before us is whether those purposes found by the 
circuit court are legitimate. , • ... - .................... 
~. 
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A 
.(1) 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between 
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State contends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
.so contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
& Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory 
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, --U.S.--
(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Al-
lied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of do-
mestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal pro-
tection analysis. 5 Rather, we held that California's purpose 
6 We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports , Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate 
business of domestic insurer~ by deterring other States from 
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate 
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to ap-
prove its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic 
insurers in Alabama by penalizing fore~ ~ers who also 
want to do business in the State. Xlabama has made no at-
tempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other 
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign 
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to im-
prove its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc . v. Hardesty,--
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly. " 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at 9. 
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NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on out-
siders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or .their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 6 In 
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
6 Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
83-1274-0PINION 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS 9 
seeks to benefit domestic ind t by 
burde · ore1 
The State contends a Al t d Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow-
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
tic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. -
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold that pro-
motion of domestic business is a legitimate state purpose. 
Rather, instead of being concerned with promotion of domes-
tic business, it involves a statute that encourages non-
residents-who are not competitors of residents-to build 
warehouses within the State. Moreover, the discriminatory 
tax involved did not favor residents by burdening outsiders; 
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption 
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 
companies involved were not competing to provide ware-
housing services, granting the former an exemption did not 
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies sub-
ject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not in-
consistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic 
business within a State, by discriminating against foreign 
corporations that wish to do business there, is not a legiti-
mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
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lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it) does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 7, 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
provisiOns serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, 
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
7 In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, 
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States 
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they 
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this 
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on 
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 
n. 6. 
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 8 from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who de-
sire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally 
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection 
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the dis-
crimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with 
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We 
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no rea-
son now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-
mestic business. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as 
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a dis-
tinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S., 
at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circum-
stances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-
8 It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E . g., Western & Southern, supra, at 
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criminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate state ~ . ~ 
purpose. B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti- ~ ~L ~ 
mate was the encouragement' of capital investment in the Al-
7 
~~ 
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the ~ ~ 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favor-
able rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama ~- . _... . 
0 assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the /1 r- -.- 7 ~ 
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies ~ ~ 
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No S ~ 
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, for- -.,.. a. ~ . 
ei~ insurance companies are still required to pay a higher~ ' · . -~ 
gross premiums tax than domestic companies. 9 The State's ~ T--
in vestment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but ~ 
1 
_ G.~ 
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based .r.:l ~~ 
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in / .L. , -
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory ~ ~ ~ 
manner serves no legitimate state purpose. ·~  
IV / · 
~ lo-~ 
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by 
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed 
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra, at 
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause. 10 The 
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is re-
9 Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten 
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 
invest in the specified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4- 5. 
10 Some 15 additional purposes have been advanced by the State and ] 
the intervenors in support of the statute. As none of these was addressed 
by the courts below, we express no view as to their legitimacy. 
~;1-4a;v 
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versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. J 
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ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA y 
(?QgQm};)Qr --, 19¢' f~ ~ 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic 
insur~r as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its prin-
cipal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three ·percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. I d., § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. ) 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
!d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its to-
tal assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to 
two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty in-
surer may reduce its tax rate from four to three percent. 
Smaller tax reductions are available based on investment of 
smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regard-
less of how much of its total assets a foreign company places 
in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross premi-
ums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable domestic 
companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax rate 
even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, the in-
vestment provision permits foreign insurance companies to 
reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination inherent in 
the domestic preference tax statute. 
3 There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a), and 
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of 
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, id., § 27-
4-6(a). 
83-1274--0PINION 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 3 
II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created be-
tween foreign and domestic companies was rationally related 
to t ose purposes and that the Alabama legislature reason-
ably cou d have believed that the classification would have 
promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
4 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
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cuit court's tinfi~ as to the existence o legitimate state 
purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of rational relationship, that summary ju gment 
was inappropriate on that question because the evidence was 
in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme Court of Ala-
bama for certiorari on the affirmance of the legitimate state 
purpose issue, and the State and the intervenors petitioned 
for review of the remand order. Appellants then waived 
their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue whether the 
statute's classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the circuit cpurt to be legitimate, and they 
requested a final determination of the legal issues with re-
spect to their equal protection challenge to the statute. The 
supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. Appellants 
again waived their rights to an evidentiary hearing on the 
rational relationship issue and filed a joint motion with the 
other parties seeking rehearing and entry of a final judg-
ment. The motion was granted, and judgment was entered 
for the State and the intervenors. This appeal followed, and 
we noted probable jurisdiction. -- U. S. -- (1984). We 
now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 . 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins . Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation im-
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posed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their res-
idence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 117 
(1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a re-
taliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and ex-
plicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. !d., at 667. We 
held that "[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on do-
mestic corporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." !d., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes t e on y 
question before us is whether those purposes ·feu:Rel by tl~ 
-ewgw~ eew.~ are legitimate.~ 
6 
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.(1) 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between 
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formati of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State ontends that this Court has long held that the pro-
motion of domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate 
state purpose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In 
:So contending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western 
'& :Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory 
taxes. See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, -- U. S. --
(1984); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Al-
lied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 
317 U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke 
Co., 301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of do-
mestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal pro-
tection analysis.~ Rather, we held that California's purpose 
~We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
\ ~~ to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
'\) promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is in-
tegrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or na-
tional interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
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in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the interstate 
business of domestic insurers by deterring other States from 
enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a legitimate 
one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks us to ap-
prove its purpose of promoting the business of its domestic 
insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers who also 
want to do business in the State. Alabama has made no at-
tempt, as California did, to influence the policies of other 
States in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to foreign 
companies who wish to do interstate business in order to im-
prove its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lie'S in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, --
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 U. S. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at 9. 
• 
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NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court al-
ways has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax in-
volved in Western & Southern, which only burdens residents 
of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on out-
siders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" an 
advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking to 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
sumably to promote domestic industry within the StateJ In o/ 
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
""1 / ~Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
V vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. , 
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seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by 
qr~$\y -\1 r---4*i~~· tD foreign competitors. 
~scvi~iM: ~ T eState contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow-
~tV~-Sr ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for We ~~e wilh -1-A e. 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, findin L -l&l· fUI"ed. 5tDres 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies uild rw ·~ D + --
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state R ose. The ;Mt (). 51-tJ.t€ S ~oa..l 
State contends that this case shows that pr otion of domes- oj bvifV\i~ ·,~ ~ L_ 
tic business is a legitimate state purp under equal protec- bu.S\r\(~ tc; ~4-iMtt.Tt:..-
tion analysis. o.c.td 0 ft"' o.ct"~iv-Aiofe · 
b ct\.sd".W\~tf'A\iV\~ We disagree with the St e's interpretation of AlliedL--Jl-------
o.4t\C!.\- :{«L\t\V\ Stores and find that theca 1s not inconsistent with the other ::1 
us fbv-A.+ic:M.s cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not.(hold that pro- ~\ll'V'!.J 
mo Ion o omes 1c usme s is ;-legitimatEtJiS~ate flllPfl8B8JJ 
~~--~ S r--11~~~~~~i5t. instea? ~~:AQQPBee w4~H flP8M8ti8H sf Q8Hle~ ~ 
~ygiBess, It4Rv-et¥eg a statute that encourages non-
residents-who are not competitors of residents-to build 
.. 
warehouses within the State. MePeave!lS1Pe discriminatory 
tax involved did not favor residents by buri:iening outsiders; 
rather, it granted the nonresident businesses an exemption 
that residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 
companies involved were not competing to provide ware-
housing services, granting the former an exemption did not 
even directly affect adversely the domestic companies sub-
ject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not in-
consistent with our holding here that promotion of domestic 
business within a State, by discriminatin a ainst foreign 
corporations that wish business there, is not a egi 1-
mate state purpose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE 
BRENNAN, concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
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lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more ~han "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden in-
terstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance contextl ~ 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the .differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
prov1s1ons serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, 
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
... ~ 1-----L.In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 
'\1 ofthe McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, 
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States 
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they 
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this 
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on 
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 
n. 6. 
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(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different nmc-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
ower-one rotects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who de-
sire to do business within the State, thereby also incidentally 
placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal protection 
restraints are applicable even though the effect of the dis-
crimination in this case is similar to the type of burden with 
which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. We 
reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause in 
the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no rea-
son now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit do-
mestic business. A. A discriminatory tax would stand or fall 
depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-as 
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a dis-
tinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U.S., 
at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circum-
stances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-
'\Y ~It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at 






not a legitimate state 
B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement' of capital investment in the Al-
abama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
"---p-o-se-. Domestic insurers remain entitled to the more favor-
able rate of tax regardless of whether they invest in Alabama 
assets. Moreover, the investment incentive provision of the 
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance companies 
to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the statute. No 
matter how much of their assets they invest in Alabama, for-
eign insurance companies are still required to pay a higher 
gross premiums tax than domestic companies~ The State's 
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, but 
reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification based 
solely on residence. We hold that encouraging investment in 
Alabama assets and securities in this plainly discriminatory 
manner serves no legitimate state purpose. 
IV 
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furth ed by 
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and a ressed 
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see 'R.ra, at 
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Claus . ;JI/ The 
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court according y is re-
9 Section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by investing ten 
percent or more of its total assets in Alabama investments, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, 
and a foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate from four 
to three percent. Domestic insurers of all types, on the other hand, are 
required to pay tax at a rate of one percent, regardless of whether they 
invest in the s ecified Alabama investments. See id., § 27-4-5. 
10 Some 15 additwna purposes have been a vance by the State and 
the intervenors in support of the statute. As none of these was addressed ....__.._-
by the courts below, we express no view as to their legitimacy. 
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versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. ~ 
NCJ. ~ :>-fiJ...:/1- YYie:tYo~·~ Ltf< V. w~ 
l. S~vv-
1Jo~J-
1The State and the intervenors advanced some 15 additional 
purposes in support of the Alabama statute. As neither the 
Circuit Court nor the Court of Civil Appeals ruled on the 
legitimacy of those purposes, that question is not before us, and 
we express no view as to it. On remand, the State will be free 
to advance its arguments relating to the legitimacy of those 
purposes again. 
As the dissent finds our failure to resolve whether Alabama 
may continue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4, we 
reemphasize the procedural posture of the case: it arose on a 
motion for summary judgment. The Court of Civil Appeals upheld 
the Circuit Court's ruling that the two purposes identified by it 
were legitimate, but it remanded on the issue of rational 
relationship as to those purposes because it found the evidence 
in conflict. In order to obtain an expedited ruling, appellants 
waived their right to an evidentiary hearing only as to the 
purposes "which the lower courts have determined to be 
legitimate." App. to Juris. St., at 2a. Thus, for this Court to 
resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect the tax, it would 
have to decide de novo whether any of the other purposes was 
legitimate, and also whether the statute's classification bore a 
rational relationship to any of these purposes--all this, on a 
record that the Court of Civil Appeals deemed inadequate. 
1rndeed, under the State's analysis, ~discrimination could be 
justified simply on the gound that it favored one group at the 
expense of another. This case does not involve or question, as 
the dissent suggests, post, at 17, the broad authority of a State 
bo promote and regulate its own economy. we hold only that such 
regulation may not be accomplished by imposing discriminatorily 
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JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5, 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955,1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
'The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the state was limited to companies not chartered by the state. 
Act No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156 [1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 [1955] Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
1 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic 
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its prin-
cipal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
characterized as a foreign insurer. /d., § 27-4-1(2). 
I 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of three percent, and foreign companies 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate of four percent. 
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a). All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a rate of only one percent on all types of in-
surance premiums. !d., §27-4-5(a). 8 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
Id., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or more of its 
total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign 
life insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from 
three to two percent. Similarly, a foreign property and ca-
sualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from four to three per-
cent. Smaller tax reductions are available based on invest-
ment of smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. 
Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company 
places in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross 
premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable do-
mestic companies. These are entitled to the one percent tax 
rate even if they have no investments in the State. Thus, 
the investment provision permits foreign insurance compa-
nies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination in-
herent in the domestic preference tax statute. 
• There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code§ 27-4-4(a), and 
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of 





METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 3 
II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases • to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created 
between foreign and domestic companies was rationally re-
lated to those two purposes and that the Alabama legislature / 
reasonably could have believed that the classification would 
have promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the cir-
4 Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Company, a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
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cuit court's rulings as to the existence of the two legitimate l 
state purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on 
the issue of rational relationship, concluding that summary 
judgment was inappropriate on that question because the evi-
dence was in conflict. Appellants petitioned the Supreme 
Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the 
legitimate state purpose issue, and the State and the interve-
nors petitioned for review of the remand order. Appellants 
then waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue 
whether the statute's classification bore a rational relation-
ship to the two purposes found by the circuit court to be 
legitimate, and they requested a final determination of the 
legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge 
to the statute. The supreme court denied certiorari on all 
claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an eviden-
tiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and filed a 
joint motion with the other parties seeking rehearing and 
entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and 
judgment was entered for the State and the intervenors. 
This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 
-- U. S. -- (1984). We now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a state, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
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placed limits on other fonns of discriminatory taxation 
imposed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their 
residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 
117 (1968); Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 
522 (1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a re-
taliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home states of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a 
domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been 
granted only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfet-
tered discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected 
the longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and ex-
plicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. I d., at 667. We 
held that "[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
. burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on 
domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." Id., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes upheld by the Circuit Court, the I 
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The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between 
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State, agreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals, con- I 
tends that this Court has long held that the promotion of 
domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate state pur-
pose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In so con-
tending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western & 
Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory taxes. 
See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, --U.S.-- (1984); 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied 
Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 
U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 
1 The State and the intervenors advanced some 15 additional purposes in 
support of the Alabama statute. As neither the Circuit Court nor the 
Court of Civil Appeals ruled on the legitimacy of those purposes, that ques-
tion is not before us, and we express no view as to it. On remand, the 
State will be ~ ~ts arguments relating to the legitimacy of 
those purpose~ -- _ -- ~ 
As the dissent finds our failure to resolve whether Alabama may con-
tinue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4, we reemphasize the procedural 
posture of the case: it arose on a motion for summary judgment. The 
Court of Civil Appeals upheld the Circuit Court's ruling that the two pur-
poses identified by it were legitimate, but reman e on t e 1ssue of 
rational relationship as to those purposes because it found the evidence in 
conflict. In order to obtain an expedited ruling, appellants waived their 
right to an evidentiary hearing only as to the purposes ''which the lower 
courts have determined to be legitimate." App. to Juris. St., at 2a. 
Thus, for this Court to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect 
the tax, it would have to decide de novo whether any of the other purposes 
was legitimate, and also whether the statute's classification bore a rational 
relationship to any of these purposes-all this, on a record that the Court 
of Civil Appeals deemed inadequate. 
, 
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301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of 
domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal 
protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's pur- J 
\ • We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is 
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or 
national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of promoting domestic industry,"-- U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty,--
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must ''regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 u. s. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic VeT8U8 foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at 9. 
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pose in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the inter-
state business of domestic insurers by deterring other States 
from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a le-
gitimate one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks 
us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its do-
mestic insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers 
who also want to do business in the State. Alabama has 
made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of 
other States in order to enhance its domestic companies' abil-
ity to operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to 
foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order 
to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court 
always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." 358 U. S., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax 
involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens resi-
dents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on 
outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" 
an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking 
to do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
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Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Harwver Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U.S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, ''the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In ) 
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by ( 
grossly discriminating against foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bow-
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
tic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. We agree with the holding of Allied' 
Stores that a State's goal of bringing in new business is legiti-
1 Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
83-1274-0PINION 
10 METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 
mate and often admirable. Allied Stores does not, however, 
hold that promotion of domestic business by discriminating 
against foreign corporations is legitimate. The case involves 
instead a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not 
competitors of residents-to build warehouses within the 
State. The discriminatory tax involved did not favor resi-
dents by burdening outsiders; rather, it granted the nonres-
ident businesses an exemption that residents did not share. 
Since the foreign and domestic companies involved were not 
competing to provide warehousing services, granting the for-
mer an exemption did not even directly affect adversely the 
domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, 
Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that 
promotion of domestic business within a State, by discrimi-
nating against foreign corporations that wish to compete by \ 
doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 
358 U. S., at 532-533 (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward, 
p. 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
ing the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden 
interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
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reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis- I 
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
proVIsions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, supra, at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, 
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is " 'at least debatable' " 
(quoting United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the \ 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who 
desire to do business within the State, thereby also inciden-
8 In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., supra, 
322 U. S. 533, and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States 
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they 
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this 
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on 
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655 
n. 6. 
{ • It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at 
660, n. 12. 
.. \, 
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tally placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal pro-
tection restraints are applicable even though the effect of the 
discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden 
with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. 
We reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause 
in the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no 
reason now for reassessing that view. ., 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit 
domestic business. 10 A discriminatory tax would stand or ( 
fall depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-
as benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a 
distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra,-- U. S., 
at --. See n. 6 supra. We hold that under the circum-
stances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-
criminating against nonresident competitors is not a legiti-
mate state purpose. 
B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the 
Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
10 Indeed, under the State's analysis, any discrimination could be justi-
fied simply on the ~und that it favored one group at the xpense of an-
other. This case oes not mvolve or question, as the dissent suggests, 
post, at 17, the broad authority of a State to promote and regulate its own 
economy. We hold only that such regulation may not be accomplished by 
imposing discriminatorily higher taxes on nonresident corporations solely 
because they are nonresidents . 
, 
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statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose when furthered by discrimination. Domestic insurers l 
remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless 
of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, the 
investment incentive provision of the Alabama statute does 
not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the dis-
criminatory effect of the statute. No matter how much of 
their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance compa-
nies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax 
than domestic companies. The State's investment incentive I 
provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms, the statute's 
impermissible classification based solely on residence. We 
hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and se-
curities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legiti-
mate state purpose. 
IV 
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by 
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed 
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra, at 
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify I 
the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here. The 
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. · 
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ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
[FeeNar, -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes- ) 
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-~ ( JC(75' 1 
that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal Pro-
tection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
1 The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
~ business in the ~tate was limited to companies not chartered by the /tate. ~ 
Act No. 1(!ll849J Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on -
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156(DL945Y Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, 
Act No. 77 (01.9551 Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amend-
ments, has remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic 
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its prin-
cipal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3)0 A corporation that d@Jot meet both of these criteria is 
characterized as a foreign insurer. I d., §27-4-1(2). ~ { 
~I 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of thre percent, and foreigl! companies 3/ 
selling other types of insurance pay at a rate o our. percent. ~( 
Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a):;:! All domestic insurance companies, in 
contrast, pay at a ra~ only @percent on all types of in- .!/ 
surance premiums. t/.!!.0§ 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company domg the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
@ §27-4-4(b). By investing~percent or more of its to/ 
total assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign 
life insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from 
~to@percent. Similarly, a foreign roperty and ca-
sualty insurer may reduce its tax rate from ou tot e per- t+/.3/ 
cent. Smaller tax reductions are available based on invest-
ment of smaller percentages of a company's assets. Ibid. 
Regardless of how much of its total assets a foreign company 
places in Alabama investments, it can never reduce its gross 
premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable do- / 
mestic companies. These are entitled to the ne ercent tax .i 
rate even if they have no investments in the tate. Thus, 
the investment provision permits foreign insurance compa-
nies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the discrimination in-
herent in the domestic preference tax statute. 
8 There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(al9and 
for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-quarters of 
one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies,@ § 27-
4-6(a). 
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins . Co. v. State Board of Equalizatiorlf)451 U. S. 648 (1981), 
the court ruled that the Alabama statute did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause because it served "at least two pur-
poses, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the for-
mation of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) en-
couraging capital investment by foreign insurance companies 
in the Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth 
in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-21a. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created 
between foreign and domestic companies was rationally re-
lated to those two purposes and that the Alabama legislature 
reasonably could have believed that the classification would 
have promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
Mter their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the ~ir-
• Metropolitan Life Insurance C~ a New York corporation, was 
chosen to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property 
and Casualty Co§pany0a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as repre-
sentative of the no life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
~ I 
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cuit Jourt's rulings as to the existence of the two legitimate I 
state purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on 
the issue of rational relationship, concluding that summary 
judgment was inappropriate on that question because the evi-
dence was in conflict. I\ Appellants petitioned the Supreme 
Court of Alabama for certiorari on the affirmance of the 
legitimate state purpose issue, and the State and the interve-
nors petitioned for review of the remand order. Appellants 
then waived their right to an evidentiary hearing on the issue 
whether the statute's classification bore a rational relation- ~ /:./ 
ship to the two purposes found by the ¢ircuit ¢ourt to be ¥ .!! 
legitimate, and they requested a final determination of the 
legal issues with respect to their equal protection challenge 
to the statute. The ~upreme lourt denied certiorari on all 
claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an eviden-
tiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and filed a 
joint motion with the other parties seeking rehearing and 
entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and 
judgment was entered for the State and the intervenors. 
This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 
--7\- U. S. -- (1984). We now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization~ supra, the jurisprudence of 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause to discrimina-
tory tax statutes had a somewhat checkered history. Lin-
coln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 U. S. 673 (1945), 
held that so-called "privilege" taxes, required to be paid by a 
foreign corporation before it would be permitted to do busi-
ness within a ~tate, were immune from equal protection chal-
lenge. That case stood in stark contrast, however, to the 
Court's prior decisions in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 
U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later decisions, in which the 
Court had recognized that the Equal Protection Clause 
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placed limits on other forms of discriminatory taxation 
imposed on out-of-state corporations solely because of their 
residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 U. S. 
117 (1968); Allied Store~ {nc.[Ot Ohiq v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 
522 (1959); Wheeling Stee Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a re-
taliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home 'Jtates of those companies ~ 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a 
domestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been 
granted only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfet-
tered discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected 
the longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and ex-
plicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. ld., at 667. We 
held that "[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on 
domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." ld., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
tion to the two purposes upheld by the Circuit Court, the I 
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The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between 
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State, agreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals, con- l 
tends that this Court has long held that the promotion of 
domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate state pur-
pose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In so con-
tending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western & 
Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory taxes. .J,_c.j 
See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, +- U. S. -- (1984); ~o 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied 
StoreslJ_ncJofOhi v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 
U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 
6 The State and the intervenors advanced some 15 additional purposes in 
support of the Alabama statute. As neither the Circuit Court nor the 
Court of Civil Appeals ruled on the legitimacy of those purposes, that ques-
tion is not before us, and we express no view as to it. On remand, the 
State will be free to advance 'ts arguments relating to the legitimacy of 
those purpose ain. 
As the dissent nds our failure to resolve whether Alabama may con-
tinue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4, we reemphasize the procedural 
posture of the case: it arose on a motion for summary judgment. The 
Court of Civil Appeals upheld the Circuit Court's ruling that the two pur- .Jhe aPf£tl 4 :k_ c..ot...vJ-
poses identified by it were legitimate, but · reman e on the issue of 
rational relationship as to those purposes because it found the evidence in 
conflict. In order to obtain an expedited ruling, appellants waived their 
right to an evidentiary hearing only as to the purposes "which the lower 
courts have determined to be legitimate." App. to Juris. St., at 2a. 
Thus, for this Court to resolve whether Alabama may continue to collect 
the tax, it would have to decide de novo whether any of the other purposes 
was legitimate, and also whether the statute's classification bore a rational 
relationship to any of these purposes-all this, on a record that the Court 
of Civil Appeals deemed inadequate. 
@I 
83-1274-0PINION 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 7 
301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of 
domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal 
protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's pur-
8 We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is 
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or 
national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a ~tate purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of(§romotf~domestic industry," -k U.S.--,-- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, -A::-
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 u. s.037J142{f97oD 
Other cases citedoY the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
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pose in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the inter-
state business of domestic insurers by deterring other States 
from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a le-
gitimate one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks 
us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its do-
mestic insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers 
who also want to do business in the State. Alabama has 
made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of 
other States in order to enhance its domestic companies' abil-
ity to operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to 
foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order 
to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in l':q q) j 
Allied Store , Inc. o hio v. Bowers, ~this Court '358" U.S. 5~d. ll 5 /1 
always has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a 
State to discriminate in favor of its own residents solely by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our fed-
eration." ([58~ at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax 
involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens resi-
dents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on 
outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" 
an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking 
to do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
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Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In I 
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by 
grossly discriminating against foreign competitor J ~ J 
The State contends that Allied Store , Inc. ofOhi v. Bow- ~~ 
ers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held true. 
In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on equal 
protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted foreign 
corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held for 
storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, finding 
that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to build 
warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The 
State contends that this case shows that promotion of domes-
tic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal protec-
tion analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. We agree with the holding of Allied J 
Stores that a State's goal of bringing in new business is legiti-
7 Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
~r 
83-1274-0PINION 
10 METROPOLITAN LIFE INS. CO. v. WARD 
mate and often admirable. Allied Stores does not, however, 
hold that promotion of domestic business by discriminating 
against foreign corporations is legitimate. The case involves 
instead a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not 
competitors of residents-to build warehouses within the 
State. The discriminatory tax involved did not favor resi-
dents by burdening outsiders; rather, it granted the notfes-
ident businesses an exemption that residents did not slfare. 
Since the foreign and domestic companies involved were not 
competing to provide warehousing services, granting the for-
mer an exemption did not even directly affect adversely the 
domestic companies subject to the tax. On its facts, then, 
Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding here that 
promotion of domestic business within a State, by discrimi-
nating against foreign corporations that wish to compete by I 
doing business there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 
358 U. S., at 532-533((.JUSTICE BRENNA~concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee War<Jo 
® 22. The State maintains that because Congress, in enact-
mg the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, 
intended to authorize States to impose taxes that burden 
interstate commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue 
here must stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental 
than as characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Com-
merce Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
1'1)/ 
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reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on dis-
criminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8 I 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
prov1s1ons serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See / 
Western & Southern, ~at 674 (if purpose is legitimate, J./-51 ti.S.f-
equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
(quoting United States v. Carotene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the I J 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Co~ v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 421, rpQ 
423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is to 
place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who 
desire to do business within the State, thereby also inciden-
8 In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn.,~ 
322 U. S. ~and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the States 
any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what they 
had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed this 
Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places limits on 
a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 655A 
n. 6. 
9 It is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at 
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tally placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal pro-
tection restraints are applicable even though the effect of the 
discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden 
with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. 
We reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause 
in the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no 
reason now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always a 
legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if the 
State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit 
domestic business. 10 A discriminatory tax would stand or 
fall depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-
as benefi~ng one group or as harming another. This is a 
distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce i } 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias,~* U.S., ~) J./-08 
at--. Seen. 6~upra. We hold that under the circum-
stances of this case, promotion of domestic business by dis-
criminating against nonresident competitors is not a legiti- I 
mate state purpose. 
B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the 
Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
10 Indeed, under the State's analysis, any discrimination could be justi-
fied simply on the !und that it favored one group at the expense of an-
other. This case oes not involve or question, as the dissent suggests, 
post, at 17, the broad authority of a State to promote and regulate its own 
economy. We hold only that such regulation may not be accomplished by 
imposing discriminatorily higher taxes on nonresident corporations solely 
because they are nonresidents. 
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statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose when furthered by discrimination. Domestic insurers I 
remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless 
of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, the 
investment incentive provision of the Alabama statute does 
not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the dis-
criminatory effect of the statute. No matter how much of 
their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance compa-
nies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax 
than domestic companies. The State's investment incentive 
provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms, the statute's 
impermissible classification based solely on residence. We 
hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and se-
curities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legiti-
mate state purpose. 
IV 
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by 
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed 
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra, at 
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify I 
the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here. The 
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 
No. 83-1274 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, 
ET AL., APPELLANTS v. W. G. WARD, JR., 
ET AL. 
ON APPEAL FROM THE SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA 
[March -, 1985] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's domes-
tic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§ 27-4-4 and 27-4-5 
(1975), that taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a 
higher rate than domestic insurance companies, violates the 
Equal Protection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955,1 the State of Alabama has granted a preference 
to its domestic insurance companies by imposing a substan-
tially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than on out-of-
state (foreign) companies. 2 Under the current statutory 
1 The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute date back to 
1849, when the first tax on premiums earned by insurance companies doing 
business in the State was limited to companies not chartered by the State. 
Act No. 1, 1849 Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was imposed on 
and off throughout the years until 1945, when the State restored equality 
in taxation of insurance companies in response to this Court's decision in 
United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 U. S. 533 (1944). 
Act No. 156, 1945 Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, the tax was reinstated, Act 
No. 77, 1955 Ala. Acts 193 (2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has 
remained in effect until the present. 
2 For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a domestic 
insurer as a company that both is incorporated in Alabama and has its prin-
cipal office and chief place of business within the State. Ala. Code 
§ 27-4-1(3) (1975). A corporation that does not meet both of these criteria 
is characterized as a foreign insurer. § 27-4-1(2). 
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provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay a tax on 
their gross premiums received from business conducted in 
Alabama at a rate of 3 percent, and foreign companies selling 
other types of insurance pay at a rate of 4 percent. Ala. 
Code § 27-4-4(a) (1975). All domestic insurance companies, 
in contrast, pay at a rate of only 1 percent on all types of 
insurance premiums. § 27-4-5(a). 3 As a result, a foreign 
insurance company doing the same type and volume of busi-
ness in Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay 
three to four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its 
domestic competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in gross 
premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages of their 
worldwide assets in specified Alabama assets and securities. 
§ 27-4-4(b). By investing 10 percent or more of its total 
assets in Alabama investments, for example, a foreign life 
insurer may reduce its gross premiums tax rate from 3 to 2 
percent. Similarly, a foreign property and casualty insurer 
may reduce its tax rate from 4 to 3 percent. Smaller tax re-
ductions are available based on investment of smaller per-
centages of a company's assets. Ibid. Regardless of how 
much of its total assets a foreign company places in Alabama 
investments, it can never reduce its gross premiums tax rate 
to the same level paid by comparable domestic companies. 
These are entitled to the 1 percent tax rate even if they have 
no investments in the State. Thus, the investment provision 
permits foreign insurance companies to reduce, but never to 
eliminate, the discrimination inherent in the domestic prefer-
ence tax statute. 
3 There are two exceptions to these general rules concerning the rates 
of taxation of insurance companies. For annuities, the tax rate is one 
percent for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code § 27-4-4(a) 
(1975), and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the rate is three-
quarters of one percent for both foreign and domestic insurance companies, 
§ 27-4-6(a). 
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II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the Ala-
bama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that the 
domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, violated 
the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds of taxes 
paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The Commis-
sioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be un-
constitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make the 
appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies inter-
vened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, selecting 
two claims as lead cases 4 to be tried and binding on all claim-
ants. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court 
ruled on May 17, 1982, that the statute was constitutional. 
Relying on this Court's opinion in Western & Southern Life 
Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization of California, 451 
U. S. 648 (1981), the court ruled that the Alabama statute did 
not violate the Equal Protection Clause because it served "at 
least two purposes, in addition to raising revenue: (1) encour-
aging the formation of new insurance companies in Alabama, 
and (2) encouraging capital investment by foreign insurance 
companies in the Alabama assets and governmental securi-
ties set forth in the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 
20a-21a. The court also found that the distinction the stat-
ute created between foreign and domestic companies was ra-
tionally related to those two purposes and that the Alabama 
Legislature reasonably could have believed that the classifi-
cation would have promoted those purposes. I d., at 21a. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, appellants 
appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It affirmed the Cir-
• Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., a New York corporation, was chosen 
to represent the life insurance claimants, and Prudential Property and Ca-
sualty Co., a New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of the 
nonlife claimants. See App. 314-315. 
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cuit Court's rulings as to the existence of the two legitimate 
state purposes, but remanded for an evidentiary hearing on 
the issue of rational relationship, concluding that summary 
judgment was inappropriate on that question because the evi-
dence was in conflict. 437 So. 2d 535 (1983). Appellants 
petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on 
the affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and the 
State and the intervenors petitioned for review of the re-
mand order. Appellants then waived their right to an evi-
dentiary hearing on the issue whether the statute's classifica-
tion bore a rational relationship to the two purposes found by 
the Circuit Court to be legitimate, and they requested a final 
determination of the legal issues with respect to their equal 
protection challenge to the statute. The Supreme Court de-
nied certiorari on all claims. Appellants again waived their 
rights to an evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship 
issue and filed a joint motion with the other parties seeking 
rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was 
granted, and judgment was entered for the State and the in-
tervenors. This appeal followed, and we noted probable ju-
risdiction. 466 U. S. -- (1984). We now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. 
v. State Board of Equalization of California, supra, the ju-
risprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection 
Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat check-
ered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 325 
U. S. 673 (1945), held that so-called "privilege" taxes, re-
quired to be paid by a foreign corporation before it would be 
permitted to do business within a State, were immune from 
equal protection challenge. That case stood in stark con-
trast, however, to the Court's prior decisions in Southern R. 
Co. v. Greene, 216 U. S. 400 (1910), and Hanover Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Harding, 272 U. S. 494 (1926), as well as to later deci-
sions, in which the Court had recognized that th~ Equal Pro-
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tection Clause placed limits on other forms of discriminatory 
taxation imposed on out-of-state corporations solely because 
of their residence. See, e. g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 
U. S. 117 (1968); Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 
U. S. 522 (1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U. S. 
562 (1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an equal 
protection challenge to a California statute imposing a re-
taliatory tax on foreign insurance companies doing business 
within the State, when the home States of those companies 
imposed a similar tax on California insurers entering their 
borders. We concluded that Lincoln was no more than "a 
surprising throwback" to the days before enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment and in which incorporation of a do-
mestic corporation or entry of a foreign one had been granted 
only as a matter of privilege by the State in its unfettered 
discretion. 451 U. S., at 665. We therefore rejected the 
longstanding but "anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and ex-
plicitly held that the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits 
upon a State's power to condition the right of a foreign cor-
poration to do business within its borders. I d., at 667. ~ We 
held that "[ w ]e consider it now established that, whatever 
the extent of a State's authority to exclude foreign corpora-
tions from doing business within its boundaries, that author-
ity does not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on 
domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between for-
eign and domestic corporations bears a rational relation to a 
legitimate state purpose." !d., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an evidentiary 
hearing on the issue whether the classification in the Ala-
bama domestic preference tax statute bears a rational rela-
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The first of the purposes found by the trial court to be a 
legitimate reason for the statute's classification between 
foreign and domestic corporations is that it encourages the 
formation of new domestic insurance companies in Alabama. 
The State, agreeing with the Court of Civil Appeals, con-
tends that this Court has long held that the promotion of 
domestic industry, in and of itself, is a legitimate state pur-
pose that will survive equal protection scrutiny. In so con-
tending, it relies on a series of cases, including Western & 
Southern, that are said to have upheld discriminatory taxes. 
See Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S. -- (1984); 
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U. S. 137 (1970); Allied 
Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 
U. S. 341 (1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 
5 The State and the intervenors advanced some 15 additional purposes in 
support of the Alabama statute. As neither the Circuit Court nor the 
Court of Civil Appeals ruled on the legitimacy of those purposes, that ques-
tion is not before us, and we express no view as to it. On remand, the 
State will be free to advance again its arguments relating to the legitimacy 
of those purposes. 
As the dissent finds our failure to resolve whether Alabama may con-
tinue to collect its tax "baffling," post, at 4, we reemphasize the procedural 
posture of the case: it arose on a motion for summary judgment. The 
Court of Civil Appeals upheld the Circuit Court's ruling that the two pur-
poses identified by it were legitimate, but the appellate court remanded on 
the issue of rational relationship as to those purposes because it found the 
evidence in conflict. In order to obtain an expedited ruling, appellants 
waived their right to an evidentiary hearing only as to the purposes "which 
the lower courts have determined to be legitimate." App. to Juris. St., at 
2a. Thus, for this Court to resolve whether Alabama may continue to col-
lect the tax, it would have to decide de novo whether any of the other pur-
poses was legitimate, and also whether the statute's classification bore a 
rational relationship to any of these purposes-all this, on a record that the 
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301 U. S. 495 (1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 
u. s. 553 (1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the State's con-
tention. In Western & Southern, the case principally relied 
upon, we did not hold as a general rule that promotion of 
domestic industry is a legitimate state purpose under equal 
protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's pur-
6 We find the other cases on which the State relies also to be inapposite 
to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and Parker discussed whether 
promotion of local industry is a valid state purpose under the Commerce 
Clause. The Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is 
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose implicates local or 
national interests. The Equal Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned 
with whether a state purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether the 
discrimination involves local or other interests is not central to the inquiry 
to be made. Thus, the fact that promotion of local industry is a legitimate 
state interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about its valid-
ity under equal protection analysis. See infra, at 10-11. 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's ability to pro-
mote domestic industry was unlimited, even under the Commerce Clause. 
Thus, in Bacchus, although we observed as a general matter that "a State 
may enact laws pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of encouraging domestic industry," 468 U. S. --, -- (1984), we 
held that in so doing, a State may not constitutionally impose a discrimina-
tory burden upon the business of other States, merely to protect and pro-
mote local business, id., at--. Accord Armco Inc. v. Hardesty, 467 
U. S. --, -- (1984). Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state 
statute promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulat[e] evenhand-
edly." 397 U. S., at 142. 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to the legitimacy of 
promoting local business at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the valid-
ity of a state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Educa-
tion deals with the State's ability to regulate matters relating to probate. 
Bowers is the only one of the State's cases that involves the validity under 
the Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis of resi-
dence of domestic versus foreign corporations. That case does little, how-
ever, to support the State's contention that promotion of domestic business 
is a legitimate state purpose. It was concerned with encouraging nonres-
idents-who are not competitors of residents-to build warehouses within 
the State. See irifra, at 9 . 
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pose in enacting the retaliatory tax-to promote the inter-
state business of domestic insurers by deterring other States 
from enacting discriminatory or excessive taxes-was a le-
gitimate one. 451 U. S., at 668. In contrast, Alabama asks 
us to approve its purpose of promoting the business of its do-
mestic insurers in Alabama by penalizing foreign insurers 
who also want to do business in the State. Alabama has 
made no attempt, as California did, to influence the policies of 
other States in order to enhance its domestic companies' abil-
ity to operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to 
foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in order 
to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in the 
fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry is 
purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to favor 
domestic industry within the State, no matter what the cost 
to foreign corporations also seeking to do business there. 
Alabama's purpose, contrary to California's, constitutes the 
very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Protec-
tion Clause was intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BREN-
NAN, joined by Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in 
Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U. S. 522 (1959), 
this Court always has held that the Equal Protection Clause 
forbids a State to discriminate in favor of its own residents 
solely by burdening "the residents of other state members 
of our federation." I d., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory tax 
involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens resi-
dents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory tax on 
outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the "home team" 
an advantage by burdening all foreign corporations seeking 
to do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not constitution-
ally favor its own residents by taxing foreign corporations at 
a higher rate solely because of their residence is confirmed by 
a long line of this Court's cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. 
l. 
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Glassboro, 393 U. S., at 119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. 
Glander, 337 U. S., at 571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Har-
ding, 272 U. S., at 511; Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 
U. S., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 258 (1965) (per curiam). As the Court stated in Hano-
ver Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens on 
business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is to be 
classified with domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 
U. S., at 511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax 
was imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing busi-
ness within the State solely because of their residence, pre-
sumably to promote domestic industry within the State. 7 In 
relying on these cases and rejecting Lincoln in Western & 
Southern, we reaffirmed the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
seeks to benefit domestic industry within the State only by 
grossly discriminating against foreign competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores of Ohio, Inc. v. 
Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always held 
true. In that case, a domestic merchandiser challenged on 
equal protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted for-
eign corporations from a tax on the value of merchandise held 
for storage within the State. The Court upheld the tax, 
finding that the purpose of encouraging foreign companies to 
build warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. 
The State contends that this case shows that promotion of do-
mestic business is a legitimate state purpose under equal pro-
tection analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
Stores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the other 
cases on which we rely. We agree with the holding of Allied 
Stores that a State's goal of bringing in new business is legiti-
7 Although the promotion of domestic business was not a purpose ad-
vanced by the States in support of their taxes in these cases, such promo-
tion is logically the primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such 
as those at issue there. 
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mate and often admirable. Allied Stores does not, however, 
hold that promotion of domestic business by discriminating 
against foreign corporations is legitimate. The case involves 
instead a statute that encourages nonresidents-who are not 
competitors of residents-to build warehouses within the 
State. The discriminatory tax involved did not favor resi-
dents by burdening outsiders; rather, it granted the non-
resident businesses an exemption that residents did not 
share. Since the foreign and domestic companies involved 
were not competing to provide warehousing services, grant-
ing the former an exemption did not even directly affect ad-
versely the domestic companies subject to the tax. On its 
facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with our holding 
here that promotion of domestic business within a State, by 
discriminating against foreign corporations that wish to com-
pete by doing business there, is not a legitimate state pur-
pose. See 358 U. S., at 532-533 (BRENNAN, J., concurring). 
(2) 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible to 
view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here as vio-
lative of the Equal Protection Clause. This approach, it con-
tends, amounts to no more than "Commerce Clause rhetoric 
in equal protection clothing." Brief for Appellee Ward 22. 
The State maintains that because Congress, in enacting the 
McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U. S. C. §§ 1011-1015, intended 
to authorize States to impose taxes that burden interstate 
commerce in the insurance field, the tax at issue here must 
stand. Our concerns are much more fundamental than as 
characterized by the State. Although the McCarran-Fergu-
son Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce 
Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in any way 
the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As noted 
above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly reaf-
'i. 
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firmed the viability of equal protection restraints on discrimi-
natory taxes in the insurance context. 8 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences be-
tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
proviSions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden 
the state law would impose on interstate commerce. In the 
equal protection context, however, if the State's purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as the 
burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to that pur-
pose, a relationship that is not difficult to establish. See 
Western & Southern, 451 U. S., at 674 (if purpose is legiti-
mate, equal protection challenge may not prevail so long as 
the question of rational relationship is "'at least debatable'" 
(quoting United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U. S. 
144, 154 (1938)). 
The two constitutional provisions perform different func-
tions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a State's 
power-one protects interstate commerce, and the other pro-
tects persons 9 from unconstitutional discrimination by the 
States. See Bethlehem Motors Corp. v. Flynt, 256 U. S. 
421, 423-424 (1921). The effect of the statute at issue here is 
to place a discriminatory tax burden on foreign insurers who 
desire to do business within the State, thereby also inciden-
8 In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the legislative history 
of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals that the Act was Congress's re-
sponse only to United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 
U. S. 533 (1944), and that Congress did not intend thereby to give the 
States any power to tax or regulate the insurance industry other than what 
they had previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left undisturbed 
this Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection Clause places lim-
its on a State's ability to tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 U. S., at 
655, n. 6. 
9 1t is well established that a corporation is a "person" within the mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment. E. g., Western & Southern, supra, at 
660, n. 12. 
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tally placing a burden on interstate commerce. Equal pro-
tection restraints are applicable even though the effect of the 
discrimination in this case is similar to the type of burden 
with which the Commerce Clause also would be concerned. 
We reaffirmed the importance of the Equal Protection Clause 
in the insurance context in Western & Southern and see no 
reason now for reassessing that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, acceptance of 
its contention that promotion of domestic industry is always 
a legitimate state purpose under equal protection analysis 
would eviscerate the Equal Protection Clause in this context. 
A State's natural inclination frequently would be to prefer 
domestic business over foreign. If we accept the State's 
view here, then any discriminatory tax would be valid if 
the State could show it reasonably was intended to benefit 
domestic business. 10 A discriminatory tax would stand or 
fall depending primarily on how a State framed its purpose-
as benefiting one group or as harming another. This is a dis-
tinction without a difference, and one that we rejected last 
term in an analogous context arising under the Commerce 
Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U. S., at--. 
See n. 6, supra. We hold that under the circumstances of 
this case, promotion of domestic business by discriminating 
against nonresident competitors is not a legitimate state 
purpose. 
B 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be legiti-
mate was the encouragement of capital investment in the 
10 Indeed, under the State's analysis, any discrimination subject to the 
rational relation level of scrutiny could be justified simply on the ground 
that it favored one group at the expense of another. This case does not 
involve or question, as the dissent suggests, post, at 17, the broad author-
ity of a State to promote and regulate its own economy. We hold only that 
such regulation may not be accomplished by imposing discriminatorily 
higher taxes on nonresident corporations solely because they are 
nonresidents. 
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Alabama assets and governmental securities specified in the 
statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate state pur-
pose when furthered by discrimination. Domestic insurers 
remain entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless 
of whether they invest in Alabama assets. Moreover, the 
investment incentive provision of the Alabama statute does 
not enable foreign insurance companies to eliminate the dis-
criminatory effect of the statute. No matter how much of 
their assets they invest in Alabama, foreign insurance compa-
nies are still required to pay a higher gross premiums tax 
than domestic companies. The State's investment incentive 
provision therefore does not cure, but reaffirms, the statute's 
impermissible classification based solely on residence. We 
hold that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and se-
curities in this plainly discriminatory manner serves no legiti-
mate state purpose. 
IV 
We conclude that neither of the two purposes furthered by 
the Alabama domestic preference tax statute and addressed 
by the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, see supra, at 
3, is legitimate under the Equal Protection Clause to justify 
the imposition of the discriminatory tax at issue here. The 
judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court accordingly is re-
versed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings not 
inconsistent with this opinion. 
It is so ordered. 
~s November 26, 1984 
No. 83-1274 
METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., et al., APPELLANTS, v. 
W.G. WARD, JR., et al. 
APPEAL FROM THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT 
[November __ , 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's 
H-j 
domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §27-4-4, nhiGR 
taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a higher rate 
- . 
2. 
than domestic insurance companies, violates the Equal 
Protection Clause. 
I 
ffince 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a 
preference to its domestic insurance companies by imposing 
a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than 
01 out-of-state (foreign) 
2 
companies. Under the current 
1The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax 
statute date back to 1849, when the first tax on premiums 
earned by insurance companies doing business in the state 
was limited to companies not chartered by the state. Act 
No. 1 [1849) Ala. Acts 1· A domestic preference tax was 
imposed on and off throughout the years until 1945, when 
~e State restored equality in taxation of insurance 
rompanies in response to this Court's decision in United 
States v. Southeastern Underwriters' Ass' n, 322 U.S. 533 
r 
(1944). Act No. 156 [1945) Ala. Acts 190. In 1955, the 
tax was reinstated, Act No. 77 [ 1955] Ala. Acts 193 ( 2d 
Sp. Sess.) , and with minor amendments, has remained in 
effect until the present. 
2For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a 
domestic insurer 




as a company that both is incorporated in 
its principal office and chief place of 
the State. Ala. Code §27-4-1(3). A 
does not meet both of these criteria is 




statutory provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay 
tax on their gross premiums received ~ business 
,A.. 
conducted in Alabama at a rate of three percent, and 
foreign companies selling other types of insurance pay at 
a rate of four percent. Ala. Code §27-4-4(a). All 
domestic insurance companies, in contrast, pay at a rate 
of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. 
M., §27-4-S(a) • 3 As a result, a foreign insurance 
company doing the same type and volume of business in 
Alabama as a domestic company ~il~ generallYApay three to 
four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its domestic 
3There are two exceptions to these general rules 
concerning the rates of taxation of insurance companies. 
'!hey are that for annuities, the tax rate is one percent 
for both foreign and domestic insurers, see Ala. Code §27-
~4, and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the 
rate is three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and 




Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in 
gross premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages 
of their worldwide assets in specified investments in 
Alabama. !d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or 
more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for 
example, a foreign life insurer may reduce its gross 
premiums tax rate from three to two percent. Similarly, a 
foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax 
rate from four to three percent. Smaller tax reductions 
are available based on investment of smaller percentages 
of a company's assets. !d. Regardless of how much of its 
total assets a foreign company invests in Alabama 






premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable 
domestic companies, ~re entitled to the one percent 
tax rate even if they have no investments in the State. 
'Ihus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance 
companies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the 
discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax 
statute. 
II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the 
Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that 
the domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds 




Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on 
July 8' 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be 
mconsti tutional and requiring the Commissioner to make 
the appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies 
mtervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, 
selecting 4 cases to be and claims lead two tried as 
binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the court ruled on May 17, 1982, that the 
statute was constitutional. Relying on this Court's 
cpinion in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board 
4Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York 
corporation, was chosen to represent the life insurance 
claimants, and Prudential Property and Casualty Company, a 
New Jersey corporation; was chosen as representative of 
the non-life claimants. See Jt. App., at 314-315 • 
7. 
of Equalization, 451 u.s. 648 (1981), the court ruled that 
the Alabama statute did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in 
&') ~ 
addition to raising revenue: )l> encourag1~ the formation 
"~') ~ 
of new insurance companies in Alabama, and Ji> encouragift9 
capital investment by foreign insurance companies in the 
Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth in 
the statute." J. s. App., at 20a-2la. The court also 
found that the distinction the statute created between 
foreign and domestic companies was rationally related to 
those purposes and that the Alabama legislature could 
reasonably have believed that the classification would 
tave promoted those purposes. Id., at 2la. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, 
J.+-




I .. ' 
8. 
affirmed the circuit court's findings as to the existence 
of legitimate state purposes, but remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of rational relationship, 
ruling that summary judgment was inappropriate on that 
question because the evidence was in conflict. Appellants 
petitioned the Alabama Supreme Court for certiorari on the 
affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and the 
state and the intervenors petitioned for review of the 
remand order. Appellants then waived their right to an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the statute's 
classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the trial court to be legitimate, and 
they requested a final determination of the legal issues 
Lv7.J./c. ~-~- k 
~g their equal protection challenge to the statute. 
1\ 
~ 
The supreme court denied certiorari on all claims. 
. -. 
9. 
Appellants again waived their rights to an evidentiary 
hearing on the rational relationship issue and filed a 
joint motion with the other parties seeking rehearing and 
entry of a final judgment. The motion was granted, and 
judgment was entered for the State and the intervenors. 
This appeal followed, and we noted probable jurisdiction. 
u.s. (1984>. w.a... ~ ~ ·. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. 
Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the 
jurisprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection 
Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat 
checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. 
Read, 325 u.s. 673 (1945), held that so-called "privilege" 
taxes, required to be paid by a foreign corporation before 
•· 
. "' 
• <. • 
10. 
it would be permitted to do business within a state, were 
inunune from equal protection challenge. That case stood 
in stark contrast, however, to the Court's prior decisions 
in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 u.s. 400 (1910), and 
~~~ 
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s. 494 (1926), ~ ~ 
to later decisions, in which the Court had recognized that 
the Equal Protection Clause placed limits on other forms 
of discriminatory taxation imposed on out-of-state 
corporations solely because of their residence. See, 
e.g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 u.s. 117 (1968); Allied 
Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 u.s. 522 (1959); Wheeling 
Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 u.s. 562 (1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an 
equal protection challenge to California's statute 
.~ 
·. 
.~ • 11. 
imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies 
doing business within the State, when the home states of 
those companies imposed a similar tax on California 
insurers entering their borders. We concluded that 
Uncoln was no more than "a surprising throwback" to the 
days before enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in 
which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of 
a foreign one had been granted only as a matter of 
privilege by the State in its unfettered discretion. 451 
u.s., at 665. We therefore ~~the longstanding but 
"anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that 
the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits upon a State's 
power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to 
do business within its borders. we held that "[w]e 




State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from 
doing business within its boundaries, that authority does 
not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on 
domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between 
foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational 
relation to a legitimate state purpose." ~at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the 
classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes 
sought to be accomplished, the only question before us is 
whether those purposes found by the trial court 5 are 
5
Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled 
a list of 17 state purposes they contend are served by the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
.• 
... 





The first of the purposes found by the trial court to 
be a legitimate reason for the statute's classification 
between foreign and domestic corporations is that it 
encourages the formation of new domestic insurance 
companies in Alabama. The State contends that this Court 
has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in 
and of itself, is a legitimate state purpose that will 
survive equal protection scrutiny. In so contending, it 
relies on a series of cases, including Western & Southern, 
statute and are legitimate under equal protection 
analysis. See Jt. App., at 27-33. We decline to review 
those here, as they are not before us, but remand to the 
. trial court to determine whether any of them ~ 
legitimate and rationally related to the classification 
set forth in the statute • 
... 
14. 
that have upheld discriminatory taxes. See Bacchus 
.Jmports, Ltd. v. Dias, __ u.s. __ (1984); Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 u.s. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. v. 
Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 (1943); 
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 u.s. 495 
(1937); Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 u.s. 553 
(1906). ~ ~~~ 
tfl 7l£ c~ U,./<.;(~,<1' aPe '<9 k 




we did not hold that promotion of domestic 
industry is always a legitimate state purpose under equal 
protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that California's 
6we find the other cases relied on by the State also to 
be inapposite to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and 
Parker discussed whether promotion of local industry is a 
valid state purpose under the Commerce Clause. The 
Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is 
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose 
implicates local or national interests. The Equal 
Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned with whether 
Footnote continued on next page. 
... 
15. 
purpose in enacting the retaliatory tax--to promote the 
interstate business of domestic insurers by deterring 
a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory: whether 
the discrimination involves local or other interests is 
not central to the inquiry to be made. Thus, the fact 
that promotion of local industry is a legitimate state 
interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about 
its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, 
cC. • 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's 
chili ty to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even 
mder the Commerce Clause. Thus, in Bacchus, although we 
observed as a general matter that "a State may enact laws 
pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of promoting domestic industry," __ u.s., at __ ~ 
[104 s.ct., at 3056], we he~~. that in so doing, a State ~;;;,. 
may not constitutionally im~e a discriminatory burden ~· 
upon the business of other States, merely to protect and ~~ 
promote local business, id., at __ [104 s.ct., at 3057] . ..(~~·. 
Likewise, in Pike, the Court held that the state statute .,,.. ~~~ 
promoting a legitimate local interest must "regulate / o ... 1. 
evenhandedly." 397 u.s., at 142. /, ~.v· 
Other 9f .th,. cases cited by the State are simply (lot.l-· 
irrelevant: to the legitimacy of promoting local business 'l,fo1P ~'} 
at all. Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a ~ 
state unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of 
ffiucation deals with the State's ability to regulate 
matters relating to probate. Bowers is the only one of 
the State's cases that involves the validity under the 
Equal Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the 
msis of residence of domestic versus foreign 
corporations. That case does little to support the 
State's contention that promotion of dom stic business is 
a legitimate state purpose, ~ · 
·~e~ concerned with encouraging non esidents--who are 
ot competitors of residents--to bui warehouses within 
the State. See infra, at • 
)~\ 
16. 
other States from enacting discriminatory or excessive 
taxes--was a legitimate one. 451 u.s., at 668. In 
contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of 
promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama 
by penalizing foreign insurers who also want to do 
business in the State. Alabama has made no attempt, as 
California did, to influence the policies of other States 
in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate: rather, it has erected barriers to 
foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in 
order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete 
at home. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in 
the fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry 
is purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to 
'·. 
17. 
favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what 
the cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do 
business there. Alabama's purpose, contrary to 
California's, constitutes the very sort of parochial 
discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was 
intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by 
Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in Allied 
Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, supra, this Court[ ha"'S alwayS). held 
that ~1 'l?r otectio~ds a State to "discriminate in 
1\~ -
favor of its own residents against the residents of other 
state members of our federation." 358 u.s., at 533. 
Uhlike the retaliatory tax involved in Western & Southern, 
k&WT 
~h only burdens residents of a State that imposes its 
1 
own discriminatory tax on outsiders, the domestic 
~eference tax burdens all foreign corporations seeking to 
,. 
18. 
do business within the State, no matter what they or their 
States do, simply to give the "horne team" an advantage. 
The validity of the view that a State may not 
constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign 
corporations at a higher rate solely because of their 
residence is confirmed by a long line of this Court's 
CBses so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, supra, 393 
u.s., at 119-120: Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, supra, 
337 u.s., at 571: Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, supra, 
272 u.s., at 511: Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 'supra, 216 
u.s., at 417. See Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 
U. S. 2 58 ( 19 6 5) (per cur i am) • As the Court stated in 
Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect to general tax burdens 
on business, "the foreign corporation stands equal, and is 
to be classified with domestic corporations of the same 
19. 
kind." 272 u.s., at 511. In all of these cases, the 
discriminatory tax was imposed by the State on foreign 
corporations doing business within the State solely 
because of their residence, presumably to promote 
<bmestic industry within the State. 7 Our reliance on them 
md our rejection of Lincoln in Western & Southern 
demonstrates the continuing viability of the Equal 
Protection Clause as a means of challenging a statute that 
seeks only to benefit domestic industry within the State 
The State contends that Allied Stores of Ohio v. 
Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always 
7 Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a 
stated purpose advanced by the states in support of their 
taxes in these cases, such promotion is logically the 
primary reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such as 
~ at issue there. 
1\ 
20. 
held true. In that case, a domestic warehouser challenged 
on equal protection grounds an Ohio statute that exempted 
foreign corporations from a tax on the value of 
merchandise warehoused within the State. The Court upheld 
the tax, finding that the purpose of encouraging foreign 
companies to build warehouses within Ohio was a legitimate 
state purpose. The State contends that this case shows 
that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state 
purpose under equal protection analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
~ores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the 
other cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold 
that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state 
purpose. 
4~ 
lfi faet, instead of being concerned with 
1\ 




encourages nonresidents--who are not competitors of 
residents--to build warehouses within the -State. 
Moreover, the discriminatory taxing scheme involved did 
not favor residents 
~
by /\ harming outsiders; rather, it 
~-~~ 
granted the otttslders an exemption that residents did not 
" 
share. Since the foreign and domestic companies involved 
were not competing to provide warehousing or other 
services, granting the ~an exemption did not ~ 
directly ~£":h~ companies subject to the tax. 
A 
On its facts, then, Allied Stores is not inconsistent with 
our holding here that promotion of domestic 
,1/t..J 
wish to do business there, is not a legitimate state 
~ 






The State argues nonetheless that it 
a discriminatory tax scheme such as the one at issue here 
as violative of the Equal Protection Clause . because it c.:r ... 
i:n-~.-....1-d'e--r -+t.,or--+-brcel'l"n~erlf=-iiHt~...,r,..,e.,...se.-hi dM=enn...._.t-s • This 
~ kt? (V\...0 ~~ 
approach, it contends, liMe BO mote than reo at rwc ts( 
~ ..d"~~~~~),, 
(';::tr; ~,"::t~~)~:~:.. ::. ~.,~~ ;:t~ 
com~;~ af'e iAapplicahle to the insurance itlaustry 
by virtl:le of Congress Is ~e:!l!!~e a the_ McCarran-Fer~~ 
.It'\~# ~t!~t .,.;~-~ ~ • .L.I - ...._. 
~~~ II" ~ 
Act, 15 u.s.c. §§1011-1015/ See western & Southern, ~~; 
cU- ~~SUL 
supra, 451 u.s., at 655. Our concerns are ~ more ~~-
,;1.C) 
fundamental than as characterized by the State_, 
1\ 
Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the insurance 
. ~ 
1ndustry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it~ makes fte-
<)UJ./- ~~-~to~~ ~a--,~ 
ab-tiUR~~ d.i-spQRee--wi:tft. the applicability of the Equal 
-'\ 
Protection Clause, a~l • As noted above, our 
.... 
23. 
in Western & Southern expressly reaffirmed the viability 
of equal protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in 
~e insurance context. 8 
~~) 
.!AJrthfir-Htece, the State's view ignores the differences 
"\ 
between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
~~ 
provisions serve. Under the Commerce Claus~, the State's 
interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the burden the 
state law would impose on interstate commerce, iR oyder t~ 
J.--- de eEr rn-±"ne law's OORQtitHtional~y. In the 
8 rn fact, as we noted in Western & South 
legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Ac 
that the Act was Congress's response only 
~utheastern Underwriters~ case, and that Congress 
equal 
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or 
regulate the insurance industry other than what t~ y had 
previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left 
this Court's decisions holding that the Equal Protection 
Clause place~ limits on a State's a .bili ty to tax out-of-
state corporations. See 451 u.s., at 655-656 n. 6 • .,. 
'·' 
24. 
protection context, however, if the State 1 s purpose is 
found to be legitimate, the state law stands as long as 
the burden it imposes is found to be rationally related to 
that purpose, a test that is ~ol--pass. See 
western & Southern, supra, 451 u.s., at 674 (equal 
protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "at least 
debatable" ) • (!!:us , the-.r-e-i-s- Ile- r:e-a s-on-to be-li--e-v-e-th~ 
7 
purpose tha-t is leg--i-t--imate in-e-n-e-GOfl-t.e-x-t-w&ll-±-d- be found 
be leg i t i-ma--t=e---i n-t---h-e-ot 11 e r 3 .-
--Moreover~ dhe two constitutional provisions perform --





State 1 s power--one protects interstate 
the other protects 9 persons from 
Footnote(s) 9 will appear on following pages. 
.. 
' .. ~ ; 
25. 
unconstitutional discrimination by the States. The effect 
of the <Ho~~ftat~'Y statute at issue here is to place a 
insurers who ~o ~ ~~ )}.Qavier tax burden on foreign 
" '\ 
business within the State, thereby also incidentally 
placing a burden on interstate commerce. The Equal 
Protection Clause, however, protects not interstate 
commerce, but the foreign corporation from an 
unconstitutional discrimination. Just because the effect 
of the discrimination in this case is similar to the type 
of burden with which the Commerce Clause would be 
concerned does not mean that the statute is not subject to 
equal protection restraints. We reaffirmed the importance 
9It is well established that a corporation is a "person" 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. ~ 
~stern & Southern, supra, 451 u.s., at 660-661, n.l2 • 
26. 
of the Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in 
Western & Southern and see no reason now for reading it 
out of the Constitution. We must be careful not to 
jeopardize the viability of the equal 
protection challenge here, even though the discrimination 
has an effect of implicating concerns that are 
traditionally the domain of the Commerce Clause, because 
there will be cases in the future in which the Equal 
Protection Clause will be needed to guard against other 
types of unconstitutionally discriminatory treatment of 
nonresidents. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, 
acceptance of its view that promotion of domestic industry 
is always a legitimate state purpose under equal 
protection analysis would eviscerate the Equal Protection 
.• 
• > 
. ' .. 
27. 
Clause in this context. A State's natural inclination 
will always be to prefer domestic business over foreign. 
If we accept the State's view here, then in the future, to 
legitimate the enactment of any discriminatory tax, the 
State need only say that it intended thereby to benefit 
domestic industries: this, however, will be true of any 
discriminatory tax. A discriminatory scheme would stand 
or fall depending on how a State framed its purpose--as 
benefitting one group or as harming another. This is a 
distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected 
just last term 
~ ~O"fA..b ~..- ~ ~ .Hk.. 
in liilaee'A~:tl'! 1 ifi 'holding that 4:lte8t:'ate 1 s 
~rpose of promoting ~omestic 1ndustty by discriminat:ing 
agaiRst RORresideRt business was not legitimate tmd~r the 
Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, supra, 
$«. ~ J IMr..t.· 
[104 s.ct. 3049, 3057] &,he Stat~·~ (t u.s., at 
·.·I 
28. 
analy:!!!i s pays only l 1p se rv 1ce to the e xi:!!ltence o f ttlte 
~aal Protecti on Cl ause as a limi tat ion oa a Sta t e ' s right ) 
A--tO cond iti on ~ f ote1gh corpora t 1on ' s a b ili ty to uo 
.. .b.Js iness witl:lin i ts bo rder s , justifying the -.::: 
distinction between foreign and domestic corporations 
solely on the ground that it promotes domestic industry 
within the State means that any discrimination will pass 
nuster under the first. prong of Western & Southern's test. 
Because almost any purpose--once found to be legitimate--
will satisfy the rational relation prong of the test, see 
451 u.s., at 674, the heart of the equal protection 
limitation on a State's power to discriminatorily tax 
foreign corporations will be eliminated. We refuse to 
permit a constitutional restraint to be so lightly 





circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic industry 
by harming nonresidents is not a legitimate state purpose. 
'!he second purpose found by the ..t..r:i:a-1 court to be 
t\ I\ 
legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in 
the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified 
in the statute. We do not agree that this f3~~ose is 
a.- ~, 
1\ legitimate'\ in tbie "'a~e. 
Our p.r.i.max __ '\L.. .re.aso.o fer ~o -i"lol-ding is tsat ~e 
investment incentive provision of the Alabama statute 
never permits foreign insurance companies to eliminate the 
discriminatory effect of the statute. No matter how much 
of their assets they invest in Alabama investment&7 
_.) 
foreign insurance companies are still required to pay a 
J2J 
higher gross premiums tax than domestic companies. ~, 
~ 




remains, despite the investment incentive 
~ ~··--
the ~ favorable rate of tax regardless of whether they 
invest any of their assets in Alabama . investments • . 1-.......... 
ZJ./<o....L...s 
A~al\ domestic pure 
insurers who do business in the 
incentive provision,Jdoes not 
cure, but reaffirms, the statute's impermissible 
classification based~sidence. 
"' 
~e£&fg~, Uk( hold 
that encouraging investment in Alabama assets and 
~~A-t~ 
securitiesA  legitimate state 
l\ .l&fwe also note that the Court held in Hanover Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s. 494 (1926), that foreign 
Footnote continued on next page. 
31. 
conclude that the 
Alabama domestic preference tax statute violates the Equal 
Protection Clause as applied to appellants. The judgment 
of the Alabama Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is 
remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with 
this opinion. 
companies are entitled to equal tax treatment even if they 
have very little permanent investment in the State. See 
id., at 508-509. Thus, it is possible that encouraging 
Investment in state assets may never be a state purpose 
that will withstand equal protection scrutiny. 
·' 
"' r 
-· ... --- -..._ 
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METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE CO., et al., APPELLANTS, v. 
W.G. WARD, JR., et al. 
APPEAL FROM THE ALABAMA SUPREME COURT 
[November __ , 1984] 
JUSTICE POWELL delivered the opinion of the Court. 
This case presents the question whether Alabama's 
domestic preference . tax statute, Ala. Code §§27-4-4 and 
27-4-5, which taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a 
2. 
higher rate than domestic insurance companies, violates 




the State of Alabama has granted a 
preference to its domestic insurance companies by imposing 
a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than . 
rn out-of-state (foreign) 
2 
companies. Under the current 
1The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax 
statute date back to 1849, when the first tax on premiums 
earned by insurance companies doing business in the state 
was limited to companies not chartered by the state. Act 
No. 1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was 
imposed on and off throughout the years until 1945, when 
the State restored equality in taxation of insurance 
oompanies in response to this Court's decision in United 
9:ates v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 u.s. 533 
( 19 4 4) • Act No . lS 6 [ 19 4 5 ) Ala • Acts 19 6 -19 7 • In 19 55 , 
the tax was reinstated, Act No. 77 [ 1955] Ala. Acts 193 
(2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in 
effect until the present. 
2For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a 
domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated in 
Alabama and has its principal off ice and chief place of 
business within the State. Ala. Code §27-4-1(3). A 
oorporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 





statutory provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay 
a tax on their gross premiums received from business 
conducted in Alabama at a rate of three percent, and 
foreign companies selling other types of insurance pay at 
a rate of four percent. Ala. Code §27-4-4(a}. All 
domestic insurance companies, in contrast, pay at a rate 
of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. 
Id.' 
3 §27-4-5 (a} • As a result, a foreign insurance 
company doing the same type and volume of business in 
Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay three to 
four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its domestic 
3There are two exceptions to these general rules 
concerning the rates of taxation of insurance companies. 
They are that for annuities, the tax rate is one percent 
for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code §27-4-
4(a}, and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the 
rate is three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and 
domestic insurance companies, id., §27-4-6(a}. 
4. 
competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in 
gross premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages 
of their worldwide assets in specified investments in 
Alabama. Id., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or 
more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for 
example, a foreign life insurer may reduce its gross 
premiums tax rate from three to two percent. Similarly, a 
foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax 
rate from four to three percent. Smaller tax reductions 
are available based on investment of smaller percentages 
of a company's assets. Id. Regardless of how much of its 
total assets a foreign company invests in Alabama 





premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable 
domestic companies, which are entitled to the one percent 
tax rate even if they have no investments in the State. 
'lhus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance 
companies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the 
discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax 
statute. 
II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the 
Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that 
the domestic preference tax statute, as applied to them, 
violated the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds 





Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on 
July 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be 
unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make 
the appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies 
intervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, 
selecting 4 cases to be and claims tried lead two as 
binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the court ruled on May 17, 1982, that the 
statute was constitutional. Relying on this Court's 
opinion in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board 
4Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, a New York 
corporation, was chosen to represent the life insurance 
claimants, and Prudential Property and Casualty Company, a 
New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of 





f' •..• ~ 
\ t .•. -l 
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7. 
of Equalization, 451 u.s. 648 (1981), the court ruled that 
the Alabama statute did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in 
addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation 
of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging 
capital investment by foreign insurance companies in the 
Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth in 
the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-2la. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created 
between foreign and domestic companies was rationally 
related to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature 
could reasonably have believed that the classification 
would have promoted those purposes. Id., at 2la. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, 
appellants appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It 
8. 
affirmed the circuit court's findings as to the existence 
of legitimate state purposes, but remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of rational relationship, 
ruling that summary judgment was inappropriate on that 
question because the evidence was in conflict. Appellants 
petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on 
the affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and 
the State and the intervenors petitioned for review of the 
remand order. Appellants then waived their right to an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the statute's 
classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and 
they requested a final determination of the legal issues 
with respect to their equal protection challenge to the 
statute. The supreme court denied certiorari on all 
9. 
claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an 
evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and 
filed a joint motion with the other parties seeking 
rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was 
granted, and judgment was entered for the State and the 
intervenors. This appeal followed, and we noted probable 
jurisdiction. u.s. (1984). We now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. 
Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the 
jurisprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection 
Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat 
checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. 
Read, 325 u.s. 673 (1945), held that so-called "privilege" 
taxes, required to be paid by a foreign corporation before 
10. 
it would be permitted to do business within a state, were 
immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood 
in stark contrast, however, to the Court's prior decisions 
in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 u.s. 400 (1910), and 
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s. 494 (1926), as 
well as to later decisions, in which the Court had 
recognized that the Equal Protection Clause placed limits 
on other forms of discriminatory taxation imposed on out-
of-state corporations solely because of their residence. 
See, e.g., WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 u.s. 117 (1968); 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 u.s. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 u.s. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an 
·' 
11. 
equal protection challenge to a California statute 
imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies 
doing business within the State, when the horne states of 
those companies imposed a similar tax on California 
insurers entering their borders. We concluded that 
Lincoln was no more than "a surprising throwback" to the 
days before enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in 
which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of 
a foreign one had been granted only as a matter of 
privilege by the State in its unfettered discretion. 451 
u.s., at 665. We therefore rejected the longstanding but 
"anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that 
the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits upon a State's 
power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to 
do business within its borders. We held that "[w]e 
~· 
12. 
consider it now established that, whatever the extent of a 
State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from 
doing business within its boundaries, that authority does 
not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on 
domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between 
foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational 
relation to a legitimate state purpose." !d., at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the 
classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes 
sought to be accomplished, the only question before us is 
W:lether those purposes found by the trial 
5 
court are 




The first of the purposes found by the trial court to 
be a legitimate reason for the statute's classification 
between foreign and domestic corporations is that it 
encourages the formation of new domestic insurance 
companies in Alabama. The State contends that this Court 
has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in 
and of itself, is a legitimate state purpose that will 
survive equal protection scrutiny. In so contending, it 
5Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled 
a list of 17 state purposes they contend are served by the 
statute and are legitimate under equal protection 
analysis. See App. 27-33. we decline to review any of 
those except the two found by the circuit court to be 
legitimate, as they are not before us, but remand to that 
court for a determination of whether any of them is 
legitimate and rationally related to the classification 




relies on a series of cases, including Western & Southern, 
that have upheld discriminatory taxes. See Bacchus 
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, __ U.S. __ ( 1984) ; Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 u.s. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of 
Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 
(1943) ; Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U.s. 
495 ( 193 7) ; Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 U.S. 553 
(1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the 
State's contention. In western & Southern, the case 
principally relied upon, we did not hold that promotion of 
domestic industry is always a legitimate state purpose 
tmder equal · protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that 
Gwe find the other cases relied on by the State also to 
~ inapposite to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and 
Footnote continued on next page. 




California's purpose in enacting the retaliatory tax--to 
Parker discussed whether promotion of local industry is a 
valid state purpose under the Commerce Clause. The 
Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is 
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose 
implicates local or national interests. The Equal 
Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned with whether 
a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether 
the discrimination involves local or other interests is 
not central to the inquiry to be made. Thus, the fact 
that promotion of local industry is a legitimate state 
interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about 
its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, 
at • 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's 
chili ty to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even 
mder the Commerce Clause. Thus, in Bacchus, although we 
observed as a general matter that "a State may enact laws 
p..trsuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of promoting domestic industry," __ u.s. ----l 
(1984) ,we held that in so doing, a State may not 
constitutionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the 
business of other States, merely to protect and promote 
local business, id., at • Accord Armco Inc. v. 
Hardesty, __ U.S.- , -rr984). Likewise, in Pike, 
the Court held that the state statute promoting a 
legitimate local interest must "regulate evenhandedly." 
397 u.s. 137, 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to 
the legitimacy of promoting local business at all. 
Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state 
unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education 
deals with the State's ability to regulate matters 
relating to probate. Bowers is the only one of the 
State's cases that involves the validity under the Equal 
Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis 
of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. 
That case does little, however, to support the State's 
Footnote continued on next page. 
16. 
promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by 
deterring other States from enacting discriminatory or 
excessive taxes--was a legitimate one. 451 u.s., at 668. 
In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of 
promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama 
by penalizing foreign insurers who also want to do 
business in the State. Alabama has made no at tempt, as 
California did, to influence the policies of other States 
in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to 
foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in 
order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete 
contention that promotion of domestic 
legitimate state purpose. It was 
encouraging nonresidents--who are not 
residents--to build warehouses within 
infra, at • 
business is a 
concerned with 
competitors of 




The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in 
the fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry 
is purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to 
favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what 
the cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do 
business there. Alabama's purpose, contrary to 
California's, constitutes the very sort of parochial 
discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was 
intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by 
Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in Allied 
Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always 
has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State 
to discriminate in favor of its own residents soley by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our 
18. 
federation." 358 u.s., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory 
tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens 
residents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory 
tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the 
"home team" an advantage by burdening all foreign 
corporations seeking to do business within the State, no 
matter what they or their States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not 
constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign 
corporations at a higher rate solely because of their 
residence is confirmed by a long line of this Court's 
cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 u.s., at 
119-120; Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 u.s., at 
571; Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s., at 511; 
Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 u.s., at 417. See Reserve 
19. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 u.s. 258 (1965) (per curiam). 
As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect 
to general tax burdens on business, "the foreign 
corporation stands equal, and is to be classified with 
domestic corporations of the same kind." 272 u.s., at 
511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax was 
imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing 
business within the State solely because of their 
residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within 
the State. 7 Our reliance on them and our rejection of 
Uncoln in Western & Southern demonstrates the continuing 
viability of the Equal Protection Clause as a means of 
7 Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a 
purpose advanced by the states in support of their taxes 
in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary 
reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such as those at 
issue there. 
20. 
challenging a statute that seeks to benefit domestic 
industry within the State only by burdening foreign 
competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores of Ohio v. 
Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always 
held true. In that case, a domestic merchandiser 
challenged on equal protection grounds an Ohio statute 
that exempted foreign corporations from a tax on the value 
of merchandise held for storage within the State. The 
Court upheld the tax, finding that the purpose of 
encouraging foreign companies to build warehouses within 
Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The State contends 
that this case shows that promotion of domestic industry 




. ' . .. 
21. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
~ores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the 
other cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold 
that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state 
purpose. Rather, instead of being concerned with 
promotion of domestic industry, it involves a statute that 
encourages nonresidents--who are not competitors of 
residents--to build warehouses within the State. 
Moreover, the discriminatory taxing scheme involved did 
not favor residents by burdening outsiders; rather, it 
granted the nonresident businesses an exemption that 
residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 
companies involved were not competing to provide 
warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did 




subject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is 
not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of 
domestic industry within a State, by discriminating 
against foreign corporations that wish to do business 
there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 u.s., 
at 532-533 (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring). 
B 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible 
to view a discriminatory tax ~e such as the one at 
issue here as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. 
This approach, it contends, amounts to no more than ~ 
~ "Commerce Clause rhetoric in equal protection clothing." 
Brief for Appellee Ward, p. 22. The State maintains that 
because Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 
"' 15 u.S. C. §§1011-1015, intended to authorize States to 




impose taxes that burden interstate commerce in the 
insurance field, the tax at issue here must stand. Our 




characterized by the State. Although the McCar ran- ~J..r, 
lfl St:J , .. 
Ferguson Act exempts the insurance industry from Commerce 
Clause restrictions, it does not purport to limit in an~ 
way the applicability of the Equal Protection Clause. As 
noted above, our opinion in Western & Southern expressly 
reaffirmed the viability of equal protection restraints on 
discriminatory taxes in the insurance context. 8 
8 In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the 
legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals 
that the Act was Congress's response only to the South-
Eastern Underwriters case, and that Congress did not 
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or 
regulate the insurance industry other than what they had 
previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left 
undisturbed this Court's decisions holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause places limits on a State's ability to 
tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 u.s., at 655 n. 6. 
24. 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences 
~tween Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 
the consequent different purposes those two constitutional 
provisions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the 
burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce. 
In the equal protection context, however, if the State's 
purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as 
long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally 
related to that purpose, a test that is not difficult to 
pass. See Western & Southern, 451 u.s., at 674 (equal 
protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least 
debatable'" (quoting United States v. Carolene Products 
Co • , 3 0 4 U • S . 14 4 , 15 4 ( 19 3 8) ) • 
. ; l-.r. 
25. 
The two constitutional provisions perform different 
functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a 
State's power--one protects interstate commerce, and the 
other protects 9 persons from unconstitutional 
discrimination by the States. The effect of the statute 
at issue here is to place a discriminatory tax burden on 
foreign insurers who desire to do business within the 
State, thereby also incidentally placing a burden on 
interstate commerce. 
~ 
 because the effect of the 
1\ 
discrimination in this case is similar to the type of 
~ 
burden with which the Commerce Clause would be concerned 
'\ 
does not mean that the statute is not subject to equal 
9It is well established that a corporation is a "person" 
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. ~, 
western & Southern, 451 u.s., at 660 n.l2. 
26. 
protection restraints. We reaffirmed the importance of 
the Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in 
~~~ 
Western & Southern and see no reason now fo~ r-eading it ~ 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, 
acceptance of its~ that promotion of domestic industry 
is always a legitimate state purpose under equal 
protection analysis would eviscerate the Equal Protection 
Clause in this context. A State's natural 
. . ~q~~-
lnCllnatloH. 1  
~2~s~be to prefer domestic business over foreign. 
domestic 
~. 
~aus..t:J>i.@-&7 t:hi-8, -Aowever, any ~~ill lee tn:te e£ 
diS'Criminatory taa. 
~ 
A discriminatory e would stand 
,'~ I' • \. ~ 
27. 
or fall depending ~ate framed its purpose.- as r 
beneE..i tt i ng Gne group or as harmiRg anot:fier. This is a 
distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected 
~ last term in an analogous context arising under the 
Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, __ u.s., 
at See n.6 supra. 
restraint to be so lightly 
Consequent! , ~e hold that under the circumstances of this \ 
case, promotion of domestic ~ '\ 1n us~ 
nonresidents is not a legitimate state purpose. 
IV 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be 
legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in 
the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified 




state purpose. The investment incentive provision of 
~~t-~ 
the Alabama statute ~ver permits foreign insurance 
companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the 
statute. No matter how much of their assets they invest 
in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required 
to pay a higher gross premiums tax than domestic 
companies. 10 Moreover, domestic insurers remain 
entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of 
whether they invest in Alabama assets. The State's 
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, 
10
section 27-4-4 (b) of the Alabama Code provides that by 
investing ten percent or more of its total assets in 
Alabama investments, a foreign life insurer may reduce its 
gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, and a 
foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate 
from four to three percent. Domestic insurers of all 
types, on the other hand, are required to pay tax at a 
rate of one percent, regardless of whether they invest in 
the specified Alabama investments. See id., §27-4-5. 
29. 
but reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification 
based solely on residence. We hold that encouraging 
investment in Alabama assets and securities in this 
plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state 
purpose. 11 
v 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to 
appellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion. 
11we note that Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s. 
494, 508-509 (1926), in holding that foreign companies are 
entitled to equal tax treatment even if they have very 
little permanent investment in the State, also casts some 
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This case presents the question whether Alabama's 
domestic preference tax statute, Ala. Code §§27-4-4 and 
27-4-5, which taxes out-of-state insurance companies at a 
{1' ... " ·!:'-lr ! 
0 . ' 
2. 
higher rate than domestic insurance companies, violates 
the Equal Protection Clause. 
I 
Since 1955, 1 the State of Alabama has granted a 
preference to its domestic insurance companies by imposing 
a substantially lower gross premiums tax rate on them than 
m out-of-state (foreign) 
2 
companies. Under the current 
statutory provisions, foreign life insurance companies pay 
a tax on their gross premiums received from business 
conducted in Alabama at a rate of three percent, and 
foreign companies selling other types of insurance pay at 
a rate of four percent. Ala. Code §27-4-4(a). All 
domestic insurance companies, in contrast, pay at a rate 
of only one percent on all types of insurance premiums. 






company doing the same type a.nd volume of business in 
Alabama as a domestic company generally will pay three to 
four times as much in gross premiums taxes as its domestic 
competitor. 
Alabama's domestic preference tax statute does provide 
that foreign companies may reduce the differential in 
gross premiums taxes by investing prescribed percentages 
of their worldwide assets in specified investments in 
Alabama. !d., §27-4-4(b). By investing ten percent or 
more of its total assets in Alabama investments, for 
example, a foreign life insurer may reduce its gross 
premiums tax rate from three to two percent. Similarly, a 
foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its tax 
rate from four to three percent. Smaller tax reductions 
are available based on investment of smaller percentages 




of a company's assets. Id. Regardless of how much of its 
total assets a foreign company invests in Alabama 
investments, however, it can never reduce its gross 
premiums tax rate to the same level paid by comparable 
domestic companies, which are entitled to the one percent 
tax rate even if they have no investments in the State. 
Thus, the investment provision permits foreign insurance 
companies to reduce, but never to eliminate, the 
discrimination inherent in the domestic preference tax 
statute. 
II 
Appellants, a group of insurance companies incorporated 
outside of the State of Alabama, filed claims with the 
Alabama Department of Insurance in 1981, contending that 





violated the Equal Protection Clause. They sought refunds 
of taxes paid for the tax years 1977 through 1980. The 
Commissioner of Insurance denied all of their claims on 
.l..Ily 8, 1981. 
Appellants appealed to the Circuit Court for Montgomery 
County, seeking a judgment declaring the statute to be 
unconstitutional and requiring the Commissioner to make 
the appropriate refunds. Several domestic companies 
mtervened, and the court consolidated all of the appeals, 
selecting two claims as lead 
4 
cases to be tried and 
binding on all claimants. On cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the court ruled on May 17, 1982, that the 
statute was constitutional. Relying on this Court's 
opinion in Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board 
of Equalization, 451 u.s. 648 (1981), the court ruled that 
6. 
the Alabama statute did not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause because it served "at least two purposes, in 
addition to raising revenue: (1) encouraging the formation 
of new insurance companies in Alabama, and (2) encouraging 
capital investment by foreign insurance companies in the 
Alabama assets and governmental securities set forth in 
the statute." App. to Juris. Statement 20a-2la. The 
court also found that the distinction the statute created 
between foreign and domestic companies was rationally 
related to those purposes and that the Alabama legislature 
could reasonably have believed that the classification 
would have promoted those purposes. Id., at 2la. 
After their motion for a new trial was denied, 
appellants appealed to the Court of Civil Appeals. It 





of legitimate state purposes, but remanded for an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of rational relationship, 
ruling that summary judgment was inappropriate on that 
question because the evidence was in conflict. Appellants 
petitioned the Supreme Court of Alabama for certiorari on 
ilie affirmance of the legitimate state purpose issue, and 
the State and the intervenors petitioned for review of the 
remand order. Appellants then waived their right to an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the statute's 
classification bore a rational relationship to the two 
purposes found by the circuit court to be legitimate, and 
they requested a final determination of the legal issues 
with respect to their equal protection challenge to the 
statute. The supreme court denied certiorari on all 
claims. Appellants again waived their rights to an 
8. 
evidentiary hearing on the rational relationship issue and 
filed a joint motion with the other parties seeking 
rehearing and entry of a final judgment. The motion was 
granted, and judgment was entered for the State and the 
intervenors. This appeal followed, and we noted probable 
jurisdiction. u.s. (1984). We now reverse. 
III 
Prior to our decision in Western & Southern Life Ins. 
Co. v. State Board of Equalization, supra, the 
jurisprudence of the applicability of the Equal Protection 
Clause to discriminatory tax statutes had a somewhat 
checkered history. Lincoln National Life Ins. Co. v. 
Read, 325 u.s. 673 (1945), held that so-called "privilege" 
taxes, required to be paid by a foreign corporation before 
it would be permitted to do business within a state, were 
··, 
9. 
immune from equal protection challenge. That case stood 
in stark contrast, however, to the Court's prior decisions 
:in Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 u.s. 400 (1910), and 
Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s. 494 (1926), as 
well as to later decisions, in which the Court had 
recognized that the Equal Protection Clause placed limits 
on other forms of discriminatory taxation imposed on out-
of-state corporations solely because of their residence. 
See, ~ WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 u.s. 117 (1968); 
Allied Stores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, 358 u.s. 522 
(1959); Wheeling Steel Corp. v • . Glander, 337 u.s. 562 
(1949). 
In Western & Southern, supra, we reviewed all of these 
cases for the purpose of deciding whether to permit an 
equal protection challenge to a California statute 
; . 
.... , ...... .... 
10. 
imposing a retaliatory tax on foreign insurance companies 
doing business within the State, when the home states of 
those companies imposed a similar tax on California 
insurers entering their borders. We concluded that 
Uncoln was no more than "a surprising throwback" to the 
days before enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment and in 
which incorporation of a domestic corporation or entry of 
a foreign one had been granted only as a matter of 
privilege by the State in its unfettered discretion. 451 
u.s., at 665. We therefore rejected the longstanding but 
"anachronis[tic]" rule of Lincoln and explicitly held that 
the Equal Protection Clause imposes limits upon a State's 
power to condition the right of a foreign corporation to 
do business within its borders. we held that "[w]e 
consider it now established that, whatever the extent of a 
11. 
State's authority to exclude foreign corporations from 
doing business within its boundaries, that authority does 
not justify imposition of more onerous taxes or other 
burdens on foreign corporations than those imposed on 
domestic corporations, unless the discrimination between 
foreign and domestic corporations bears a rational 
relation to a legitimate state purpose." ~ at 667-668. 
Because appellants waived their right to an 
evidentiary hearing on the issue of whether the 
classification in the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute bears a rational relation to the two purposes 
sought to be accomplished, the only question before us is 
\\hether those purposes found 
legitimate. 
A 
by the trial 5 court are 
12. 
The first of the purposes found by the trial court to 
be a legitimate reason for the statute's classification 
between foreign and domestic corporations is that it 
encourages the formation of new domestic insurance 
companies in Alabama. The State contends that this Court 
has long held that the promotion of domestic industry, in 
and of itself, is a legitimate state purpose that will 
survive equal protection scrutiny. In so contending, it 
relies on a series of cases, including Western & Southern, 
that have upheld discriminatory taxes. See Bacchus 
Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, u.s. (1984); Pike v. Bruce 
Church, Inc., 397 u.s. 137 (1970); Allied Stores, Inc. of 
Ohio v. Bowers, supra; Parker v. Brown, 317 u.s. 341 
(1943); Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 u.s . 





495 (1937): Board of Education v. Illinois, 203 u.s. 553 
(1906). 
The cases cited lend little or no support to the 
State's contention. In Western & Southern, the case 
principally relied upon, we did not hold that promotion of 
domestic industry is always a legitimate state purpose 
mder equal protection analysis. 6 Rather, we held that 
California's purpose in enacting the retaliatory tax--to 
promote the interstate business of domestic insurers by 
deterring other States from enacting discriminatory or 
excessive taxes--was a legitimate one. 451 u.s., at 668. 
In contrast, Alabama asks us to approve its purpose of 
promoting the business of its domestic insurers in Alabama 
by penalizing foreign insurers who also want to do 
business in the State. Alabama has made no at tempt, as 
... 
14. 
California did, to influence the policies of other States 
in order to enhance its domestic companies' ability to 
operate interstate; rather, it has erected barriers to 
foreign companies who wish to do interstate business in 
order to improve its domestic insurers' ability to compete 
at horne. 
The crucial distinction between the two cases lies in 
the fact that Alabama's aim to promote domestic industry 
is purely and completely discriminatory, designed only to 
favor domestic industry within the State, no matter what 
the cost to foreign corporations also seeking to do 
business there. Alabama's purpose, contrary to 
California's, constitutes the very sort of parochial 
discrimination that the Equal Protection Clause was 
intended to prevent. As JUSTICE BRENNAN, joined by 
• ,t,. . . 
15. 
Justice Harlan, observed in his concurrence in Allied 
~ores, Inc. of Ohio v. Bowers, supra, this Court always 
has held that the Equal Protection Clause forbids a State 
to discriminate in favor of its own residents soley by 
burdening "the residents of other state members of our 
federation." 358 u.s., at 533. Unlike the retaliatory 
tax involved in Western & Southern, which only burdens 
residents of a State that imposes its own discriminatory 
tax on outsiders, the domestic preference tax gives the 
"home team" an advantage by burdening all foreign 
corporations seeking to do business within the State, no 
matter what they or their States do. 
The validity of the view that a State may not 
constitutionally favor its own residents by taxing foreign 
corporations at a higher rate solely because of their 
16. 
residence is confirmed by a long line of this Court's 
cases so holding. WHYY, Inc. v. Glassboro, 393 u.s., at 
119-120: Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 u.s., at 
571: Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s., at 511: 
Southern R. Co. v. Greene, 216 u.s., at 417. See Reserve 
Life Ins. Co. v. Bowers, 380 u.S. 258 (1965) (per curiam) • 
As the Court stated in Hanover Fire Ins. Co., with respect 
to general tax burdens on business, 11 the foreign 
corporation stands equal, and is to be classified with 
domestic corporations of the same kind. 11 272 u.s., at 
511. In all of these cases, the discriminatory tax was 
imposed by the State on foreign corporations doing 
business within the State solely because of their 
residence, presumably to promote domestic industry within 





Lincoln in Western & Southern demonstrates the continuing 
viability of the Equal Protection Clause as a means of 
challenging a statute that seeks to benefit domestic 
industry within the State only by burdening foreign 
competitors. 
The State contends that Allied Stores of Ohio v. 
Bowers, supra, shows that this principle has not always 
held true. In that case, a domestic merchandiser 
challenged on equal protection grounds an Ohio statute 
that exempted foreign corporations from a tax on the value 
of merchandise held for storage within the State. The 
Court upheld the tax, finding that the purpose of 
encouraging foreign companies to build warehouses within 
Ohio was a legitimate state purpose. The State contends 
that this case shows that promotion of domestic industry 
18. 
is a legitimate state purpose under equal protection 
analysis. 
We disagree with the State's interpretation of Allied 
~ores and find that the case is not inconsistent with the 
other cases on which we rely. Allied Stores does not hold 
that promotion of domestic industry is a legitimate state 
purpose. Rather, instead of being concerned with 
promotion of domestic industry, it involves a statute that 
encourages nonresidents--who are not competitors of 
residents--to build warehouses within the State. 
Moreover, the discriminatory taxing scheme involved did 
not favor residents by burdening outsiders: rather, it 
granted the nonresident businesses an exemption that 
residents did not share. Since the foreign and domestic 





warehousing services, granting the former an exemption did 
not directly affect adversely the domestic companies 
rubject to the tax. On its facts, then, Allied Stores is 
not inconsistent with our holding here that promotion of 
domestic industry within a State, by discriminating 
against foreign corporations that wish to do business 
there, is not a legitimate state purpose. See 358 u.s., 
at 532-533 (JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring). 
B 
The State argues nonetheless that it is impermissible 
to view a discriminatory tax such as the one at issue here 
as violative of the Equal Protection Clause. This 
approach, it contends, amounts to no more than "Commerce 
Clause rhetoric in equal protection clothing." Brief for 
Appellee Ward, p. 22 . The State maintains that because 
20. 
Congress, in enacting the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 u.s.c. 
§§1011-1015, intended to authorize States to impose taxes 
that burden interstate commerce in the insurance field, 
the tax at issue here must stand. Our concerns are much 
more fundamental than as characterized by the State. 
Although the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts the insurance 
industry from Commerce Clause restrictions, it does not 
purport to limit in any way the applicability of the Equal 
Protection Clause. As noted above, our opinion in Western 
& Southern expressly reaffirmed the viability of equal 
protection restraints on discriminatory taxes in the 
insurance context. 8 
Moreover, the State's view ignores the differences 
between Commerce Clause and equal protection analysis and 






provisions serve. Under Commerce Clause analysis, the 
State's interest, if legitimate, is weighed against the 
burden the state law would impose on interstate commerce. 
In the equal protection context, however, if the State's 
purpose is found to be legitimate, the state law stands as 
long as the burden it imposes is found to be rationally 
related to that purpose, a test that is not difficult to 
pass. See Western & Southern, 451 u.s., at 674 (equal 
protection challenge may not prevail so long as the 
question of rational relationship is "'at least 
debatable'" (quoting United States v. Carolene Products 
Co • , 3 0 4 u . s . 14 4 , 15 4 ( 19 3 8 ) ) • 
The two constitutional provisions perform different 
functions in the analysis of the permissible scope of a 
State's power--one protects interstate commerce, and the 
other protects 9 persons 
22. 
from unconstitutional 
discrimination by the States. The effect of the statute 
at issue here is to place a discriminatory tax burden on 
foreign insurers who desire to do business within the 
State, thereby also incidentally placing a burden on 
interstate commerce. Simply because the effect of the 
discrimination in this case is similar to the type of 
burden with which the Commerce Clause also would be 
concerned does not mean that the statute is not subject to 
equal protection restraints. we reaffirmed the importance 
of the Equal Protection Clause in the insurance context in 
Western & Southern and see no · reason now for reassessing 
that view. 
In whatever light the State's position is cast, 
acceptance of its contention that promotion of domestic 
~ ,' 
' ~· \ . 
23. 
industry is always a legitimate state purpose under equal 
protection analysis would eviscerate the Equal Protection 
Clause in this context. A State 1 s natural inclination 
frequently would be · to prefer domestic business over 
foreign. If we accept the State 1 s view here, then any 
discriminatory tax would be valid if the State could show 
it reasonably was intended to benefit domestic business. 
A discriminatory tax would stand or fall depending 
primarily on how a State framed its purpose. This is a 
distinction without a difference, and one that we rejected 
last term in an analogous context arising under the 
Commerce Clause. Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, u.s. ' 
at See n.6 supra. we hold that under the 
circumstances of this case, promotion of domestic business 
24. 
by discriminating against nonresidents is not a legitimate 
state purpose. 
IV 
The second purpose found by the courts below to be 
legitimate was the encouragement of capital investment in 
the Alabama assets and governmental securities specified 
in the statute. We do not agree that this is a legitimate 
state purpose. The investment incentive provision of the 
Alabama statute does not enable foreign insurance 
companies to eliminate the discriminatory effect of the 
statute. No matter how much of their assets they invest 
in Alabama, foreign insurance companies are still required 
to pay a higher gross premiums tax than domestic 
companies. 10 Moreover, domestic insurers remain 
entitled to the more favorable rate of tax regardless of 
?{~ .... , ... 
25. 
whether they invest in Alabama assets. The State's 
investment incentive provision therefore does not cure, 
but reaffirms, the statute's impermissible classification 
based solely on residence. We hold that encouraging 
investment in Alabama assets and securities in this 
plainly discriminatory manner serves no legitimate state 
:p.lrpose. 11 
v 
We conclude that the Alabama domestic preference tax 
statute violates the Equal Protection Clause as applied to 
appellants. The judgment of the Alabama Supreme Court is 
reversed, and the case is remanded for further proceedings 
not inconsistent with this opinion • 
... 
No. ~ 3 - l ~ 7 t.f - f 
3 ~I 'J-74--G 
1The origins of Alabama's domestic preference tax statute 
date back to 1849, when the first tax on premiums earned 
cy insurance companies doing business in the state was 
limited to companies not chartered by the state. Act No. 
1 [1849] Ala. Acts 5. A domestic preference tax was 
imposed on and off throughout the years until 1945, when 
the State restored equality in taxation of insurance 
mmpanies in response to this Court's decision in United 
S:ates v. South-Eastern Underwriters Assn., 322 u.s. 533 
( 1944) • Act No. 156 [ 1945] Ala. Acts 196-197. In 1955, 
the tax was reinstated, Act No. 77 [ 1955] Ala. Acts 193 
(2d Sp. Sess.), and with minor amendments, has remained in 
effect until the present. 
2For domestic preference tax purposes, Alabama defines a 
domestic insurer as a company that both is incorporated . in 
Alabama and has its principal office and chief place of 
business within the State. Ala. Code §27-4-1(3). A 
corporation that does not meet both of these criteria is 
rnaracterized as a foreign insurer. !d., §27-4-1(2). 
3There are two exceptions to these general rules 
concerning the rates of taxation of insurance companies. 
They are that for annuities, the tax rate is one percent 
for both foreign and domestic insurers, Ala. Code §27-4-
4(a), and for wet marine and transportation insurance, the 
rate is three-quarters of one percent for both foreign and 
domestic insurance companies, id., §27-4-G(a). 
'\ietropoli tan Life Insurance Company, a New York 
corporation, was chosen to represent the life insurance 
claimants, and Prudential Property and Casualty Company, a 
New Jersey corporation, was chosen as representative of 
the non-life claimants. See App. 314-315. 
5Altogether, the State and the intervenors have compiled 
a list of 17 state purposes they contend are served by the 
statute and are legitimate under equal protection 
analysis. See App. 27-33. We decline to review any of 
those except the two found by the circuit court to be 
legitimate, as they are not before us, but remand to that 
' ·· 
·' 
court for a determination of whether any of them is 
legitimate and rationally related to the classification 
~t forth in the statute. 
Gwe find the other cases relied on by the State also to 
~ inapposite to this inquiry. Bacchus Imports, Pike, and 
~rker discussed whether promotion of local industry is a 
valid state purpose under the Commerce Clause. The 
Commerce Clause, unlike the Equal Protection Clause, is 
integrally concerned with whether a state purpose 
implicates local or national interests. The Equal 
Protection Clause, in contrast, is concerned with whether 
a State purpose is impermissibly discriminatory; whether 
the discrimination involves local or other interests is 
not central to the inquiry to be made. Thus, the fact 
that promotion of local industry is a legitimate state 
interest in the Commerce Clause context says nothing about 
its validity under equal protection analysis. See infra, 
at • 
Moreover, neither Bacchus nor Pike ruled that a State's 
ability to promote domestic industry was unlimited, even 
mder the Commerce Clause. Thus, in Bacchus, although we 
observed as a general matter that "a State may enact laws 
pursuant to its police powers that have the purpose and 
effect of promoting domestic industry," __ U.S. ---.J 
(1984) ~w~ held that in so doing, a State may not 
consti tstionally impose a discriminatory burden upon the 
business of other States, merely to protect and promote 
local business, id., at • Accord Armco Inc. v. 
Hardesty, __ U.S.~ "(1984). Likewise, in Pike, 
the Court held that the state statute promoting a 
legitimate local interest must "regulate evenhandedly." 
397 u.s. 137' 142 (1970). 
Other cases cited by the State are simply irrelevant to 
the legitimacy of promoting local business at all. 
Carmichael relates primarily to the validity of a state 
unemployment compensation scheme, and Board of Education 
deals with the State's ability to regulate matters 
relating to probate. Bowers is the only one of the 
State's cases that involves the validity under the Equal 
Protection Clause of a tax that discriminates on the basis 
of residence of domestic versus foreign corporations. 
That case does little, however, to support the State's 
contention that promotion of domestic business is a 
legitimate state purpose. 
encouraging nonresidents--who 
residents--to build warehouses 
infra, at • 
It was concerned with 
are not competitors of 
within the State. See 
7 Although the promotion of domestic industry was not a 
purpose advanced by the states in support of their taxes 
in these cases, such promotion is logically the primary 
reason for enacting discriminatory taxes such as those at 
issue there. 
8In fact, as we noted in Western & Southern, the 
legislative history of the McCarran-Ferguson Act reveals 
that the Act was Congress • s response only to the South-
Eastern Underwriters case, and that Congress did not 
intend thereby to give the States any power to tax or 
regulate the insurance industry other than what they had 
previously possessed. Thus Congress expressly left 
undisturbed this Court's decisions holding that the Equal 
Protection Clause places limits on a State's ability to 
tax out-of-state corporations. See 451 u.s., at 655 n. 6. 
9It is well established that a corporation is a "person" 
within the meaning of the Fourteenthh_ Amendment. ~, 
Western & Southern, 451 u.s., at 660 n.~2. 
10section 27-4-4(b) of the Alabama Code provides that by 
investing ten percent or more of its total assets in 
Alabama investments, a foreign life insurer may reduce its 
gross premiums tax rate from three to two percent, and a 
foreign property and casualty insurer may reduce its rate 
from four to three percent. Domestic insurers of all 
types, on the other hand, are required to pay tax at a 
rate of one percent, regardless of whether they invest in 
the specified Alabama investments. See id., §27-4-5. 
llwe note that Hanover Fire Ins. Co. v. Harding, 272 u.s. 
494, 508-509 (1926), in holding that foreign companies are 
entitled to equal tax treatment even if they have very 






doubt on the legitimacy of Alabama's investment incentive 
provision . 
